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ABSTRACT
Postmodern American Sociology: A Response 
to the Aesthetic Challenge
by
Jongryul Choi
Dr. David R. Dickens, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Sociology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Over the past two decades, American sociologists have debated about the postmodern 
and what we might call “postmodern American sociology' began to emerge at the turn of 
this century. This dissertation examines the nature o f the postmodern in general, and 
postmodern American sociology in particular, in terms o f three models of knowledge; 
science, morality, and aesthetics.
This dissertation pays close attention to the fact that science, morality, and aesthetics 
began to be differentiated from religion in the modem era, which posited two problems: 
the problem of legitimacy o f knowledge and the problem o f figuring out the relationship 
among science, morality, and aesthetics. It sees the modem as a specific way to address 
these two problems. About the first problem, the modem derived legitimacy 
of knowledge from the idea o f progress: progress in science and technology will lead to 
the improvement in material well-being as well as the moral perfection o f individuals and 
societies. About the second problem, the modem presented two positions. The
III
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Enlightenment tried to reintegrate science, morality, and aesthetics into society according 
to scientific laws while the Counter-Enlightenment did so according to moral laws. In this 
sense, the modem is defined as the scientization and moralization of ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics, which proceeded from the 17th century to the early 
1960s in Western societies.
This dissertation also observes how the process of dedifferentiation, a process of 
social entropy leading to the collapse o f boundaries, is changing the two issues associated 
with the modem. It is increasingly difficult to derive legitimacy of each knowledge from 
the idea o f progress because science and morality become contested arenas mainly by the 
implosive impact of electronically-mediated culture industry on ontology, epistemology, 
and ethics/politics. The process o f dedifferentiation also makes the problem of 
integration of science, morality, and aesthetics into society outdated by refiguring them in 
terms o f the state of incommensurability. In this sense, the postmodem is defined as the 
aestheticization of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which has proceeded from 
the early 1960s on in advanced Westem societies.
This dissertation examines the nature of postmodem American sociology by situating 
it within this general relationship between the modem and the postmodem. It 
investigates how sociology has been based on the modem, excluding the aesthetic, how 
the postmodem as the aesthetic challenge is threatening the modem discipline o f 
sociology, and how some American sociologists, especially critical and interactionist 
sociologists, form postmodem American sociology in the course o f responding to the 
aesthetic challenge. Finally, this dissertation proposes that postmodem American 
sociology needs multi- or trans-disciplinary approaches for addressing the postmodem.
IV
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the core o f which is the synthesis of poststructuralist linguistics and post-Marxist political 
economy.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, American sociologists have debated about the postmodern. 
As a result, what we might call “postmodern American sociology” began to emerge at the 
turn o f  the century. This dissertation aims to understand the nature o f the postmodern in 
general, and postmodern American sociology in particular, in terms o f three models of 
knowledge: science, morality, and aesthetics.
These three models o f knowledge stemmed from the long history of Westem 
philosophy, according to which there are three discrete categories of knowledge based on 
three discrete human faculties: theoretical knowledge based on cognitive faculty 
(thinking or knowing), practical knowledge based on moral faculty (doing), and aesthetic 
knowledge based on aesthetic faculty (feeling). But these three models o f knowledge 
were eclipsed by religious “faith” during the medieval age, but the situation 
fundamentally changed when science, morality, and aesthetics began to be differentiated 
from religion in the modem era. Losing religious foundation, each of them confronted 
the problem of legitimacy of knowledge, and another problem of figuring out the 
relationship among science, morality, and aesthetics emerged. The modem tried to solve 
these two problems. About the first problem, the modem derived legitimacy of 
knowledge from the idea o f progress. About the second problem, the modem presented 
two positions. The Enlightenment tried to reintegrate science, morality, and aesthetics
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into society according to scientific laws while the Counter-Enlightenment did so 
according to moral laws. The postmodern is challenging the modem by embracing 
aesthetics as the axial principle to (dis)organize humanity and society.
I believe that the nature o f postmodem American sociology would be better 
understood by situating it within this general scheme about the modem and the 
postmodem. The postmodem as the aesthetic challenge to the modem calls modem 
American sociology into question because its fundamental assumptions about ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics were based on the modem. Postmodem American 
sociology has emerged in the course o f responding to this challenge. One o f the main 
merits o f my approach is that it might help us see postmodem American sociology not as 
a intellectual fad of the 1980s, but as a sociological response to the emerging 
aestheticized world in which the traditional ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics 
modem American sociology has embraced do not work well as before. In this sense, 
postmodern American sociology is a durable project to investigate a new world in which 
aesthetics is the axial principle to (dis)organize man and society.
1 think it will be helpful to the reader to know from the outset the general outlines of 
the dissertation. Thus, 1 will briefly describe the postmodem in general and postmodem 
American sociology in particular in terms of the dynamic relationship between science, 
morality, and aesthetics. 1 believe that this might be one way to grasp the nature o f the 
postmodem in general and postmodem American sociology in particular.
In the modem era, science, morality, and aesthetics (art) were considered to be 
separate disciplines. For this separation, Kant’s trilogy. Critique o f  Pure Reason, 
Critique o f  Practical Reason, and Critique ofJudgment, played a decisive role. Kant
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grounded science, morality, and aesthetics on their own foundation. The a priori 
principle of the faculty of cognition could provide a basis for theoretical judgment being 
universally valid and binding; the a priori principle of the faculty of doing could provide 
a basis for moral judgment being universally valid and binding; and the a priori principle 
o f the faculty of feeling could provide a basis for aesthetic judgment being universally 
valid and binding. In the early modem era, this Kantian division played a crucial role in 
justifying science, morality, and aesthetics as mutually exclusive autonomous disciplines. 
Accordingly, science is concemed with tme and false, morality/ethics is concemed with 
good and bad, and aesthetics is concemed with beautiful and sublime.
This Kantian division sounded reasonable to modem thinkers because it was 
connected with the substantial process of differentiation of modem society, in which new 
institutions of science, morality, and aesthetics were relieved from the control o f the 
traditional institution o f religion and specialized relative to one another in terms of their 
respective functions. But this process also provoked the problem of integration: if each 
institution has its own specific foundation as well as function, what would be the proper 
interrelationship among science, morality, and ethics?
Modem thinkers presented different answers to this question. For the Enlightenment 
thinkers who tried to apply Newtonian science to society in order to organize it according 
to universal scientific laws, differentiation itself would solve the problem of integration 
because it meant specialization o f functions as well as integration (mutual independence 
o f the structurally differentiated parts and coordination of their functions). In this sense, 
specialization o f function entails integration. Thus, science, morality, and aesthetics are 
considered to be subsystems equipped with their own specialized functions, which are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
integrated into the whole society. But the Enlightenment thinkers observed that this 
optimism did not always come true in the real world. They needed a new encompassing 
foundation, like God, to reintegrate differentiated parts into the whole society. The idea 
of progress replaced the medieval God: progress in science and technology will lead to 
the improvement in material well-being as well as the moral perfection of individuals and 
societies (see Bury 1920; Wright 1997). The main concern is how to organize 
individuals and societies according to universal scientific laws. In this sense, the 
Enlightenment thinkers believed that science should be the axial principle to functionally 
“reintegrate” specialized parts so as to form a highly organic society. The ideal of the 
Enlightenment is the “scientific” organization o f humanity and society.
For the Counter-Enlightenment thinkers who objected to the application of the 
Newtonian science to human society and tried to complement the extremity of the 
Enlightenment by recovering morality o f the ancient Greeks and the Renaissance 
humanism, differentiation meant specialization o f functions as well as fragmentation, 
alienation, and dehumanization. The Counter-Enlightenment thinkers claimed that 
although progress in science and technology would bring about the improvement in 
material well-being o f individuals and societies, it could not automatically lead to the 
moral perfection o f individuals and societies. Science could not solve the problem of 
integration. Rather, it was incorporated into the economy or the system and turned into 
domination (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). The Counter-Enlightenment thinkers 
criticized the modem ideal of autonomy of science, morality, and aesthetics was false, 
because each of them was under control of its objective experts and specialists detached 
from the public. In this sense, science failed to reintegrate science, morality, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
aesthetics into society. Nevertheless, they basically believed in the idea o f progress.
What is needed is to re-ground science, morality, and aesthetics on the principles of 
morality (see Habermas 1995). According to them, one of the main features of modem 
morality is the separation of “ought” from “is,” which opened both the possibility and the 
burden o f autonomy of the human subject. They believed that human beings should be a 
law unto themselves and represent this law for themselves. In this sense, the basic 
project o f the Counter-Enlightenment is the “moral” organization o f humanity and 
society.
Even though the Enlightetunent and the Coimter-Enlightenment thinkers had different 
opinions about differentiation, they shared the same belief that society is one entity into 
which science, morality, and aesthetics should be reintegrated. The difference between 
them lied in the issue of which principle should play the main role o f reintegrating them 
into society. Science is the main principle for the Enlightenment while morality is the 
counterpart for the Counter-Enlightenment. In this sense, both the Enlightenment and the 
Counter-Enlightenment shared a nostalgia for the past when religion incorporated all 
institutions so as to not allow differentiation.
Some Anti-Enlightenment thinkers such as Sade and Nietzsche resisted this view, 
arguing that there is no entity called society. For them, differentiation referred to the 
state o f incommensurability in which absolute differences stand without effacing their 
heterogeneity. They recognized the historical inevitability of separating science, 
morality, and aesthetics from religion but did not believe that these should be reintegrated 
into society.
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The Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment perspectives were two intellectual 
pillars o f the modem. By contrast, the Anti-Enlightenment viewpoint was virtually 
ignored in the modem. But in the course of the second half o f the 20th century, the 
modem project as scientization and moralization began to be challenged by the new 
aesthetics associated with poststmcturalism, which shifts the main subject from the 
beautiful to the sublime (see Carroll 1987). Embracing the anti-Enlightenment tradition, 
the new aesthetics fundamentally challenges the modem project o f autonomy of science, 
ethics, and aesthetics, arguing that they all relied on their own foundations or absolute 
grounds, which are in fact arbitrary. It argues that science, morality, and aesthetics in the 
modem era were all discourses (rational orders of concepts), within which unspeakable 
others (the sublime) were repressed or marginalized. The new aesthetics emphasizes that 
these unrepresentable others were necessarily at work within and against discourses, 
disrupting the mles of representation. As a result, the new aesthetics blurs the boundaries 
between the representer and the represented, or the signifier and the signified: they are 
not two separated entities in which one represents the other. In this way, the new 
aesthetics fundamentally challenges foundational science, morality, and aesthetics, 
revealing their dependence on the unspeakable others. All discourses are always 
implicated in power and there are no foundations. Modem science as a discourse 
depended on nonscientific others such as narrative, rhetoric, myth, religion, subjectivity, 
etc. Modem morality as a discourse depended on the unspeakable others such as desire, 
sexuality, body, women, etc. And modem aesthetics as a discourse depended on 
unrepresentable others such as the sublime, the real, etc. The autonomy o f science.
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morality, and aesthetics is imploded from within, which in turn resulted in the blur o f the 
traditional rigid boundaries between them.
The most salient feature of the new aesthetics associated with the sublime is its 
defiance of order. This defiance resonated among the so-called postmodern social 
thinkers when it was situated within a substantive process o f dedifferentiation, a process 
o f social entropy leading to the collapse o f boundaries (see Lash 1990; Crook, Pakluski 
and Waters 1992). For this process of dedifferentiation, the change in system o f culture 
is decisive. In differentiation, culture used to be seen as discrete and isolated values, 
beliefs, attitudes, etc., whose meanings are firmly located within the institutional fabrics 
o f society. Culture also used to be thought to perform integrative functions for the social 
system. But in dedifferentiation, culture becomes an aesthetic field of signs whose 
meaning is in a state o f infinite regress by way o f a continual deferral to other signs. 
Meaning is not located within the social any more; it is scattered in an indefinite 
signifying chain. Electronically-mediated mass media play a crucial role in this changing 
conception of culture. Electronically-mediated culture industry bombards the mass with 
images and signs whose meanings are neutralized or “imploded.” As a result, any stable 
structure of meaning is virtually impossible. Modem autonomy of science, morality, and 
aesthetics used to presuppose their own foundations on which each discipline was 
grounded. What is at issue is that science, morality, and aesthetics have become more 
and more aestheticized due to the trend o f new aesthetics increasingly permeating and 
dismantling their foundations. Everything has become at length cultural because 
everything is mediated by culture saturated with images and signs in the society o f the 
spectacle, the image, or the simulacrum. As a result, the distinction between the real and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8the imaginary disappears, which gives rise to a depthless aestheticized hallucination of 
reality (Baudrillard 1983). In this new reality, no stable meaning is possible due to the 
ceaseless permutation of signifiers, which neutralizes meaning. Due to the permeation of 
the sublime into science, morality, and aesthetics, they could not help but accept that 
truth, justice, and beauty become contested arenas.
Postmodern social thinkers have different attitudes toward dedifferentiation. 
Poststructuralist postmodern social theorists, who adopt aesthetics as the axial principle 
o f society, see dedifferentiation in purely cultural terms (for instance, see Baudrillard 
1983,1990, 1994). According to them, it is senseless to discern what is not cultural from 
what is cultural in a dedifferentiated world. By contrast, critical postmodern social 
theorists who adopt morality as the axial principle of society try to locate the process of 
dedifferentiation within the restless transformative activity of capital acciunulation (for 
instance, see Harvey 1989). The attempt here is to produce marketable commodities by 
brutal aesthetics of squalor and shock. In spite of this difference, both postmodern social 
theory camps share the belief that the modem as the scientization and moralization of 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics is being challenged by the postmodem as the 
aestheticization of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. Both camps argue that 
dedifferentiation neither entail integration nor alienation. Rather, they pay attention to 
how dedifferentiation is liquidating the binary opposition of integration and alienation, 
and how it is producing the aesthetic condition in which the subject becomes like the 
“schizophrenic” who is unable to link signifiers together in a temporal order (Jameson 
1984a). To the schizophrenic, the binary opposition of integration and alienation is 
senseless because the schizophrenic experiences signifiers as a series of pure and
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unrelated presents in time (see Lacan 1993). In this sense, the schizophrenic goes beyond 
the social.
American sociology was influenced by the historical change of the relationship 
between science, morality, and aesthetics described above. Inspired by scientific model 
o f knowledge, which derived fi-om the Enlightenment, modem American sociologists 
took for granted the separation o f science, morality, and aesthetics and wanted to make 
sociology a genuine “science.” Following the ideal o f the modem, they tried to expunge 
morality and aesthetics from its horizon. The scientific model that American sociology 
has embraced has two variations: functionalist sociology and positivistic sociology. 
Functionalist sociology embraces a theoretical notion of science, which strives to 
establish a grand abstract system of theory deduced from some fundamental axioms. 
Positivistic sociology accepts an empirical notion of science which seeks to achieve an 
analytic synthesis o f narrowly-oriented empirical data. As a result, modem American 
sociology has become an esoteric science at the cost of being isolated from the public 
(see Agger 2000). Other models such as morality and aesthetics, the two pillars o f the 
Counter-Enlightenment, have been marginalized or repressed, even though morality and 
aesthetics have challenged the hegemony of science. In fact, the moral notion of 
knowledge has challenged science fi*om the start in sociology. Classical European 
sociology counterbalanced morality against science. American sociology was not much 
different; both interactionist sociology and critical sociology, both of which adopt 
morality as the primary model o f sociological knowledge, have challenged scientific 
sociology from the start. Yet it cannot be said that their challenge was greatly successful;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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until now scientific sociology has been considered as mainstream sociology in the United 
States.
In this sense, the moral challenge to scientific sociology is not new. What is new is 
the aesthetic challenge, which does not necessarily mean that the moral challenge is not 
important in the postmodern. The aesthetic challenge described above demands that 
American sociologists should refigure what sociology is in an entirely different way. It is 
not easy to embrace this demand because of the aesthetic nature o f the challenge. 
American sociology has long excluded the aesthetic from its disciplinary knowledge 
because it believes that the aesthetic challenges the fundamental assumptions of modem 
American sociology, proposing the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and 
ethics/politics. Modem American sociology, like classical European sociology, has 
conceived o f the aesthetic as being pre- or anti-social or at least outside the social. 
Mainstream sociologists ignore the aesthetic challenge, trying to make sociology into a 
genuine science. Nevertheless, some American sociologists, especially critical and 
interactionist sociologists, embrace this challenge seriously, but their ways of embracing 
it are distinct. Both critical sociology and interactionist sociology have accepted morality 
as the primary model of knowledge, whose comer stone is its notion of indeterministic 
world that allows people to choose their own destinies. But their emphases are different: 
critical sociology has emphasized a stmcturally-induced nature of human practice while 
interactionist sociology has highlighted the inderministic nature of the world. This 
difference influences the ways of embracing the aesthetic challenge. Critical postmodem 
sociology embraces the aesthetic challenge from the perspective of morality, trying to 
situate the aesthetic challenge within institutional change. By contrast, interactionist
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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postmodern sociology embraces the aesthetic challenge from the perspective o f the new 
aesthetics, emphasizing the textual construction o f the social and the human subject.
Organization o f the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 reformulates the Kantian trilogy into the theoretical, the practical (the 
technically practical and the morally practical), and the aesthetic in order to shed light on 
the relationship between the modem and the postmodem. Here 1 define the modem as 
the “scientization and moralization” of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which 
proceeded from the 17*’’ century to the early 1960s in Westem societies. The 
Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment will be discussed to concretize their 
definition. While the Enlightenment proposed scientization of ontology, epistemology, 
and ethics/politics, the Coimter-Enlightenment suggested moralization o f ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics.
Chapter 3 defines the postmodem as the aestheticization of ontology, epistemology, 
and ethics/politics, which has proceeded from the early 1960s to the present in advanced 
Westem societies. This chapter addresses postmodem social theory, distinguishing 
poststmcturalist postmodem social theory from critical postmodem social theory.
Chapter 3 goes on to demonstrate that poststmcturalist postmodem social theory 
embraced the aesthetic model of knowledge and that critical postmodem social theory 
embraced the morally practical model o f knowledge. Chapter 3 also argues that despite 
this difference, these versions of postmodem social theory share, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the view that ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics have been aestheticized. 
Finally, this chapter argues that this situation is not new, and shows some historical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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exemplars such as Gorgias, Sade, and Nietzsche that strikingly parallel the present 
situation in terms of the aestheticization of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
Chapter 4 explains how sociology has developed by expunging the aesthetic from its 
horizon, suggests how classical European sociology developed out o f the complex 
mixture o f the Enlightemnent and the Counter-Enlightenment, and explains how it 
excluded the aesthetic while criticizing individualist approaches to man and society. As a 
result of excluding the aesthetic, classical European sociology followed the tradition of 
the modem as the scientization and moralization of ontology, epistemology, and 
ethics/politics. Then, a short history of modem American sociology is provided to 
explain how this exclusion o f the aesthetic in the establishment o f sociology as a discrete 
discipline. Finally, chapter 4 presents some o f the fundamental assumptions that 
sociology has preserved, which are now being challenged by the aesthetic.
Chapter 5 shows documents how American sociologists responded to the aesthetic 
challenge to the fundamental assumptions in sociology. It also emphasizes that 
“marginal” sociologists took this challenge seriously, more precisely, critical and 
interactionist sociologists. This chapter 5 distinguishes critical postmodem sociology 
from interactionist postmodem sociology. Some critical sociologists, who followed the 
realist tradition of pragmatism, did not fully accept the aesthetic as social ontology, but 
relatively welcomed the aesthetic as epistemology. Some interactionist sociologists, who 
followed the nominalist tradition of pragmatism, embraced the aesthetic as both social 
ontology and epistemology. Finally, chapter 5 documents how some mainstream 
sociologists responded to postmodem sociology.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Finally, chapter 6 discusses further implications o f postmodern American sociology. 
It argues that multi- or trans-disciplinary approaches are needed for investigating the 
postmodern, the core o f which is the synthesis of poststmcturalist linguistics and post- 
Marxist political economy.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MODERN AS THE SCIENTIZATION AND MORALIZATION OF 
ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ETHICS/POLITICS 
Many scholars have tried to define the postmodern, and their definitions differ from 
one to another. Nevertheless, they have all defined the postmodern in terms of its 
relationship to the modem. I will likewise define the postmodem in comparison to the 
modem, but I need to distinguish between some analytic levels in order to compare. I 
agree with Dickens and Fontana’s suggestion that any intelligent discussion of 
postmodernism should distinguish three dimensions (1996:182; see also Dickens 2000):
(1) As a substantive theoretical category, postmodernism refers to a series 
of profound structural transformations in the so-called advanced societies, 
such as institutional changes (in the family, polity, economy, religion, etc.) 
and changes in conventional forms o f social inequality (race, class, 
gender, etc.). This dimension o f postmodemism also refers to alleged 
changes in the nature o f interaction in contemporary mass-mediated 
societies, transforming our conventional notions o f self and identity.
(2) As a methodological term, postmodemism includes a critique and 
reformulation of the epistemology of the social sciences in general, and 
sociology in particular, and a corresponding reworking, a broadening 
really, of the appropriate strategies for investigating the social world in a 
concrete fashion.
(3) As a normative concept, postmodemism refers to ethical and political 
implications, focusing on the nature and direction of contemporary social 
change and the inadequacy o f conventional moral and political theories.
I will rephrase these three categories in philosophical terms as ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics respectively. I define the modem as the “scientization”
and “moralization” of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which proceeded firom
14
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the 17“* century to the early 1960s in Western societies. I also define the postmodern as 
the “aestheticization” of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which has proceeded 
from the early 1960s to the present in advanced Western societies. What do I mean by 
scientization, moralization, and aestheticization? I believe that these notions can be 
better grasped when the relationship among scientization (science), moralization 
(morality), and aesteticization (aesthetics) is clarified.
The starting point might be in reformulating the Kantian trilogy; the theoretical, the 
practical, and the aesthetic. Kant’s notion of the theoretical (pure reason) could be 
rephrased into “theoretical science." Kant’s notion of the practical (practical reason) 
might be better to be subdivided into two: the technically practical (empirical science) 
and the morally practical (morality). Although Kant implicitly divided the practical into 
two, he did not give autonomy to the technically practical. In contrast, I believe that one 
of the most important features o f modem and postmodern worlds is the predominance of 
the technically practical model of knowledge, as positivism shows. Thus, I need to 
separate the technically practical from the morally practical. Also needed is the 
reformulation of the aesthetic. Until recently, the aesthetic has been equated with shared 
judgment on beauty. But the notion of the aesthetic has increasingly become associated 
with the notion of the sublime, something that disrupts ± e  system o f representation, 
rather than the beautiful.
I believe that this reformulation is crucial for an understanding the postmodern as the 
aesthetic challenge, and postmodern American sociology as a response to this. Before 
demonstrating this argument, I will first present four models o f knowledge in terms of 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. It is vital to keep in mind that each model of
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knowledge I am presenting here is an ideal type. None o f the Western thinkers proposed 
these models as such. Nonetheless, each model can be seen as having ideal-typical traits.
Reformulation o f the Kantian Trilogy
1. The Theoretical (Theoretical Science)
According to Kant, pure reason has its own a priori synthetic judgment; pure reason is 
concerned with “all knowledge after which it [the faculty of reason] may strive 
independently of all experience” (Kant 1965:9). Without any experience (i.e., a priori), 
pure reason knows, for instance, that concept A is connected with concept B, the 
proposition that should be known only by a posteriori experience. As pure reason makes 
synthetic judgment without any experience, the knowledge it produces is of necessity and 
universal: it is universally true regardless o f any historical contexts. The models of 
knowledge pure reason thinks of are mathematics and physics: they all contain a priori 
synthetic judgments as the principle. Following mathematics and physics, Kant tried to 
make metaphysics a priori synthetic knowledge. That is why Kant investigated a priori 
synthetic elements o f mathematics and o f  the pure science of nature. Using a priori 
synthetic faculty o f pure reason as the criterion for the truth of judgment, Kant tried to 
establish objective knowledge, which is universally and necessarily valid.
The knowledge that Kant’s pure reason aims to produce can be translated into the 
theoretical model of knowledge. But the theoretical I am presenting here is different 
from the subjectivist interpretation o f Kant’s pure reason, according to which all 
universals are fictions that the mind produces. The ability of Kant’s pure reason to know 
truth a priori should entail the existence o f a necessary relation between the structure of
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the mind and its external referents. In this sense, the theoretical ontologically 
presupposes a monistic realism that “there exist true, immutable, universal, timeless, 
objective values, valid for all men, everywhere, at all times” (Berlin 1976: 251). These 
values are “universals.” Regarding the relationship between the universals and the 
particulars, the theoretical proposes two positions: transcendentalism and essentialism. 
Transcendentalism separates the real world of universals (Ideals, Forms, Essence, etc.) 
from the illusory world of the particulars (realities, matters, appearances, etc.) and 
considers the latter as a shadow o f the first world. Essentialism combines these two 
worlds into one: the real world of the universals is embodied in the illusory world. The 
universals realize themselves in the particulars. The particulars are moving from 
potentiality to actuality.
Epistemologically, the theoretical assumes that the human mind is structured to know 
the universals a priori, i.e., without using the structure o f sense organs. Cognitive 
capacities and forms o f  thought are inherent to the structure o f the mind: they are 
immutable, universal, timeless, objective categories. Transcendentalism emphasizes the 
capacity o f the mind to ascend from the illusory world o f the particulars to the real world 
of the universals. Transcendentalism aims to produce an abstract and contemplative sort 
of knowledge suitable to a disembodied mind. Transcendentalism is ready to enjoy the 
disinterested contemplation of Truth. By contrast, essentialism emphasizes the capacity 
of the mind to conceive a non-rational arrangement of the empirical world in rational 
terms. Essentialism seeks to find simple and indisputable a priori First Principle from 
which necessary derivatives follow. The First Principle is a counterpart o f the First 
Cause, the ultimate source o f change, the First Mover, which is itself uncaused and
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eventually unmoved by its own action. Just as the First Cause serves the foundation from 
which all beings necessarily follow, so does the a priori First Principle serve the 
foundation on which coherent knowledge is built. The truth o f this knowledge is not 
subject to empirical verification because it is not apprehensible through the structure of 
sense organs.
The theoretical endorses the linear notion of temporality, where time is moving in a 
progressive way towards the betterment of hiunanity. The ideal of ethics is to live as a 
self-sufficient entity. In order to be self-sufficient, human beings should control 
accidental features by their essence. The ideal of politics is a centralized absolutism, in 
which a God like center controls all other parts so as to serve the equilibrium of the 
whole.
2. The Technically Practical (Empirical Science)
According to Kant, the practical consists of two worlds of phenomena (determinism)
and noumena (freedom): the technically practical and the morally practical. The
technically practical emphasizes determinism over freedom: freedom is equated with
freedom o f choice, options among technical variables. In this sense, the technically
practical is subject to the theoretical:
Propositions called “practical” in mathematics or natural science should 
properly be called “technical,” for in these fields it is not a question of 
determining the will; they only indicate the manifold of a possible action 
which is adequate to bring about a certain effect, and are therefore just as 
theoretical as any proposition which asserts cotuiection between cause and 
effect (Kant 1993:25).
Like the theoretical, the technically practical assumes that there exist universals 
which are inherently organized in an orderly fashion. The technically practical believes
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that the world is characterized by the recurrent, persistent, permanent, uniform patterns 
which are empirically observable. It assumes that it is the external world, not the human 
mind, that is orderly structured. The technically practical holds that the structure of the 
external world exists prior to, or independent of, human experience. It is an immutable, 
universal, timeless, objective entity, valid for all men everywhere, at all times. The 
structure of the external world consists of a variety of particulars which are in a state of 
motion. Nothing just happens; all the combinations o f the particulars are made to occur 
by prior impact o f the particulars on one another and prior motion of the particulars. In 
this way, the world is mechanically, not teleologically, determined. In this stable system, 
the relation between input and output is always calculable.
The technically practical has a different epistemology from the theoretical, denying 
the capacity o f the mind to know the patterns o f the particulars a priori. The technically 
practical holds that what is given to us are a variety of the particulars from which we 
should start to seek the universals. In other words, the technically practical believes that 
knowledge must start with sensory experience and end in formulating empirical 
generalizations. In this sense, the technically practical gives up the pursuit of the First 
Cause, and tries to pursue secondary causes, like natural causes that are found in the 
natural world. In this sense, the technically practical is not concerned with “the true” any 
more. Rather, the technically practical is concerned with efficiency: it tries to maximize 
output (the information or modification obtained) and minimize input (the energy 
expended in the process) (see Lyotard 1984:44). Knowledge is valuable only when it 
improves performance. In this sense, cognitive statements are subordinate to the finality 
of the best possible performances. The technically practical aims to bring together into a
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unified body o f  knowledge the massive quantity o f empirical findings accumulated by 
researchers, and believes that a unified body o f knowledge is predicated if all the 
variables are known. Knowledge is a derivative o f  sensation or experience rather than a 
construction of the mind. Since sensation or human experience might be deceptive, 
technological devices are welcome because they can aid human organs to produce more 
proof.
The technically practical also accepts the linear notion of temporality. History is 
mechanically determined towards the betterment o f hiunanity. The ideal of ethics is to 
live according to the universal law of the maximization of pleasure and minimization of 
pain, which governs all individuals. The ideal o f politics is liberalism, in which the 
subject is the atomic individual who is fi’eely associated and dissociated with other 
atomic individuals according to the law of maximization of utility.
3. The Morally Practical (Morality)
To Kant, morally practical reason is synonymous with pure practical reason. Unlike 
the technically practical, the morally practical emphasizes freedom over determinism.
The morally practical is subject to the supersensible, “the unconditioned in a causal 
series” (Kant 1993: 3). Kant (1951:9) argued that “the morally practical precepts, which 
are altogether based on the concept of freedom, to the complete exclusion of the natural 
determining grounds o f the will, constitute a quite special class. These, like the rules 
which nature obeys, are called simply laws, but unlike them do not rest on sensuous 
conditions but on a supersensible principle.” A fundamental law of the morally practical
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reason is expressed in the following: “So act that the maxim o f your will could always 
hold at the same time as the principle giving universal law” (Kant 1993: 30).
Kant’s notion o f the morally practical should be modified to erase its monistic 
implication. Kant argued that there are universal laws that govern the morally practical, 
which are fundamentally separate from imiversal laws that govern pure reason. But I do 
not believe there are separate universal laws of the morally practical that have their own 
separate realms. Rather, the morally practical presupposes a totally different ontology 
from the theoretical. Unlike the theoretical that presupposes a monistic ontology, the 
morally practical presupposes a plmalistic ontology: “There are many objective ends, 
ultimate values, some incompatible with others, pursued by different societies at various 
times, or by different groups in the same society” (Berlin 1991: 79-80). According to 
pluralism, “beliefs involving value-judgments, and the institutions founded upon them, 
rested not on discoveries o f objective and unalterable natural facts, but on human 
opinion, which was variable and differed between different societies and at different 
times; that moral and political values, and in particular justice and social arrangements in 
general, rested on fluctuating human convention” (Berlin 1979: 2).
The cornerstone o f the morally practical is its notion o f an indeterministic world that 
allows the human subject to choose his/her own destiny. Dewey (quoted in Kennedy 
1950: 52) argued that we live in “a universe which is not all closed and settled, which is 
still in some respects indeterminate and in the making.. .an open universe in which 
uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, novelties, and possibilities are naturalized.” There are 
two types o f the morally practical: the nominalist and the realist. If the nominalist 
version emphasizes the indeterministic nature o f the world, the realist version highlights
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the contextuaily-bound nature o f human practice. The nominalist version conceives the 
relation between reahty and language as being open, recognizing the constitutive power 
of language in reality. The realist version conceives the relation between reality and 
language as being open, recognizing the constitutive power o f reality in language. But 
both share the belief in contextualism, according to which both the objects and the 
subjects o f the inquiry should be seen as part o f culture and the institutional life of a 
particular society at a specific time.
Epistemologically, the morally practical does not try to reflect or represent pre­
existing reality. Rather, the morally practical aims to investigate how reality is 
linguistically and socially constructed at a specific time and space. The main standard of 
the validity of knowledge is found in its practical consequences.
The morally practical claims that each society has its own sense of temporality.
There is no universal direction of history. Thus, it is important to live within the unique 
sense o f temporality that each society has. The ideal o f ethics is to fully participate in a 
culturally unified conununal group without loosing individuality. Communication with 
other members of society is the key to negotiating freedom and necessity. The ideal of 
politics is participatory democracy, in which individuals and society are in the course of 
fashioning themselves.
4. The Aesthetic (Art)
Kant divided the Critique ofJudgment into the critique o f aesthetic judgment and 
teleological judgment; and he argued that aesthetic judgment is essential. The aesthetic 
“alone contains a principle which the judgment places quite a priori at the basis of its
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reflection upon nature, viz. the principle of a formal purposiveness o f nature, according to 
its particular (empirical) laws, for our cognitive faculty, without which the understanding 
could not find itself in nature” (Kant 1951: 30). The aesthetic consists of two parts; the 
beautiful and the sublime. ‘The beautiful in nature is connected with the form o f the 
object, which consists in having [definite] boundaries. The sublime, on the other hand, is 
to be found in a formless object, so far as in it or by occasion of it boundlessness is 
represented, and yet its totality is also present to thought” (Kant 1951: 82). Kant’s 
analysis of the sublime has long been ignored because the sublime implies going beyond 
the intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment. Thus, modem interpreters o f Kant’s 
Critique o f  Judgment tended to equate the beautiful with the aesthetic. But contemporary 
interpretations such as the deconstructionist, the psychoanalytic, and the ideological 
emphasize the sublime over the beautiful (Guyer 1993: 187-192). These interpretations 
all emphasize the sublime as something beyond representation. Following this line of 
interpretation, I will equate the sublime with the aesthetic.
I believe that “the beautiful” and “the sublime” can be rephrased in Lacanian 
psychoanalytic terms. Unlike other scientific discourses, psychoanalysis has 
concentrated on the irrational and unconscious forces, which go beyond the limit of 
discourses (rational orders of concepts). Freud associated the unconscious with the 
primary process in which drives strive to discharge their energy freely. In this 
explanation, the unconscious is somewhat mystical. In this respect, Lacan is impressive. 
Lacan robbed Freud o f mystical biological determinism by introducing (post)structuralist 
linguistics into psychoanalysis: the unconscious is structured like a language (Lacan 
1977). In this new definition, both the conscious and the unconscious can be explained in
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terms o f (post)structuralist linguistics. From this, I become to believe that both the 
beautiful and the sublime can be explained in terms of (post)structuralist linguistics. 
Kant’s notion o f the sublime implies a mystical implication because it cannot be grasped 
through rational concepts. Lacan erased this mystical implication of the sublime. 
According to Lacan’s scheme, the beautiful and the sublime are not two separate entities 
but instances in a signifying chain of signifiera. The sublime is a matrix o f signification 
as well as residing at the points of impasse in language. In this sense, the rigid boundary 
between the beautiful and the sublime imploded (see Fink 1995).
The beautiful follows the pleasure principle, which prohibits incest (oneness with the 
mOther) and thus, regulates the distance between the subject and the thing in itself. 
Pleasure is the safeguard of a state of homeostasis and constancy: “The function o f the 
pleasure principle is, in effect, to lead the subject from signifier to signifier, by generating 
as many signifiers as are required to maintain at as low a level as possible the tension that 
regulates the whole functioning o f the psychic apparatus” (Lacan 1992: 119). Thus, we 
can say that the beautiful is about pleasures that are socially allowed because the 
prohibition of incest is a symbolic law. If the distance between the subject and the thing 
in itself is \x o \z X s é ,  jouissance, not pleasure, is evoked. Jouissance is an excessive 
quantity of excitation which the pleasure principle attempts to prevent. The sublime is 
related to jouissance, and to Lacan’ notion of the real. The real has two features. First of 
all, the real is a world of undifferentiated wholeness: “The real is absolutely without 
fissure” (Lacan 1988: 97). The real is “concrete and already full, a brute pre-symbolic 
reality” (Ragland-Sullivan 1996:192). Second, the real resides at points of impasse in 
language exchange, functioning to make signification possible. The real does not exist
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outside o f signification, and thus, is not das Ding in the phenomenological sense that can 
never be reached. Rather, the real is the precondition that makes the chain of 
signification possible as a function o f the link of the chain. The real always tries to return 
as a subversive force and reminds o f trauma in language.
Ontologically, the aesthetic defies any existence o f an objectively persistent reality, 
let alone the universals. What is existent is natural forces that manifest themselves in the 
multiplicity o f phenomena in variegated ways in the process o f their free flowing. Thus, 
the distinction between being and non-being is blurred and the aesthetic is oneness in 
flux. The aesthetic defies any endeavor to fi-eeze natural forces.
Epistemologically, the aesthetic defies the equation o f thought (logos, language) and 
being (thing, nature). There is no correspondence between language and thing. The 
thing in itself is always more than language. Thus, any effort to freeze the thing itself in 
a form o f language is useless. As a result, it is futile to seek a vantage point fi’om which 
the truth o f thing is grasped. Methodologically, the aesthetic aims to have “the real” 
symbolized as erupting the symbolic. In this sense, the aesthetic tries to express the 
inexpressible. Transgression is the most intellectual activity which tries to express the 
inexpressible; to transgress is to pass beyond any limit or boundary o f discrete form and 
identity. Transgression demands the complete overthrow of any vestige of order, because 
order itself constrains and dictates only certain possibilities for human action.
The aesthetic does not believe that there is any specific direction in time. There is no 
differentiation between the past, the present, and the future. Thus, traditional morality, 
which seeks future rewards by controlling present bodily desire, loses its significance.
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The ideal of ethics is to free oneself from all kinds o f constraints. Anything goes. The 
ideal o f politics is anarchism, in which no hierarchical organization exists.
Definition o f the Modem as Scientization and Moralization 
From this reformulation, what I mean by “scientization,” “moralization,” and 
“aestheticization” may be better understood. It is commonly accepted that the modem 
refers to the historical period from the I?'** century the early 1960s, which is intellectually 
associated with the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment. Intellectually, the 
Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment are considered the two pillars of the 
modem. These two intellectual pillars stemmed, directly or indirectly, from Renaissance 
humanism (Grafton 1991; Tamas 1991; Toulmin 1990).
In my scheme, the Enlightenment embraced science (the theoretical and the 
technically practical) as the primary model o f knowledge. The ideal of the 
Enlightenment was the scientization (scientific reorganization) of ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics. It conceived of universalistic laws as being similar to 
natural laws that are tme across space and time. Based on foundational knowledge, the 
Enlightenment tried to clear away uncertainty and ambiguity that might trigger and 
intensify social conflict, and to constmct an ideal society, i.e., a conflict-free society in 
which completely harmonious relationships among individuals could be established. In 
different words, the Enlightenment tried to rationally organize ontology, epistemology, 
and ethics/politics according to universal and etemal laws that are universally valid.
By contrast, the Counter-Enlightenment adopted morality (the morally practical) as 
the primary model o f knowledge. The ideal of the Counter-Enlightenment was the
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moralization (moral reorganization) o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics 
according to pluralist laws. The Counter-Enlightenment saw pluralist laws as human- 
made laws bound to specific contexts o f space and time, and aimed to embrace 
uncertainty and ambiguity as they are even though they might trigger and intensify social 
conflict. According to the Counter-Enlightenment, uncertainty and ambiguity make it 
clear that some values are incompatible with each other. In other words, the Counter- 
Enlightenment argued that the elimination of uncertainty and ambiguity would lead to 
extreme dogmatism in which everything is evaluated according to one rigid standard. 
Instead, the Coimter-Enlightenment believed that proper values for organizing ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics varies from context to context.
As the two intellectual pillars o f the modem are the Enlightenment and the Counter- 
Enlightenment, I define the modem as the scientization and moralization of ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics, which proceeded from the 17“' century to the early 
1960s in Westem societies. In what follows, I will discuss each o f these aspects in tum.
1. The Enlightenment as the Scientization of Ontology,
Epistemology, and Ethics/politics 
The Enlightenment contains a variety of ideas that sometimes contradict each other, 
mainly due to its synthesis of seventeenth century rationalism and eighteenth century 
empiricism. In fact, the most important feature of the Enlightenment in the Westem 
intellectual history might be its synthesis o f rationalism and empiricism (Zeitlin 1990); 
before the Enlightenment, rational philosophy had been antagonistic to empiricism. 
“Reason guided by experience” is the achievement of the Enlightenment. Newton (1642-
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1727) is one o f the first who achieved this synthesis, and the Enlightenment philosophers 
are followers o f Newton. Newton found the mathematical method that would describe 
mechanical motion, and he applied it universally. Through his overarching laws—the 
three laws o f motion (of inertia, force, and equal reaction) and the theory of universal 
gravitation—Newton explained both the celestial and the terrestrial realms. Just as both 
the celestial and the terrestrial realms are composed of material substances, so are their 
motions impelled by natural mechanical forces. Newton arrived at some fundamental 
principles by the analysis of observed facts and then deduced the mathematical 
consequences o f these principles. Finally by observation and experiment, Newton proved 
that what follows logically from the principle is in agreement with experience. In this 
way, Newton gave evidence to the fact that reason and experience do not contradict each 
other; the universal law (the law of gravity) is supported by empirical data. Newton not 
only explained the material world by means of relatively few fundamental laws, but also 
made it possible to determine the properties and behaviors of every particle of every 
material body in the universe with precision and simplicity.
The Enlighteiunent tried to apply this Newtonian science to man and society. 
Condorect, one o f the representatives o f the Enlightenment, illustrated this basic project 
in his famous book o f 1793, Sketch fo r  a Historical Picture o f  the Progress o f  the Human 
Mind: “The sole foundation for belief in the natural sciences is this idea, that the general 
laws directing the phenomena of the universe, known or unknown, are necessary and 
constant. Why should this principle be any less true for the development o f the 
intellectual and moral faculties o f man than for the other operations o f nature?” 
(Condorcet 1976:258). The core project o f the Enlightenment thus was to eradicate all
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conflicts prevalent during the times and to rationally reorganize the social world 
according to universal laws. As Berlin (1991: 5) summarized well: “The rational 
reorganization of society would put an end to spiritual and intellectual confusion, the 
reign of prejudice and superstition, blind obedience to unexamined dogmas, and the 
stupidities and cruelties o f the oppressive regimes which such intellectual darkness bred 
and promoted.” As I have argued, the Enlightenment was the synthesis of seventeenth 
century rationalism and eighteenth century empiricism. While this uncomfortable 
synthesis consistently manifested itself in the works o f Enlightenment thinkers, 
subsequent history showed that this synthesis began to dissolve in the nineteenth century 
and was completely dissolved in the twentieth century. Thus, I will analytically divide 
the Enlightenment into two versions: the rationalist (or idealist) version, and the 
empiricist (or materialist) version.
1-1. The Rationalist Version of the Enlightenment:
The Theoretical (Theoretical Science)
The scientific revolution deprived the universe of its spiritual dimension; everything 
was explained in terms o f matter and its movement. The hallmark of the rationalist 
version is that it tried to retain the spiritual dimension of human beings while 
simultaneously accepting the materialist implication of the scientific revolution. The 
rationalist version accomplished this dual task by relying on the notion o f God. The 
notion of God was the real foundation o f the rationalist version. There were two notions 
o f God: the Cartesian notion o f God and the Spinozian notion o f God. If the Cartesian 
notion o f God is similar to the Platonian notion of transcendental Form, then the 
Spinozian notion o f God is similar to the Aristotelian notion of immanent form.
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Descartes (1596-1650) refuted the Aristotelian God. According to Aristotle, God 
does not create, but moves the world. And God moves the world not as a mechanical 
force but as the total motive of all operations in the world. By contrast, Descartes held 
that God created the world, and since then He has been entirely removed from His 
creation. Thus the world is a fundamental reality that is liberated from the 
anthropomorphic God. God moves the world as a mechanical force with mathematical 
laws. Thus, all can be explained by mechanical and mathematical laws. In this sense, 
Descartes’ God is transcendental. By contrast, Spinoza (1632-1677) borrowed the 
Aristotelian notion of God as the immanent cause o f things. Spinoza held that there 
exists a Supreme Being, a most perfect or necessary being, which is called “substance.” 
All phenomena necessarily derive their being from a Supreme Being. In this sense, all 
beings are necessarily coimected to each other.
Relying on God as the foundation, the rationalist version tried to establish an abstract 
grand system of knowledge. In this grand system, just as all beings depend on God, so all 
propositions depend on the First Principle. In this sense, the rationalist version retained 
the medieval Thomistic and Aristotelian ideal o f a body o f knowledge that could be one 
great logical system of the deductive, the universal, and the infallible. The rationalist 
version held that both God and the First Principle could be known simply by means of a 
priori reasoning without any appeal to the senses, and aimed to construct a coherent and 
all-embracing account o f the universe and man. But without a Supreme Being, this 
coherent and all-embracing system o f knowledge would be jeopardized because it 
depends on the existence of a Supreme Being. In this sense, a Supreme Being functions 
as the foundation on which an all-embracing system o f knowledge is built.
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Many Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire (1694-1778), Condillac (1715-1780), 
and D’Alembert (1717-1789) are, at least partly, indebted to the Cartesian version of the 
rationalist Enlightenment and the Spinozian version of the rationalist Enlightenment. I 
am convinced that these two versions of the Enlightenment are a revitalization of the 
ancient Greek model o f the theoretical; Platonian transcendentalism and Aristotelian 
essentialism. But it is the Cartesian version rather than the Spinozian version that 
dominated this era. One o f the most important reasons is that until the eighteenth century 
mathematical physics rather than biology was considered as the ideal o f science. If the 
Cartesian version has a selective affinity with mathematical physics, the Spinozian 
version has a selective affinity with evolutionary biology. Thus, in the seventeenth and 
the eighteenth centuries the Cartesian version was easily integrated into the empiricist 
version of the Enlightenment that was associated with Newtonian mathematical physics. 
In what follows, I will discuss both versions in terms o f three dimensions.
Ontologically, Descartes attacked the Aristotelian view of nature as the “Great Chain 
of Being” in which each being strives to fulfill its purpose of attaining perfection in its 
own way (see Lovejoy 1964). Instead, he substituted the mechanical view o f nature as a 
great harmonious and mathematically ordered machine. According to Aristotle, there are 
many substances such as this man, this horse, and so on, each of which strives to fulfill its 
own substance. But Descartes argued that there are only two discrete substances, mind 
(thinking substance) and body (extended substance): “we can clearly perceive the mind, 
that is, a thinking substance, apart fi"om the body, that is, apart from any extended 
substance. And conversely we can clearly perceive the body apart from the mind (as 
everyone readily admits). Therefore the mind can, at least through the power of God,
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exist without the body; and similarly the body can exist apart from the mind. Now if  one 
substance can exist apart from another the two are really distinct. But the mind and the 
body are substances which can exist apart from each other” (Descartes 1984b: 119-120). 
According to this dualism, a homogeneous substance (extension) underlies all material 
phenomena while another homogeneous substance (thought) underlies all mental 
phenomena.
Descartes (1985c: 232) argued that the whole universe is composed o f one matter
“whose nature consists simply in its being an extended substance.” Even though body
contains attributes other than extension, such as the sensual attributes of colors, tastes,
sounds, etc., only extension is special because body cannot exist without extension while
it can exist without sensual attributes.
[EJxtension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal 
substance.. Everything else which can be attributed to body presupposes 
extension, and is merely a mode o f an extended thing.. .Thus, for 
example, shape is unintelligible except in an extended thing; and motion is 
unintelligible except as motion in an extended space.. By contrast, it is 
possible to understand extension without shape or movement.. .(Descartes 
1985c: 210-211).
Thus, an extended body contains the geometrical properties such as size, shape, and 
motion. In this sense, empirically observable properties such as colors, tastes, sounds, 
etc. are not essential. The real essence o f the universe is composed of matter 
characterized by geometrical properties. Since geometrical properties such as size, shape, 
and motion are the qualities of nature, the qualities of nature can be known 
mathematically. In this sense, nature is written in the language o f mathematics, and its 
characteristics are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures. In this way, nature 
becomes physical, quantitative, and mathematical. The mathematical laws of nature are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
etemal because God created them. God’s own nature prevents Him from changing what 
He once freely created. If He changes the laws. He is not God because this change forces 
Him to recognize that His creation was imperfect: “God’s perfection involves not only 
his being immutable in himself, but also his operating in a manner that is always utterly 
constant and immutable” (Descartes 1985c: 240). In this sense, God is transcendental. 
After creating the universe. He stepped back to let it operate functionally: “[i]n the 
beginning <in his omnipotence> he created matter, along with its motion and rest; and 
now, merely by his regular concurrence, he preserves the same amount of motion and rest 
in the material universe as he put there in the begirming” (Descartes 1985c: 240). The 
universe is a self-operating machine according to etemal mathematical laws. This view is 
directly connected with the monistic nature of the universe: “the earth and the heavens 
are composed of one and the same matter; and there caimot be a plurality o f worlds.. 
.[T]he matter whose nature consists simply in its being an extended substance already 
occupies absolutely all the imaginable space in which the alleged additional worlds 
would have to be located” (Descartes 1985c: 232). The universe is static, not dynamic 
because God "'always preserves the same quantity o f  motion in the universe" (Descartes 
1985c: 240).
By contrast, Spinoza tried to retain the Aristotelian view of nature as a “Great Chain 
of Being” while simultaneously accepting the mechanical implication o f the Cartesian 
universe. For Spinoza, the universe or nature is the same as God, “an absolutely infinite 
entity, that is, a substance consisting o f infinite attributes, each o f which expresses etemal 
and infinite essence” (Spinoza 2000: 75). Spinoza defined substance as what exists in 
itself and is conceived through itself: “By substance I understand that which is in itself
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
and is conceived through itself; that is, that which does not need the concept of another
thing, from which concept it must be formed” (Spinoza 2000: 75). According to this
definition, there is only one substance, God. If there are two or more substances, then
they would be understood in terms o f each other. But this violates the definition of
substance. Spinoza held that substance has an infinite number o f attributes and that all
attributes must necessarily follow from substance. If some attributes do not follow from
substance, they are not substance because they must contain something other than
themselves. Thus, substance or God has an infinite number o f attributes. As Harris
(1995: 23) explained it:
Spinoza was confident that he had shown conclusively why an absolutely 
iitfinite Substance must have an infinity o f attributes. Because a thing has 
attributes in proportion to its reality or perfection, the more reality it has, 
the more attributes must belong to it. Its essence expresses what it is, and 
its attributes express its essence; therefore, the more it encompasses, the 
more attributes are needed to express its essence. If it is absolutely infinite 
it must have an infinity o f attributes.
Concerning particular things, Spinoza, unlike Plato, did not hold that individual
things are no more than illusory appearances o f the one Supreme Being. Spinoza
explained any particular thing in terms of “mode.”
A mode is any individual thing or event, any particular form or shape, 
which reality transiently assumes; you, your body, your thoughts, your 
group, your species, your planet, are modes; all these are forms, modes, 
almost literally fashions, of some etemal and invariable reality lying 
behind and beneath them (Durant 1935: 188).
This etemal and invariable reality is God. In this sense, God is immanent, not 
transcendent: “God is the immanent but not the transitive cause o f all things” (Spinoza 
2000:93). God does not stand outside particular things; from God all things follow. In 
this sense, God is the organizing principle o f the universe. Each mode has attributes in
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proportion to its reality or perfection. Further, “[e]ach thing, in so far as it is in itself, 
endeavours to persevere in its being” (Spinoza 2000:171). And through this endeavour, 
each thing also expresses the power of God in a certain way, because the power of God is 
expressed in and through each o f its finite modifications. Thus, the universe is the 
hierarchical series of diversified finite modes that endeavoiu: to persevere in their beings. 
What is at stake here is that “mere addition o f finites does not produce the infinite, which 
is not an aggregate nor compoimded of separable parts, each independently real” (Harris 
1995: 32). The true infinite being, God or the universe, is a single and coherent whole.
Spinoza recognized that there is also a causal relationship among particular things 
themselves: “[e]very particular thing, or, any thing which is finite and has a determinate 
existence, cannot exist or be determined to operate unless it is determined to existence 
and operation by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence” 
(Spinoza 2000:98). All this causal activity takes place in God, a single and coherent 
whole. Thus, for Spinoza the imiverse is an enclosed and unified system in which the 
entire imiverse with all its complexities is a manifestation of one single reality, God: “In 
Nature there exists nothing contingent, but all things have been determined by the 
necessity of the divine nature to exist and operate in a certain way” (Spinoza 2000: 99). 
Thus, everything that exists exists of necessity. But this necessity is not a mechanical, 
causal necessity but a “logical” necessity. As God’s existence follows logically from the 
concept of God, the existence of all other things follows logically from God’s existence. 
To say that God causes all things is to say that all things are a “logical” consequence of 
God. Thus, a logically necessary relationship is a timeless relationship; it is not affected 
by time.
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On the nature o f man, Descartes as a Platonian critical philosopher wanted to retain 
the spiritual dimension of human beings by arguing that extension is the essence o f body 
and thought is the essence o f mind. According to Aristotle, soul and body are integral to 
each other. Soul is to body as form is to matter. But according to Descartes, soul and 
body are totally separated. Soul or mind is incorporeal because it is not extended. Put it 
differently, the mind does not occupy space, and can exist without body. The mind 
contains attributes other than thought, such as feeling and sensation, but only thought is 
special because mind cannot exist without thought while it can exist without feeling and 
sensation. The Cartesian mind is an active subject whose essence is thought. Since the 
senses are not always stimulated, the mind must produce thoughts itself. Thus the 
Cartesian mind is free from bondage to sense. The Cartesian mind is the rational, 
autonomous and self-contained subject; it needs nothing in order to think or generate 
ideas. Thus, Descartes proposed a dualistic worldview that categorically differentiates 
mental phenomena and material phenomena. What is at issue here is that Descartes 
argued that the human mind can grasp material reality consisting of matter without any 
sensory experience. This dualism posited a fundamental difficulty. As Randall (1954: 
269) pointed out: “The picture that the mind perceives in experience and the real world 
that physics depicts seemed totally different; how, then, could the mind be certain that its 
physics was a genuine knowledge of the world in which man was really living?” 
Descartes answered this question by arguing that man is a “thinking thing.” In this sense, 
man is exceptional. Only man is a “thinking thing” whose thought is identical to his 
body: “I am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking”
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(Descartes 1984a: 18). This axiom excludes dimensions of human beings other than pure 
reason and its identical body, such as the unconscious.
By contrast, Spinoza’s concept of man is that of a living organism which endeavours 
to persevere in his own being. Like other finite modes, man is a finite mode of substance, 
a part of Nature. But man’s essence is characterized by his ability to attain the 
intellectual knowledge of God. This argument seems to be self-contradictory because it 
assumes that finite man can know infinite God. Spinoza solved this problem by 
proposing that man is the unity o f body and mind. Spinoza rejected Descartes’ dualism 
because he believed that if this dualism were true there would be an arbitrary relationship 
between mind and body. According to Spinoza, mind and body are one and the same 
thing because they are two main attributes of God: “Thought is an attribute of God, or, 
God is a thinking thing” (Spinoza 2000:114); “Extension is an attribute o f God, or, God 
is an extended thing” (Spinoza 2000: 115). God expresses Himself in and through His 
attributes such as thought and extension. Thus, matter (extension) and mind (thought) are 
attributes of one substance that is God. The human mind is the idea of the human body. 
Thus, the nature of the human mind depends on the nature o f the human body. Compared 
to other bodies, “The human body is composed o f very many individuals of a diverse 
nature, each o f which is highly composite” (Spinoza 2000: 130). Likewise, “The idea 
which constitutes the formal being o f the human mind is not simple, but is composed of 
very many ideas” (Spinoza 2000: 131). “The human body is capable of perceiving very 
many things, and the more so, the more its body can be disposed in several ways” 
(Spinoza 2000:131). And thus, “to the extent that some body is more capable than others 
o f doing several things at the same time, or o f being acted on at the same time, to that
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extent its mind is more capable than others o f perceiving several things at the same time” 
(Spinoza 2000:125). Accordingly, the human body and the human mind are complex, 
and man can acquire knowledge of God’s etemal and infinite essence because God’s 
essence is best expressed in and through the most complex body and mind like human 
body and mind.
Epistemologically, Descartes as a Platonian critical philosopher revitalized Platonian 
apriorism that believes in the possibility of a priori knowledge of the etemal tmths. This 
belief presupposes that there are universal tmths to be discovered and, furthermore, that 
all human beings are naturally equipped with the ability to gain access to the etemal 
tmths because “God not only created the etemal tmths, he also created our minds in such 
a way that we possess an innate capacity to understand them” (Osier 1994: 130). God 
guaranteed there is a necessary coimection between etemal tmths and rational human 
minds: “what I took just now as a mle, namely that everything we conceive very clearly 
and very distinctly is tme, is assured only for the reasons that God is or exists, that he is a 
perfect being, and that everything in us comes from him. It follows that our ideas or 
notions, being real things and coming from God, cannot be anything but tme, in every 
respect in which they are clear and distinct” (Descartes 1985b: 130). Descartes further 
held that the etemal tmths are characterized by abstract or pure mathematics. In other 
words, physical reality itself is fundamentally mathematical because it consists o f matter 
whose essence is “extension.” Mental reality itself is also fundamentally mathematical 
because God created human mind in such a way that the human being possesses an innate 
capacity to understand mathematical tmths o f the physical world. The necessary 
connection between etemal tmths and the human mind is fundamentally mathematical.
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Thus, other empirically observable attributes o f things are not essential because they do 
not show mathematical essence of things.
As a method, mathematics is primarily characterized by deduction. Mathematics 
provides certainty and clarity because mathematics is concerned with subject matter so 
clear and distinct that it cannot be doubted. Thus mathematics starts with a subject matter 
(the First Principle), and by indubitably necessary steps develops an abstract grand 
system of knowledge that is absolutely certain. Like mathematics, any true science 
should start with the First Principle that is simple and certain. Systematic doubt is a first 
strategy that aims to achieve the First Principle. From this First Principle, other 
propositions should necessarily follow, which should finally establish an abstract grand 
system of knowledge. Thus, Descartes believed in unity o f science, i.e., universal 
applicability of mathematics to all areas o f human inquiry.
Epistemologically, Spinoza did not seem to be much different fi-om Descartes. In his 
Ethics, Spinoza, like Euclid, began his work with definitions, axioms, and postulates.
And firom these he claimed to derive, by rigorous logical deduction, a number of 
propositions. Thus, many scholars have interpreted Spinoza’s method as mathematical 
deduction. But there is a fundamental difference between mathematical deduction and 
Spinoza’s deduction on the nature o f the First Principle. If for Descartes the First 
Principle is the abstract universal, for Spinoza the First Principle is the concrete 
universal, God. Spinozian God is not an abstract transcendental entity but a concrete, 
immanent organizing principle o f the universe. Thus, God as the First Principle is not a 
simple atomic axiom, but the infinite whole firom which other propositions necessarily 
follow. Thus, Spinoza’s “conception o f method is not the linear formal deduction of
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traditional logic, but is a crypto-dialectical development o f the structural implications o f a 
systematic whole” (Harris 1995: 13). The whole development of deduction is implicit 
from the start because God as the First Principle is the whole one from which all others 
necessarily follow.
In this way, Spinoza believed that this deductive and infallible science would soon 
exhaust all experimentation and be able to dispense with every appeal to experience.
This triumphant optimism is based on the core idea o f rationalism, i.e., one that “The 
order and connection o f ideas is the same as the order and connection o f things, and 
conversely the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of 
ideas” (Spinoza 2000: 290). We can conceive of substance under the attribute of thought, 
or under the attribute o f extension, but in both we shall find the same order because God 
expresses itself in and through both thought and extension. As Spinoza (2000: 118) 
explained:
[T]hinking substance and extended substance is one and the same 
substance, which is understood now under this and now under that 
attribute. So also a mode of extension and the idea o f that mode is one 
and the same thing, but expressed in two ways.. For example, a circle 
existing in Nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, 
is one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes.
Thus, Spinoza did not try to analyze the truth o f a proposition in terms of its 
correspondence with facts. Rather, he tried to analyze the truth of a proposition in terms 
of the coherence which it has with the total system o f assertions within which it belongs. 
Just as any given action or reaction can be fully accounted for only in terms o f its relation 
to the structure of the universe as a whole, so any given proposition can be fully 
accounted for only in terms o f  its relation to the total system of assertions as a whole. 
Thus, truth does not have to appeal to the fallible testimony of the sense experience.
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On the direction o f history, Descartes believed that history is a progressive process of 
mastering and possessing nature by means of instrumental knowledge. Descartes did not 
believe that the universe is moving toward some final end because the universe is perfect. 
Rather, the universe is rationally operating according to eternal mathematical laws. As 
such, Descartes believed that human society can be advanced only if human beings know 
the eternal mathematical truth o f the universe, and then control it for the welfare of 
human beings.
Through this [practical] philosophy we could know the power and action 
of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens and all the other bodies in our 
environment, as distinctly as we know the various crafts o f our artisans; 
and we could use this knowledge—as —e artisans use theirs—for all the 
purpose for which it is appropriate, and thus make ourselves, as it were, 
the lords and masters o f nature (Descartes 1985b: 142-143).
Unlike Descartes, Spinoza retained the traditional view that conceived of the whole of 
history as the unfolding of God’s plan to build up the heavenly city until its final triumph 
at the end o f the world. But unlike the traditional view, it is human reason that writes the 
drama of history as the realization o f human beings, because God is immanent in human 
reason. Unlike the traditional drama of salvation, this drama is “within” the reach of 
human reason because God as the organizing principle o f the universe is immanent in 
human beings. In this sense, history is the self-realization of God.
One o f the most important moral implications of the rationalist version of the 
Enlightenment is its monistic notion o f ethics: there is a true universal ethics that is valid 
across time and space. According to Descartes, human beings can acquire universal 
ethics only when they complete the grand system of knowledge. Thus, Descartes (quoted 
in Morgan 1994:2) defined morals as “the highest and most perfect moral system, which 
presupposes a complete knowledge o f the other sciences and is the ultimate level of
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wisdom.” If we want true knowledge, we should eliminate the physical dimension of 
knowledge because that is not certain. This necessarily leads to the control of the body 
by the mind. If we complete the grand system of knowledge through the mathematical 
deduction from the first self-evident axioms, then everyday moral problems would solve 
themselves.
Spinoza also proposed a monistic notion of ethics. “In so far as,” argued Spinoza 
(2000: 249), “men live in accordance with the guidance of reason, to that extent alone 
they always necessarily agree in natiure.” But he also held that “The endeavour to 
preserve oneself is the first and unique basis o f virtue” (Spinoza 2000: 242).
Synthesizing the two arguments, Spinoza (2000:243) held that “In our case, to act 
absolutely in accordance with virtue is simply to act, live, and preserve one’s being (these 
three mean the same) in accordance with the guidance of reason, and on the basis of 
looking for what is useful to oneself’ (Spinoza 2000: 243). This argument is based on his 
assumption that all men share a common nature and that, insofar as all men act to benefit 
themselves, their actions must be beneficial to other men.
A political implication o f Cartesian rationalism is a kind of conservatism that tries to 
preserve the status quo forever. Just as the universe is a self-operating perfect system, so 
society should be a self-operating perfect system. Just as the eternal mathematical laws 
o f nature regulate the parts so as to keep the total structural pattern constant, so the 
eternal mathematical laws o f society should regulate individuals so as to keep the total 
structural patterns of society constant. For this constancy o f society or perfection of 
society is possible only when a few scientists know perfectly the eternal law and apply it 
to society. In this way, elitism is inunanent in Cartesian rationalism.
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A political implication of Spinozian rationalism is a kind o f centralized 
totalitarianism. Spinoza did not conceive o f the whole merely as an aggregate of 
elements that are regarded as logically prior to and existentially independent of the 
whole. Rather, it is the whole that is regarded as logically prior to individuals. Just as 
the whole is prior to the part and the principle of its structure is immanent in every part, 
so society as the whole is prior to its individual members and the principle of its structure 
should be immanent in every individual. For this, the state as the representative of the 
whole should control individuals so as to make them contribute to the whole society: “For 
it comes first to be considered that just as in the state of nature that man is strongest and 
most his own master (suiJuris) who is guided by reason, so also that state will be most 
powerful and most fully suiJuris which is founded on and directed by reason. For the 
right of a state is determined by the power o f a people (multitudo) which is led as if by 
one mind. And this union o f minds could by no means be conceived, unless the state 
does all it can to aim at what sound reason shows to be good for all men” (Spinoza, 
quoted in Harris 1995:122).
1 -2. The Empiricist Version o f the Enlightenment:
The Technically Practical (Empirical Science)
The empiricist version o f the Enlightenment revitalized the ancient Greek tradition o f 
the technically practical, which had been long forgotten with the rise o f Christianity (see 
Vitzthum 1995). The empiricist version o f the Enlightenment is rooted in the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century empiricists such as Bacon (1561-1626), Hobbes 
(1588-1679), Locke (1632-1704), and the British and Scottish sensationalists. It also
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flourished in France where French materialists such as Helvetius (1715-1771) and 
d’Holbach (1723-1789) revitalized the ancient Greek tradition of the technically 
practical. Concerning the problem of God, the empiricist version took a moderate atheist 
position. If God exists, it is not the anthropomorphic Christian God but the Cartesian 
efficient cause or the Newtonian mathematical God. The empiricist version did not want 
to push atheism to the extreme because if it does, the entire universe becomes absurd. It 
just put aside the problem o f the First Cause while rejecting the Final cause. While the 
empiricist version believed that the universe is rationally operating, it rejected the very 
basis of the rationalist claim to achieve a priori knowledge on the nature of things 
because it did not believe in innatism, i.e., the doctrine that the mind can generate its own 
ideas out of nothing. Rather, it believed that all human knowledge derives ultimately 
from sensory experience. In this sense, the empiricist version o f the Enlightenment might 
be said to be the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century version of the technically practical 
model of knowledge.
Ontologically, the empiricist version rejected the traditional dualism of spirit and 
matter, holding that only matter exists. D’Holbach represented this view. According to 
d’Holbach, the whole o f reality is matter endowed motion. Matter is not created by the 
external agent but is self-existent. Matter has existed from the beginning and will never 
cease to exist. But even though matter is eternal, its manifestations and forms have their 
beginnings and endings. According to d’Holbach, matter is composed of primitive 
elements, which might be called atoms and which are specifically different from each 
other: air, fire, earth, and water. While human beings are incapable of directly knowing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
the essence of these four elements, they can apprehend the properties o f the elements
only through their effects on human senses. As Pecharroman (1977; 31-32) put it:
These four elements are composed of discrete molecules which differ in 
volume, in position in space, and in specific properties. These properties 
of extension, mobility, divisibility, solidity, gravity and inert force make 
sensible experience possible.
In this sense, matter is all that affects our senses. Those objects of which man does
not have sensible knowledge do not exist in this scheme. If those objects exist, they are
material. Spirit does not exist. If spirit exists, it is material. Thus, everything can be
explained in terms o f diversified arrangement and combination of these four elements.
There seems to be infinite ways of arranging and combining these four elements since the
elements o f matter are in a state of constant and reciprocal movement. But the elements
of matter move mechanically according to the general law o f attraction. Thus, d’Holbach
(quoted in Vitzthum 1995:69) held that “[njature is but an immense chain of causes and
effects, which unceasingly flow from each other.”
Applying this ontology to society, the empiricist version saw society as a mechanistic
machine governed by iron causality. It definitely broke with the Christian
anthropomorphic view in which the universe and society are conceived as an organic
whole that was created and operated by the personal supreme Intelligence. It did not
need a force to set matter in motion because it believed that matter moves by its own
peculiar energies that are inherent in itself. Concerning society, tlie empiricist version
put aside the problem o f the First Cause while rejecting the Final cause. Everything is
mechanically determined through an uninterrupted succession of causes and effects. In
this scheme, the universe is nothing more than an essentially rational and harmonious
machine. As d’Holbach (quoted in Randall 1954:274) put it:
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The universe, that vast assemblage of everything that exists, presents only 
matter and motion: the whole offers to our contemplation nothing but an 
immense, an uninterrupted succession of causes and effects.. .Nature, 
therefore, in its most extended signification, is the great whole that results 
firom the assemblage of matter, under its various combinations, with that 
contrariety of motions, which the universe offers to our view.
Applying this ontology to man, the empiricist version refuted the traditional dualism 
of mind and body, considering man as matter endowed with motion. It did not accept 
Descartes’ belief that the mind can generate its own ideas, nor did it believe that innate 
structures can utilize sense-data in a peculiarly human fashion. Thus, the human being is 
not an exception in the natural world. It is Locke who first developed this view. For 
Locke the human mind is a blank and empty state at birth, and thus, it is mechanical and 
malleable; it can be molded by accumulation and recombination o f the data o f 
experience. “The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; 
and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the 
memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abstracts 
them, and by degrees learns the use o f general names ” (Locke 1928: 99). Following and 
modifying Locke, the empiricist version reduced mental activity to the faculties of 
sensation and memory. According to this material psychology, “the judgment is a 
mechanical process o f material organs, ‘produced only by the meetings o f all that has 
struck our senses’” (Crocker 1959: 117). As a result, it denied the existence of the soul. 
The soul is only an activity of the brain. Through experience, the soul is formed. Thus, 
body and soul form an indivisible material unity that ends in death. The empiricist 
version also rejected the rationalists’ belief that human beings are bom equipped with 
reason. It believed that reason is the most humane faculty, but that it is not given at birth. 
Rather, reason is formed through experience. Thus, D’Holbach (quoted in Randall 1954:
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265) held that “the faculty we have of gaining experiences, of remembering them, of 
calling to mind their effects, constitutes what we designate by the word reason. Without 
experience there can be no reason.”
The hallmark of methodology of the empiricist version is that it does not have to look
for the First Cause of motion of matter because it believes that motion forms an all-
encompassing and eternal circle of generation and destruction, which has had no
beginning and will have no end. As Pecharroman (1977: 34-35) put it:
[T]here is no need for a Cartesian or external agent to explain motion in 
matter since motion derives from the properties o f matter as such. Since 
motion derives from the properties inherent in matter, and properties 
constitute the essence o f a thing, we can construct mentally the essence o f 
things by apprehending their movements which affect our senses.
Instead, the empiricist version proposed reductionism: reductionism reduces complex 
data or phenomena to simple terms. Just as all phenomena can be reduced step by step to 
simpler phenomena and finally the simplest atoms, all propositions about empirical 
phenomena can be reduced step by step the simplest propositions about atoms. The 
empiricist version believed that sensations are the first source of knowledge. Truth 
cannot be grasped except through direct experimentation. The empiricist version did not 
favor deductive reasoning from the First Principle because it did not decide in advance 
what course nature actually follows. It held that only by experimental reasoning can 
matters of fact be determined.
Concerning the direction of history, the empiricist version proposed a secularized 
version of progressivism. For the first time in Western history, it combined the three 
different kinds of progress. This progressivism had some distinctive features. First is a 
kind of technical determinism. Von Wright (1997: 7) called this the “Great Idea o f
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Progress”: “We have distinguished three different kinds o f progress. One is progress in 
science and technology. Another is the improvement o f the material well-being of 
individuals and societies. A third is moral perfection. The Great Idea of Progress was 
the thought that the first type o f  progress has an instrumental role in promoting the other 
two types—the accumulative and linear nature of the first being a warrant o f life 
becoming progressively easier and manners more civilized.” In this technical 
determinism, the cumulative growth of technology and science was itself regarded as 
progress. Second is that it is this-world-oriented rather than other-world-oriented 
progressivism. The pivotal force that moves the world is human beings, not God. 
Paradise is not in the past world that God made, but will be in the fiiture world human 
beings are now making. Third is that it is optimistic. The empiricist version believed 
that man could “control his own destiny, make his own laws as he pleases, build on 
indestructible foimdations, and be fi’ee and wise and rational for ever” (Berlin 1976: 76). 
Last is that the Enlightenment view of progress believed that science has a transcultural 
(i.e., universal) character. Scientific knowledge is not the exclusive secret of the Western 
people but can be open to anybody who has the requisite training. Thus, the transcultural 
diffusion of scientific knowledge and of technology was considered to be progress.
One of the important moral implications of this view is a secular hedonism. In the 
empiricist version, the concept o f immortality vanished because it believed that there is 
no spiritual soul. With the death of the body, the soul disappears because it is merely an 
activity of the brain. This resulted in a definite break with traditional Christian morality, 
in which man is supposed to expect postmortem rewards for his spiritual control over 
corporeal desires. Thus, the empiricist version confi'onted the following questions: “if
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there was no heavenly reward after death, what was left? Why should any man deny 
himself? Why suffer persecution for truth and justice without compensation here or 
hereafter?” (Becker 1963:148). It is not surprising that man seeks his happiness “within 
this world” where only matter exists. Man is supposed to follow the general law of 
motion of matter because man is also matter in motion. Just as every matter incessantly 
moves in order to maintain itself as matter, so is it natural for man to incessantly move in 
order to preserve itself as matter. In this sense, man’s desire to preserve himself is 
natural. Thus, D’Holbach identified self-interest or self-love with the good. Human self- 
interest is always material since man is simply matter. In this scheme, “the happiest man 
is the man with the fewest material needs and the ability to satisfy the needs he has” 
(Pecharroman 1977:92).
This secular hedonism is directly connected with utilitarianism. Just as motion of 
matter keeps the mutual interdependence of bodies alive, so man’s activity keeps the 
mutual interdependence of other men alive. Just as motion o f matter aligns itself with the 
general motion of other matter, so man’s activity should align itself with the general 
activities o f other men. Even though utility suggests social way of attaining self-interest, 
the emphasis is put on self-interest. Utilitarian behaviorism is an eminent expression of 
this: all humans like pleasure and dislike pain, and consequently, human beings act to 
maximize their pleasure and minimize their pain. This descriptive law provides a basis 
from which a normative law, i.e., one that this law is the only objective that is morally 
worthy, derives.
One o f the most significant political implications is a liberal (bourgeoisie) democracy 
in which every (bourgeois) individual will enjoy his/her natural right, freedom, which
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was previously violated by medieval institutional arrangements. Democracy bases itself 
on an essentialist notion o f a unitary and universal rational agent, the bearer of universal 
rights. The empiricist version justified this concept of human rights on the basis of 
natural law. Natural law was the law that nature imposed on all living creatures. For the 
human being, the natural right imposed by natural law was the utilitarian principle in 
which man acts to maximize his pleasure and minimize his pain. Every individual acts 
morally because s/he has universal reason, the capability of calculating utility. This 
individual is seen primarily like a merchant. On the social level, the concept o f natural 
right also refers to “what must be done if  political institutions were to survive, as well as 
to what ought to be done if justice were to be secured. If humans were not granted their 
natural rights, existing political institutions would inevitably be rent by discord and 
overthrown; they should be replaced by institutions that were in harmony with natural 
rights” (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974: 12). Social institutions provided 
opportimities for the merchant’s maximization o f utility. Thus the primary social 
institution was the market: “Social relationships are therefore viewed as ‘opportunity 
structures’ or means which are rationally assessed by each and every individual. It is as 
if  every member o f the human race, possessing fi'ee will, is in the marketplace with 
freedom to choose between various institutions and institutional identities” 
(Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974: 21).
In short, the Enlightenment was an effort at the scientization of ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics. This effort largely dominated the imagination of 
modem thinkers who tried to realize this idea at the institutional level. The following
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points summarize the basic ideas o f the Enlightenment as the scientization of ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics.
1) The Enlightenment as the scientization of ontology: Being and essence are 
universals that are true regardless of time and space. Non-being and appearance are 
particulars that are copies of being and essence. This ontology is directly applied to 
society and man. The rationalists saw society as the neatly ordered hierarchy of being, all 
leading up to one Supreme Being. The empiricists saw society as a mechanistic machine 
governed by iron causality. Society is nothing more than a rational and harmonious 
machine in which everything is mechanically determined through an uninterrupted 
succession o f causes and effects. The rationalists saw man as a rational, autonomous, and 
unified subject. Man’s essence is mind, not body, which propels man to move towards 
God. The empiricists saw man as a pure, transparent matter that moves according to the 
general law of motion of matter.
2) The Enlightenment as the scientization of epistemology: The Enlightenment 
assumed that the order and cotmection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of 
things. Scientific knowledge mirrors reality. For rationalists, it is the structure o f mind 
that mirrors reality. For empiricists, it is the structure of reality that is mirrored in the 
receptive mind. Here, language is a transparent tool to reflect reality as it is. In this 
scheme, being, language, and knowledge are equated: “being, language, knowledge are 
self-evident, neutral and transparent terms. Being can be known and experienced in its 
intimacy; language transfers meaning neutrally without interfering in the underlying 
thoughts it ‘expresses’; knowledge undistortedly reflects reality in truthful 
representations” (Grosz 1989: 28). There is a vantage point from which reality is
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faithfully represented. This vantage point is objective science in which subjective 
elements are totally erased for the equation of being, language, and knowledge.
3) The Enlightenment as the scientization of ethics/politics: The Enlightenment had a 
linear sense o f temporality, according to which history is moving towards betterment. To 
rationalists, this movement is teleologically determined. To empiricists, this movement is 
mechanically determined. The Enlightenment believed that there is a true universal 
ethics that is valid across space and time. To rationalists, this ethics refers to the control 
of body by mind for the future rewards. To empiricists, this ethics refers to living 
according to the universal law of maximization of pleasure and minimization o f pain. 
Thus, ethics is reduced to the capability of calculating utility. Politically, the 
Enlightenment proposed two positions. Rationalists proposed centralized totalitarianism 
in which all beings lead up to one Supreme Being. Empiricists proposed liberalism in 
which all individuals, whose nature is the same in regards to utilitarian principle, enjoy 
their natural rights. But both of them believed that all individuals should be totally 
integrated into society.
2. The Counter-Enlightenment as the Moralization o f Ontology, 
Epistemology, and Ethics/Politics 
The Counter-Enlightenment is the term that refers to the counter-forces 
against/alongside the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries 
(Berlin 1979). Berlin, who coined the term Counter-Enlightenment, used it as a 
complement o f  dogmatic rationalism (see Berlin and Jahanbegloo 1992: 70). According 
to this definition, the Counter-Enlightenment complemented the extremity of the
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Enlightenment by recovering the morally practical (morality) o f the ancient Greeks and 
Renaissance humanism. In this scheme, the Enlightenment and the Counter- 
Enlightenment are partly complementary. The Counter-Enlightenment is rooted in Vico 
(1668-1744) and developed in the writings of Hamann (1730-1788) and Herder (1744- 
1803) (see Berlin 1976,1979, 1993). Vico distinguished the realm of human society 
from the realm o f nature, and thus was very critical of the application of Newtonian 
science to the realm of human society. Vico believed that human beings can not 
understand the world of external nature because they did not create it. Human beings can 
understand only what they create; mere observers can not understand what they did not 
create.
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so 
remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a 
truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been 
made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the 
modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot 
but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the 
study of the world of nature, which, since God made it. He alone knows; 
and that they should have neglected the study of world of nations, or civil 
world, which, since men had made it, men could come to know (Vico 
1968:96).
All human beings could do then is to just observe and to interpret what they did not 
create. Only God can fully understand Nature because He made it. Concerning the 
existence and nature of God, Vico took an agnostic position: God is beyond the reach of 
human faculties. The nature o f physical nature is also beyond the reach of human 
faculties because it is made by God. Human beings can only know the social world that 
they made. In this way, Vico shifted the focus from God and physical nature to human 
society. Like empiricists, Vico rejected the very basis of the rationalist claim to achieve 
a priori knowledge o f the nature o f things. But Vico also rejected the very basis o f the
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empiricist claim that all human knowledge derives ultimately from sensory experience. 
Rather, Vico situated epistemology in concrete historical situation.
On the nature o f society, Vico tried to give balance to a mechanistic worldview, 
retaining and revising the traditional Aristotelian organicist view of the world in which 
society is conceived as a whole structure. Vico refuted divine Providence of the Creator 
and proposed a man-made cultural logic which assigned an appropriate function to every 
institution. Vico, in fact, did not desert the notion o f Providence but rather revised it.
Vico believed that we can not know the divine Providence o f the Creator until we came 
to historically reconstruct historical facts, i.e., “the story of men’s daily lives and 
activities on earth, which alone revealed the pattern which determined what men were, 
had been and might have been, could and would be” (Berlin 1976: 73). Vico saw society 
as a man-made organism, not a transcendental entity. Society is a man-made cultural 
community, where people speak the same language, live on the same soil, and possess the 
same habits, a communal past and common memories. Thus, men do not create society 
from thin air; rather, men create society on a historical pattern that predecessors happened 
to make. This historical pattern is not always an invention o f men’s intentional actions; 
rather, it is an “unintended result” because men freely act within narrow limits that 
predecessors happened to set up. Not everything is predictable, because there is space for 
choice even though limits exist. Vico felt that certain structural transformations were 
deconstructing the old man-made cultural logic without giving human beings sufficient 
time to make a new cultural logic. In this sense, Vico saw his time as a transient era from 
the old man-made cultural logic to a new one.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
On the nature o f man, Vico believed that man is a cultural being who participates in a 
cultural community. Vico emphasized the negative impact of the structural 
transformation of traditional institutions on people. Vico felt that human beings are 
becoming like atomic mechanical matter. Vico held that this does not mean a process of 
achieving freedom and autonomy of individuals but rather a process o f dehumanization 
and alienation. This negative position came from the fact that Vico retained the 
Renaissance ideal o f the human being as a whole being. Vico secularized this ideal of the 
whole being, arguing that man creates himself by way of creating society; “for him 
[Vico] human nature, in the course o f seeking to satisfy its needs, cannot help 
transforming itself, and so constantly generates new characteristics, new needs, new 
categories of thought and action” (Berlin 1976: 37-38). Thus, the growth o f man goes 
together with the growth of institutional life of society. The whole being who belongs to 
a cultural community is characterized by his/her wholeness within him/herself, 
uniqueness and freedom, which is possible only in the process o f his/her communion with 
society. According to this tradition, human beings can not be reduced to a part o f a 
machine that has only a specific function, because they are assumed to be like a self- 
sufficient cosmos. Human beings are also assumed to be an integral part o f society; 
without society, human beings can not achieve self-sufficiency because it is human 
beings who made society. Vico lamented the situation in which human beings are 
reduced to atomic matter, robbed of their spirituality, and totally disconnected from the 
larger society, and in which they think and act in accordance with the seemingly 
universal law of utility maximization.
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Although Vico also characterized man mainly as a rational being, he did not restrict 
the notion of reason to the universal law o f utility maximization, which exists across time 
and space. Rather, Vico extended the notion of reason so as to imply a dynamic 
complexity situated in specific history and tradition in which human beings live, feel, 
desire, love, hate, eat, drink, create, worship, etc. In this new interpretation of reason, 
reason is seen as a historical product produced in specific historical, social, cultural, 
economic, and geographical contexts of each society. Vico was well aware that 
contemporary society tended to reduce hiunan reason into a capacity of calculating utility 
and to change the nature o f social interaction between people into a kind of exchange of 
utility. Against this, Vico wanted to use its notion of reason as the source o f identity of 
human beings and to make interaction between individuals into rational as well as non- 
rational ones based on historically and socially shared values, customs, habits, memories, 
etc. Based on a re-evaluation of the medieval and the Renaissance order, Vico 
recognized how important tradition, culture, and history are when human beings live, 
feel, desire, love, hate, eat, drink, create, worship, etc. Thus, every society has its own 
reason, because every society has its own specific tradition, culture, and history. Every 
individual also has its own reason, but this reason is similar to other individuals’ reasons, 
because every individual reason is constructed within the same community.
Epistemologically, Vico distinguished the humanities from the natural sciences. 
Human beings are primarily cultural; they feel, think, and act through their common 
language, culture, and tradition. Thus, Vico rejected the Enlightenment view of 
mathematical language that is assumed to be free of all contexts. Rather, Vico believed 
that “a particular type o f locution, the use and structure of a language, has a necessary.
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‘organic’ connection with particular types o f political and social structure, of religion, of
law, o f economic life, of morality, o f theology, of military organization, and so on”
(Berlin 1976: 51). In place of rationalist or empiricist epistemology, Vico emphasized
the poetic, artistic, intuitive, traditional, historical, and linguistic approaches to life and
knowledge. In the New Science, Vico sought to discover the poetic logic (New Science)
and set it up against the rational logic of the experimental-mathematical knowledge
(natural sciences). For Vico, myth is neither fictional nor as irrational as the rationalists
argue. It is the true narration that people made. As Vico (1968:21-22) put it:
We find that the principle o f these origins both of languages and of letters 
lies in the fact that the first gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of 
nature, were poets who spoke in poetic characters. This discovery, which 
is the master key of this Science, has cost us the persistent research of 
almost all our literary life, because with our civilized natures we 
[modems] cannot at all imagine and can understand only by great toil the 
poetic nature of these first men.
Thus, it can be said that Vico recognized that reality is poetically or discursively 
constructed. In this sense, Vico already took a linguistic turn: “Vico, like many modem 
interpretive social theorists, could establish his New Science only after he had taken a 
linguistic tum: he saw that inasmuch as the world in which men live is a world of 
institutions based on language, the task of the human sciences most resembles, and must 
be modelled on, the interpretation of texts” (Mali 1992:4). Through reading the 
collective symbolic figures and myths, we can understand the lives o f the people who 
made them.
Vico, who recognized the embeddedness of reason in culture and history, held that 
the diversity and multiplicity of life cannot be completely grasped by abstract and 
mathematical reasoning. Absolute objectivity and universal validity o f knowledge that
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the Enlightenment envisioned is impossible because the human subject is always situated 
in concrete culture and society. Human reason is not a priori but a historical capacity. In 
other words, human reason is part of life and history and, therefore, it is limited by its 
own historicity. Various non-rational approaches to knowledge and language shape 
consciousness o f human beings, and they are in tum shaped by the stmcture of culture. 
Each culture has its own categories and definitions, and thus, it should be understood 
internally in terms o f its own cultural categories, values, and standards. Vico, thus, 
preferred history to mathematics when he studied the social world. “The nature of 
institutions is,” argued Vico (1968:64), “nothing but their coming into being 
(nascimento) at certain times and in certain guises. Whenever the time and guise are thus 
and so, such and not otherwise are the institutions that come into being.” Thus, Vico was 
very critical o f all theorists who did not understand the systematically developing and 
altering succession o f outlooks and motives, such as natural law theorists, social contract 
theorists, utilitarians, individualists, materialists, and rationalists. From this perspective, 
a comparative-historical method is preferred. The key to all tmth and value lies in 
history, rather than in abstract rationality. Knowledge produced by human subjects 
situated in their concrete culture and society is always partial and relative.
In addition to this comparative-historical view, an interpretive or sympathetic method
was welcomed for understanding real human beings. Berlin (1999:44-45) summarized
the doctrine of Hamann, who was one o f the fathers of Romanticism as follows:
[I]f you really wish to enter into contact with human beings, if you really 
wish to understand what they think, what they feel and what they are, then 
you must understand every gesture, every nuance, you must watch their 
eyes, you must observe the movement o f their lips, you must hear their 
words, you must understand their handwriting, and then you come to 
direct acquaintance with the actual sources of life. Anything less than
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that, the attempt to translate a man’s language into another language, to 
classify all his various movements by some anatomical or physiognomical 
means, to try to put him into a box with a lot o f other people and produce a 
learned volume which will simply classify him as one of a species, one o f 
a type, that is the way to miss all knowledge, that is the way to kill, that is 
the way to apply concepts and categories, hollow baskets, to the 
palpitating, unique, asymmetrical, unclassifiable flesh of living human 
experience.
On the direction of history, Vico criticized the “Great Idea of Progress” by 
revitalizing the Greek cyclic view of history. Vico saw history in terms of rise, growth, 
decline, and fall of both the mental life of men and the institutional life o f society.
Basing himself on his study o f the Greek and Roman societies, Vico argued that all 
societies pass through essentially the same stages of development; Age o f  the Gods, Age 
of the Heroes, and Age o f Men. But particular societies traverse this path in different 
ways and with varying tempo because they have their own individualities. Vico thus 
agreed with some arguments of the Enlightenment view on human progress, but he 
recognized that achievement has a cost. The Age of Men is the most developed state, but 
it also signifies decadence, which might in tum lead to a beginning o f a new cycle. Vico 
recognized the gradual progress of science and technology and the improvement of 
material life o f individual and society, but he lamented that these sorts o f progress injured 
the moral perfection of men and society. Thus, Vico explained the structural 
transformation o f the West in terms of the alienation and fragmentation o f human beings. 
In Vico’s eyes, this transformation tended to reduce the whole individual into a mere 
function as well as to detach the individual from his/her community with which s/he has 
to be in harmony. But Vico was not totally pessimistic; Vico believed that a new cycle 
would start again. This new and upcoming society or civilization might be totally 
different from the old one. It will have its own life cycle o f rise, growth, decline, and fall
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
of both the mental life o f  men and the institutional life o f  society, operating according to 
its own law. Nevertheless, Vico did not believe that the history of mankind showed the 
total diversity of man. It is rather Herder who argued this: “Only in Herder’s early work 
o f 1774 do we find the historicist position formulated in its radical form: the conception 
that every age must be viewed in terms of its own immediate values; that there is no 
progress or decline in history, but only value-filled diversity” (Iggers 1983: 30).
The moral implications of this view are partly antithetical and partly complementary 
to the Enlightenment view. Unlike the Enlightenment philosophers who tried to compose 
universal ethics, Vico, who was well acquainted with anthropological and historical 
works, recognized that there is no natural man whose substance is given once and for all. 
Rather, there are social men who belong to a variety o f cultural communities, and thus, 
there are different ethics based on each specific community. Accordingly, there is no 
universal right of the human being and universal ethics valid across time and space; 
rather, there are specific morals and ethics which are bound to their specific contexts. 
Vico, for instance, severely attacked the seventeenth century natural law theorists who 
assumed “a fixed, universal human nature, from the needs of which it is possible to 
deduce a single set of principles of conduct, identical everywhere, for everyone, at all 
times, and constituting therefore the perennial basis of all human laws, whatever special 
modifications and adjustments might be required by changing times and circumstances. 
For Vico there is no static nucleus, no unalterable minimum of this kind” (Berlin 1976: 
84).
Thus, Vico was strongly against the Enlightenment utilitarianism in which morality is 
equated with utility. Instead, following the Aristotelian and Christian view of human
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beings, Vico envisioned that human beings have their potential capacities as a whole 
microcosm. These potential capacities can be differently achieved according to the 
development o f a whole society as a macrocosm. In a decadent age when men lose their 
wholeness and when hedonistic, utilitarian, and nihilistic trends prevail, morality will be 
equated with utility. As critical of this utilitarian morality of the Age o f Men, Vico also 
criticized the slave morality of the Age o f Gods. Frightened by terror and fear of the 
uncontrollable nature, primitive men imagined and created external entities of mysterious 
authority and gave their absolute obedience to them. In a word, man is ruled by his self- 
made, mysterious Gods. In this age, morality is equated with absolute obedience. 
Although recognizing that any morals and ethics are possible according to their contexts, 
Vico tended to prefer a kind of pietism that emphasizes spiritual rather than material life. 
Vico worried about situations where the technological and scientific achievements rob 
individuals o f their spiritual interests. This spiritual life is possible only in a community 
in which every individual fully participates; “the spiritual activity of men—expressed in 
art and literature, religion and philosophy, laws and sciences, play and work—consists 
not in the creation o f objects, o f commodities or artifacts, the value o f which resides in 
themselves, and is independent of their creators and their characters and their purposes— 
but in forms o f communication with other men” (Berlin 1976: xxii).
Translated into political terms, Vico envisioned the most desirable state as being a 
pluralist democracy. Vico believed that the growth of men comes together with the 
growth of society. Every individual has his/her own purpose in life and s/he 
simultaneously shares the same purpose as the community s/he belongs to. “Unity in 
diversity” is Vico’s motto; necessity and freedom do not contradict each other. Vico
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projected as ideal society a spiritually unified, communal, and group-centered order.
What is at stake here is that people are spiritually unified. This does not just mean that 
individuals are unified by common sense or a collective sense, but also that every 
individual is pious. This pietism does not mean a passive one: “If you cannot obtain from 
the world that which you really desire, you must teach yourself not to want it. If you 
cannot get what you want, you must teach yourself to want what you can get” (Berlin 
1999: 37). Rather, it means active pietism: Even though I can obtain from the world that 
which I really desire, I will teach myself not to want it. In this sense, the individuals in a 
spiritually unified, communal, and group-centered order are the pious artists who have 
their own inner lives. This argument seems to be self-contradictory, but it is possible 
because a spiritually unified, communal, and group-centered order is not an object 
detached from its makers, i.e., the pious artists who have their own inner lives, but is part 
of a living process of communication between its makers. Pietism is possible only when 
the individual has his own “inner” life. Moreover, self-expression is possible only for the 
pious individual. In this sense self-expression is part o f the essence o f the human being 
as such. Thus, a spiritually unified, communal, and group-centered order is the self- 
expression o f a living process o f communication between its makers. In this way, Vico 
presented a new communal order in which every individual will realize his/her potential 
capacities as a whole microcosm who recognizes the purpose of the public as his/her 
own.
In this society, freedom (voluntary activities of the individual) and necessity 
(restrictions o f the social institutions) do not contradict each other any more. But Vico 
believed that every society might achieve this goal in its own way. Vico thus did not
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encourage imperialism which aims to eliminate the diversity o f culture over the world, 
but rather a pluralism which allows all kinds of culture to flower; Vico believed that 
every culture has its own inner life which would be expressed in a variety of cultural 
forms: “Every culture expresses itself in works of art, of thought, in ways o f living and 
action, each of which possesses its own character which can neither be combined nor 
necessarily form stages o f a single progress towards a single universal goal” (Berlin 
1991:65).
In short, the Counter-Enlightenment, represented most systematically by Vico, tried 
to moralize ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics against what it saw as the extreme 
Enlightenment version as the scientization of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. 
These ideas of the Counter-Enlightenment thus criticized the dark side o f the 
Enlightenment. The following are the basic ideas of the Counter-Enlightenment as the 
moralization of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
1) The Counter-Enlightenment as the moralization of ontology: The distinction 
between being and non-being, and between universals and particulars is historically made 
by men. Thus, there are many constellations of distinctions among being and non-being, 
and universals and particulars. This ontology is applied to society and man. The 
Counter-Enlightenment saw society as a man-made cultural community, where people 
speak the same language, live on the same soil, and possess the same habits, a communal 
past, and common memories. In this sense, every society has its own values because it 
has its own specific tradition, culture and history. An ideal society is characterized by a 
spiritually unified, communal, group-centered order. The Counter-Enlightenment saw 
man as a historical being who creates himself by way of creating society. Humans create
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society on the basis o f historical patterns that predecessors happened to make. Humans 
behave in similarly patterned ways because they share values, customs, habits, memories, 
etc. within communities. Simultaneously, human beings are expressive subjects because 
they preserve their own inner life, which is not contradictory to communal life. Rather, 
each individual’s inner life is made in the course o f communicating with other 
individuals in the community.
2) The Counter-Enlightenment as the moralization of epistemology: The Counter- 
Enlightenment also assumed that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the 
order and connection of things. Although the Counter-Enlightenment believed the 
equation of being, language, and knowledge, it claimed that there are many constellations 
of equation of being, language, and knowledge in the human world. Thus, the form of 
the equation o f being, language, and knowledge differs from one to another culture. It is 
the practice o f human subjects that construct the equation of being, language, and 
knowledge. What is important here is the contextual nature of the human subject. The 
human subject is always situated in and limited by his own culture and society. The 
human subject as an epistemological subject is the carrier of the lived experience which is 
mediated by his/her specific cultural categories, values, and standards. The Counter- 
Enlightenment claimed that the diversity and multiplicity of life could not be completely 
grasped by abstract and mathematical reasoning only. According to the Counter- 
Enlightenment, absolute objectivity of and universal validity o f knowledge are 
impossible because each society has its own categories and definitions, and thus, it 
should be understood internally and in terms o f its own cultural categories, values, and 
standards.
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3) The Counter-Enlightenment as the moralization o f ethics/politics: The Counter- 
Enlightenment has a cyclical notion of temporality, according to which history moves 
from rise, growth, decline, and fall of both mental life of men and institutional life of 
society. The Counter-Enlightenment believed that there is a variety of cultural 
communities, each o f which has its own ethics that is bound to its specific contexts.
There is no universal ethics, but the ideal of ethics is still to live spiritually. This spiritual 
life refers to the control of body by the spiritual life of the community. Politically, the 
Counter-Enlightenment presented a pluralist democracy, in which freedom (voluntary 
activities of the individual) and necessity (restrictions o f the social institutions) do not 
contradict each other because all members are pious artists who have their own inner 
lives. In this sense, all individuals should be socialized enough to voluntarily adjust their 
individualities to spiritual commonalities of society.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POSTMODERN AS THE AESTHETICIZATION OF ONTOLOGY, 
EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ETHICS/POLITICS
I define the postmodern as the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and 
ethics/politics, which has proceeded from the early 1960s to the present in advanced 
Western societies. Nevertheless, I do not claim that the moralization of ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics is not important in defining the postmodern. What I 
really referring to is that the moral challenge to science is not new; there was the moral 
challenge from the start of the modem. What is new in the postmodern is the aesthetic 
challenge to the modem. The following is a philosophical rephrasing of the postmodem.
(1) The postmodem as the aestheticization of ontology; The traditional ontological 
distinction between “being” and “non-being” is blurred. The ontological privilege o f 
“what is” over “what is not” is overtumed. As a result, there is no original. Everything is 
a copy of a copy o f a copy, ad infinitum.
(2) The postmodem as the aestheticization of epistemology: The traditional 
epistemological equation o f being, language, and knowledge is blurred. As “being” is a 
copy of a copy of a copy, ad infinitum, so are language and knowledge. The distinction 
between reality and discourse is also blurred. As there is no vantage point from which 
“being” is grasped, “non-being,” which has not been represented in thought, begins to be 
represented.
66
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(3) The postmodern as the aestheticization o f ethics/politics: The traditional notion of 
temporality as a linear progress toward betterment is lost. As a result, the traditional 
moral ideal o f self-sufficiency which is based on the control of the body by reason for 
future rewards is senseless because there is no future. The traditional politics of 
inclusion/exclusion based on negation: x = x = not y (I = I = not You), is senseless 
because “I” and “you” are entangled in multiple ways.
Postmodern Social Theory 
In order to grasp postmodern social theory, I will categorize it into two: 
poststructuralist postmodern social theory and critical postmodern social theory. 
Poststructuralist postmodern social theory utilizes poststructuralist linguistics for 
theorizing the postmodern. Poststructuralist postmodern social theory considers society 
as language (an indefinite signifying chain), and argues that society can be best studied 
through linguistics. Critical postmodern social theory utilizes post-Marxist political 
economy for theorizing the postmodern. It sees society in general in Marxist terms of 
base and superstructure, and characterizes contemporary Western advanced societies as 
the most developed form o f capital. Critical postmodern social theory connects the 
aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics with the restless 
transformative activity of capital accumulation, and tries to see the postmodern within a 
given historical framework as related to one another as to a totality.
1. Poststructuralist Postmodern Social Theory 
The term poststructuralism always comes together with the term structuralism.
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According to Sarup (1993), structuralism and poststructuralism have many similarities: a 
critique of the human subject, historicism, meaning, and philosophy. But there is a 
fundamental difference between structuralism and poststructuralism. Intellectually, 
structuralism belongs to the rationalist version of the Enlightenment. Structuralism tries 
to discover the truth, a deep structure lying behind appearances. This structure is 
linguistically organized, a system of groups o f binary opposition o f the signified and the 
signifier. In this structure, there is a master code that determines others within the 
system. By contrast, poststructuralism intellectually belongs to the tradition of the 
aesthetic, especially the anti-Enlightenment tradition. Poststructuralism developed out of 
a disillusionment with structuralism. Poststructuralism is anti-scientific; it does not 
believe that there is a deep structure lying behind appearances. Binary opposition 
between the signified and the signifier is deconstructed. Poststructuralism criticizes 
structuralism which sees language as closed structures of oppositions by giving primacy 
to the signifier over the signified. According to poststructuralism, the signifiers do not 
rest in the signified. The signified is only a moment of a never-ending process o f the 
infinite, intertextual play of the signifiers. Thus, language is approached as a self- 
referential system o f differences. There is no “being,” but only “becoming.” Therefore, 
poststructuralism denies the existence of a master code.
Structuralism developed in post-WW II France. Many parts of France were destroyed 
during the war, and its people were weary o f change and destruction. They wanted to 
rebuild social stability through applying scientific knowledge to their country. Marxism, 
existentialism, and phenomenology dominated the intellectual scene in the post-WW II 
France, but by 1960s they were superseded by structuralism (Poster 1975). There might
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be many reasons for this change, but two seems to be decisive. Intellectually, most 
French intellectuals sought for scientificity and “structuralism promised a rigorous 
method and some hope for making decisive progress toward scietificity” (Dosse 1997a: 
xix). Structuralism adopted modem structural linguistics as a primary model of science ) 
and applied it to social phenomena. During those days, “linguistics was a pilot science 
guiding the steps o f the social sciences as a whole toward scientificity” (Dosse 1997a: 
X X ). Institutionally, the boom of structuralism was related to the continuous growth of 
French capitalism, in which wages and profits steadily increased in parallel. In fact, this 
was not a unique French phenomenon; firom the late 1940s, Western capitalism in general 
enjoyed continuous economic growth. The age o f ideology seemed to end. Structuralism 
fitted this ambience because it focused on stability and synchrony rather than change and 
diachrony.
In post-World War II France, Ferdinard de Saussure was revitalized as the founder of 
modem linguistics. Saussure established “the arbitrariness of the sign, showing that 
language is a system o f values established neither by content nor by experience, but by 
pure difference” (Dosse 1997a: 44). The linguistic sign joins a concept (a signified) with 
an acoustic image (a signifier) whose link is arbitrary. Saussure was only interested in 
the relationship between the signified and the signifier and excluded the referent. The 
meaning of a sign does not lie in the connection between the sign and the referent, but in 
the connection between the sign and the overall system o f language. In this sense, 
language creates rather than conveys meaning; it is language that constructs reference. 
Language is a system o f signs whose meanings lie in relations of difference: “in language 
there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive
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terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences 
without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has 
neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and 
phonic differences that have issued from the system”(Saussure 1966: 120). Saussure 
argued that the oppositional or binary relation o f sign in a specific language system 
generates the meaning o f the sign. In this sense, the oppositional or binary relation o f 
sign is the fundamental structure which determines the meaning o f the sign in a specific 
language system. Saussure also conceived o f language mainly as a synchronic system. 
When a person is bom, this system is given as a synchronic system. As a result, the 
meaning that language produces is stable; a sign is the inseparable union between the 
signified and the signifier within language. In this sense, language acquires autonomy.
In this formalistic notion o f language, the speaking subject is eliminated.
Through Jakobson’s stmctural linguistics, Claude Lévi-Strauss applied this 
Saussurean linguistics to anthropology. Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism embraced the 
positivistic tradition in two ways: first is “Comte’s idea that knowledge is only interesting 
if it borrows from a scientific model or manages to transform itself into a science or a 
theory”; and second is Comte’s inspiration “toward ‘holism,’ his desire to totalize” 
(Dosse 1997a: 13). Lévi-Strauss believed that stmctural linguistics would satisfy this 
positivistic project. Lévi-Strauss saw the social as a language: “[l]ike language, the 
social is an autonomous reality (the same one, moreover); symbols are more real than 
what they symbolise, the signifier precedes and determines the signified” (Lévi-Strauss, 
quoted in Dosse 1997a: 29). Thus, the social can be studied by linguistic methods in 
which phonemes play a decisive role: “[Ijike phonemes, kinship terms are elements of
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meaning; like phonemes, they acquire meaning only if  they are integrated into systems” 
(Lévi-Strauss, quoted in Dosse 1997a: 22). According to Jakobson, structural phonology 
is the model of models, whose code is binary. Following Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss 
believed that the social is structured according to a binary code. According to him, 
kinship relationships are like linguistic systems; just as signs stand in a binary 
relationship of opposition and correlation to each other, so do members of society to one 
another. The binary code is constants belying the multitude of identifiable variations. 
These constants are universal structures that manifest themselves in appearances. What is 
important here is that these universal structures are characterized by the unconscious. It 
is not the conscious subjects but the signifiers that are autonomous. Studying the 
reciprocal combination o f discrete signifiers will reveal the internal laws regulating 
language. In this sense, Lévi-Strauss emphasized synchrony over diachrony.
This structuralist project for a science o f human societies took off with Roland 
Barthes. In Mythologies (first published in 1957), Barthes analyzed petit-bourgeois 
culture as a myth that functions to eliminate reality by utilizing a linguistic model. 
Barthes worked within the binary opposition o f ideology and science. Using the 
linguistic model as a true scientific method, Barthes aimed to demonstrate how a myth 
functions in contemporary society. Here, the agent is myths, not human subjects.
Barthes contributed to the success of the linguistic model in social sciences.
In the 1950s, Jacques Lacan also applied the linguistic model to the unconscious. 
Rereading Freud through structural linguistics, Lacan embraced Lévi-Strauss’s notion of 
the unconscious as the site of structures, not Freud’s notion o f the unconscious as being 
composed o f primary processes. By connecting Freud’s condensation and displacement
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with Jakobsonian metaphor and metonymy, Lacan showed how the unconscious is 
structured like a language. Language is composed of phonemes and o f groups of 
phonemes. In this sense, “Lacan reversed Freud; the symbolic governed the structure 
whereas the id, which Lacan assigned to the Real, was at the core o f drives for Freud” 
(Dosse 1997a: 119). The human subject is the product or effect o f language. As a 
structuralist, Lacan gave priority to synchrony over diachrony. Lacan considered the 
Oedipal structure to be universal and autonomous with respect to all temporal and spatial 
contingencies. The Oedipal structure is characterized by the symbolic.
In the early 60s, other figures joined this poststructuralist project. In Madness and 
Civilization (first published in 1961), Michel Foucault demonstrated how madness was 
historically constituted as the other o f reason by discourses. In The Order o f  Things (first 
published in 1966), he claimed that the agents of knowledge and history are what he 
called “episteme,” not modem Man. According to Foucault, modem Man, who was 
considered as an autonomous agent, was a discursive effect.
Similarly in For Marx (first published in 1965) and Reading Capital (with Balibar, 
first published in 1965), Louis Althusser applied the structuralist method to Marxism. 
Althusser worked within the binary opposition of ideology and science. Althusser 
considered the late Marx as the real scientific Marx who presented a scientific theory of 
history utilizing structural categories such as social formation, the forces of production, 
relationships of production, etc.
In short, structuralism can be summarized as follows: 1) structuralism is a French 
version o f the scientific project, which aims to discover the truth, a deep structure lying 
behind appearances; 2) stmcturalism sees the social and the subject to be structured like a
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language as a system o f signs whose meanings are determined by the binary opposition of 
signs within itself; and 3) structural linguistics can be used to investigate the social and 
the subject.
In the 1970s, structuralism was superseded by poststructuralism even though “[w]hat 
American call poststructuralism existed even before the structural paradigm waned" 
(Dosse 1997b: 17). There might be many reasons for this change, but intellectual and 
institutional reasons should be pointed out. Intellectually, poststructuralism followed the 
Anti-Enlightenment tradition, especially Nietzsche’s attacks on Western philosophy and 
Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics: “Building on the legacy of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, poststructuralists stressed the importance o f differences over unities and 
identities while championing the dissemination o f meaning in opposition to its closure in 
totalizing, centered theories and systems’’ (Best and Kellner 1991: 22-23). Informed by 
the Anti-Enlightenment, poststructuralism challenged the scientific project of 
structuralism, radicalizing Saussure’s linguistics in which structure is assumed to be 
stable. Poststructuralists gave primacy to the signifier over the signified and thus opened 
the dynamic productivity of language. Institutionally, the decline of scientific project 
was related to the dynamic change of capitalism, which was often termed as the 
postindustrial society, the consumer society, the society of spectacle, etc. Post-war 
France saw a rapid development of (monopoly) capitalism, mass communication 
technologies, and mass consumption (Best and Kellner 1991: 16-18). This challenged the 
post-war bureaucracy, which was represented by the events o f May 1968 and the 
turbulent politics o f the period. The subject of this challenge did not come from the 
working class as traditional Marxism predicted. Rather, radical students and social
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minorities played an important role in protesting against bureaucracy. Influenced by the 
Situationists who demanded the overthrow of all bureaucratic regimes, radical students 
and social minorities were not after reconstruction; they wanted to deconstruct existing 
rules, codes, structures, etc. “The events o f May appeared as a sort o f cultural 
upheaval/street theater/happening/performance art as much as a political protest. Wall 
posters and leaflets put into question not only capitalism, representative democracy, and 
bureaucracy, but the parties of the Left, the star system of radical intellectuals, and the 
culture o f daily life in advanced industrial society" (Poster 1990; 131). Structuralism lost 
support, because it contained a stable notion o f structure; “In May, the mythology of a 
return to Eden with its (anti)rules, (anti)structure, and anti(law) was expressed in a 
hostility toward the dominant, structuralist intellectual methodology" (Turkle 1992: 70). 
In this social ambience poststructuralism emerged.
Most scholars agree that one o f the chief figures of poststructuralism is Jacques 
Derrida. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Derrida clearly proposed a new notion of 
language that is different from the structuralist one, radicalizing Saussure’s notion of 
language. Saussure saw sign as an inseparable union of the signified and the signifier, 
excluding the referent from a linguistic concern. Lacan considered the signifier and the 
signified as two distinct and separate orders. Lacan contended that the two realms of 
signifier and signified are never unified and the signifier is superior to the signified 
because the signified is the secondary and passive effect o f the signifier. The final, fixed 
meaning is impossible because o f “an incessant sliding of the signified under the 
signifier" (Lacan 1977:154). Thus, there are not some opaque signified hidden behind 
signifiers, a deep structure. Derrida went further; he eliminated the signified “in favor of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
an indefinite signifying chain without any site at which it could be perceived” (Dosse 
1997b: 23). Derrida claimed that meaning is in a state of infinite regress by way of a 
continual deferral of signs to others: “The meaning of meaning is infinite implication, the 
indefinite referral of signifier to signified.. Its force is a certain pure and indefinite 
equivocality which gives signified meaning no respite, no rest.. it always signifies again 
and differs” (Derrida, quoted in Best and Kellner I991: 21). Language always entails a 
process of deferral and delay. There is no fixed stable structure. In this way, Derrida 
deconstructed the binary opposition between the signified and the signifier. According to 
Derrida, Western philosophy is structured in terms of binary oppositions such as 
good/bad, presence/absence, mind/matter, being/non-being, identity/difference, 
nature/culture, speech/writing, meaning/form, masculine/feminine, man/women, 
literal/metaphorical, positive/negative, reason/madness, etc. Further, there is a hierarchy; 
the first term is given privilege. The first positive term disavows its intimate dependence 
on its negative term and masquerades itself as self-present truth. According to Derrida, 
Western philosophy has been obsessed with this knowledge. Thus, Derrida called 
Western philosophy “metaphysics of presence” which identifies knowledge with self- 
present truth (Norris 1987). But it is impossibly ideal because it in fact depends on its 
negative terms. In this sense, Derrida refuted traditional ontology which has been based 
on binary opposition o f being and non-being: “Derrida renounced all ontology. The trace 
he perceived always eluded itself by a continuous veiling making it impossible to 
establish any meaning” (Dosse 1997b: 27).
Other major structuralists also began to depart fi-om structuralism to 
poststructuralism. Mainly using Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of text as being polyphonic
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within the text itself, Kristeva introduced a historical dimension to structuralism. In S/Z 
(1970), Barthes distanced himself from what he later considered to be the illusory 
reduction of all the stories “to a single structure” (Dosse 1997b: 57). Lacan also took a 
similar step. This might be seen as the first phase of poststructuralism, which was 
characterized by the “imperialism of the signifier” (Dews 1987: 110). Even though 
language was conceptualized as a decentered dynamic, its all-embracing feature was not 
challenged. Rather, everything became textualized. This textual poststructuralism 
conceived that there is nothing outside of language.
But there was a second phase in poststructuralism, which was characterized by the 
deconstruction of the textual and non textual. “It is precisely against this ‘imperialism of 
the signifier,’ however, that the second phase of post-structuralism turns. Attention 
begins to shift from language as all-embracing medium to the determinations which bear 
upon language; discourse starts to be seen as patterned and disturbed by non-discursive 
forces” (Dews 1987: 110). The referent o f language began to become an important issue. 
Language was no longer considered to be a self-perpetuating system which does not need 
the referent for signification. Poststructuralism brought the referent back. But this 
referent is not positivistic or phenomenological; rather, it is similar to what I defined as 
“the aesthetic.” The referent as the aesthetic resides at points o f impasse in language 
exchange, functioning to make signification possible. The referent as the aesthetic 
always tries to return as a subversive force. Many poststructuralists began to challenge 
the monolithic notion of language by reintroducing the non-discursive referent. Lacan’s 
notion o f the real, Foucault’s notion of power, Lyotard’s notion o f the figurai, Deluze and
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Guattari’s notion o f desire were some examples. Thus, textual poststructuralism was 
challenged by more materialist poststructuralism.
In short, poststructuralism can be seen as an anti-scientific project which deconstructs 
an invariant structure by making it an infinite game o f differences. This project was 
highly philosophical or literary. Its main figures were relatively less interested in the 
social than the textual. But through the late 1960s and the 1970s, poststructuralism began 
to permeate other areas. Especially, poststructuralism began to be associated with 
postmodernism, from which poststructuralist postmodern social theory emerged. 
Poststructuralist postmodern social theory utilized poststructuralism for explaining and 
investigating ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics in Western societies since 
World War II. In this sense, poststructuralist postmodern social theory situated 
poststructuralism within institutional change in the advanced Western societies. What is 
distinct is that poststructuralist postmodern social theory understood this institutional 
change in terms o f postindustrial society or information society, a non-capitalist society 
based on the production, ownership, and exchange o f knowledge. Poststructuralist 
postmodern social theory replaced the category of class as the operative unit of social 
analysis or relegated it to historical utility only. In different words, poststructuralist 
postmodern social theory denied that there are “structured” contradictions in advanced 
Western societies. According to poststructuralist postmodern social theory, the most 
spectacular feature in institutional change is the textualization of the social institutions, in 
which multiple types o f  linguistic experiences bombard individuals so as to change them 
into masses. The main point is that the social has become an indefinite signifying chain, 
in which traditional binary oppositions are deconstructed. Poststructuralist postmodern
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social theory tried to understand this aestheticized world from the perspective o f  the 
aesthetic. It replaced the relations of production with the relations o f consumption as the 
key dimension o f advanced Western societies, and claimed that the relations of 
consumption exist outside the relations o f production in postmodern Western societies 
and, thus, are exempt from political economy. The relations o f consumption operate 
according to the poststructuralist notion of language (the play o f differences). In this 
sense, poststructuralist postmodern social theory embraced the aesthetic as the primary 
model o f knowledge.
Foucault presented poststructuralist thoughts which many postmodernists utilized for 
their purpose, but he himself did not situate his thoughts within the institutional change of 
Western societies since World War II. Foucault’s main target lied in the critique of 
modernity, not an analysis of postmodemity. Derrida and Lacan are similar. They are 
poststructuralists but not poststructuralist postmodern social theorists. It was later 
postmodernists who utilized Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan when discussing 
postmodernism (for instance, see Poster 1989,1990; Best and Kellner 1991). Derrida, 
Foucault, and Lacan did not develop analysis of postmodern forms of society or culture. 
Their works concentrated mainly on epistemological issues.
In this respect, Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari, and Baudrillard are different. First of 
all, they linked poststructuralism with the institutional changes of Western societies since 
World War n. In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard concentrated on conditions of 
postmodern knowledge and challenged modem knowledge with postmodern knowledge. 
Lyotard, even though implicitly, situated his critique o f modem knowledge within the 
institutional change o f Western societies since World War H. He understood this change
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in terms of the discourse o f postindustrial society. Deleuze and Guattari, and Baudrillard 
linked poststructuralism more explicitly with the institutional changes o f Western 
societies since World War H. Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 33) situated the forms of 
subjectivity within their social structures: “schizophrenia is the product of the capitalist 
machine, as manic-depression and paranoia are the product of the despotic manic, and 
hysteria the product of the territorial machine.” Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 33) argued 
that “[cjapitalism is in fact bom of the encounter o f two sorts o f flows: the decoded flows 
o f production in the form of money-capital, and the decoded flows o f labor in the forms 
of the ‘free worker.’” In this sense, the most characteristic and the most important 
tendency of capitalism is the decoding of flows and the deterritorialization o f the socius. 
Capitalism “continually draws near to its limit, which is a genuinely schizophrenic limit” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 34). This tendency produces the condition in which the 
schizophrenia is massively produced: “As for the schizo, continually wandering about, 
migrating here, there, and everywhere as best he can, he plunges further and further into 
the realm of deterritorialization, reaching the further limits o f the decomposition o f the 
socius on the surface of his own body without organs.” Baudrillard utilized some 
semiotic versions of information society theory when explaining the historical change. 
Baudrillard (1994: 121) distinguished three orders o f simulacra: “simulacra that are 
natural, naturalist, founded on the image, on imitation and counterfeit, that are 
harmonious, optimistic, and that aim for the restitution or the ideal institution of nature 
made in God’s image; simulacra that are productive, productivist, founded on energy, 
force, its materialization by the machine and in the whole system of reproduction—a 
Promethean aim o f a continuous globalization and expansion, of an indefinite liberation
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of energy (desire belongs to the utopias related to this order of simulaca); simulacra of 
simulation, founded on information, the model, the cybernetic game—total 
operationality, hyperreality, aim o f total control.” Baudrillard situated poststructuralism 
within the age o f simulacra of simulation which has no referent or ground in any reality 
except its own. In the age of simulacra of simulation, a hyperreality, a world of self- 
referential signs, that electronically-mediated media generate, replaces reality.
In addition, Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari, and Baudrillard all agreed that the social 
has become like a language, but had slightly different positions about the nature of 
language. Lyotard, and Deleuze and Guattari had similar view on the nature of language: 
they all embraced the second phase of poststructuralism, a more materialist 
poststructuralism. They all emphasized that there is an asignifying element, the aesthetic 
that resides at points of impasse in language exchange, functioning to make signification 
possible. From his early intellectual career, Lyotard contrasted the figurai with the 
discursive. If the discursive is the condition o f representation to consciousness by a 
rational order o f concepts, the figurai is an unspeakable other necessarily at work within 
and against discourse, disrupting the mle o f representation. With these two terms, 
Lyotard invented a more materialist poststructuralist notion of language. The critical 
discourse Lyotard valorized “seeks to make possible meanings that cannot be produced or 
presented directly or immediately within the linguistic code: meanings that are not extra- 
linguistic in nature, but not entirely linguistics or discursive in nature either” (Carroll 
1987: 33). Deleuze and Guattari are similar. They rejected representation itself because 
they considered “representation to be not just a distortion of desire but the principal 
means o f  repressing desire and o f betraying its authentic schizophrenic form” (Holland
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1999: 22). By contrast, Baudrillard accepted the first phase of poststructuralism, a textual 
poststructuralism which emphasizes merely the multiplication and dispersion of 
signification (see Kellner 1989a). This position appears more clearly in his later works 
such as Simulations, In the Shadow o f the Silent Majorities, Simulacra and Simidation, 
and Fatal Strategies, which I take as the primary postmodern texts of Baudrillard’s 
postmodern social theory.
Poststructuralism was actively imported to, and soon began to influence, American 
academe, especially the humanities. But it was the first phase of poststructuralism that 
influenced American academe during these days. Textual poststructuralism gained 
power especially in literary criticism. The Yale School represented this; it considered 
language as an autonomous system of purely internal relations. From the mid-1980s, 
social sciences began to investigate the social implications of poststructuralism. What is 
important here is that social sciences paid more attention to the second phase of 
poststructuralism which reintroduced the referent as the aesthetic.
In short, poststructuralist postmodern social theory can be summarized as follows: 1) 
it is an anti-scientific project, which aims to deconstruct any rigid hierarchical 
organization structured according to binary oppositions; 2) it sees the social as an 
indefinite signifying chain, in which traditional binary oppositions are deconstructed; 3) 
to investigate the social, it utilizes poststructuralist discourse theory, in which discourse is 
seen as being already heteronomous, complicated by absences and impasses.
In a nutshell, poststructuralist postmodern social theory characterized the postmodern 
by the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
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1) Ontology
a. The Nature of the Social
Lyotard argued that there were two basic representational models for society in the 
modem era: the functional model and the conflictual model. The functional model saw 
society as a unified totality, a “unicity,” in which the principle o f performativity prevails. 
By contrast, the conflictual model saw society as being divided in two, in which the 
principle of dualism resists the principle of performativity. Lyotard claimed that the 
functional model in fact happened to dominate advanced Western societies. Even the 
conflictual model has been absorbed into the functional model. Further, Lyotard argued 
that these two models are no longer appropriate for the postmodern condition. The 
reason is that the functional model (also the functionalized conflictual model) is based on 
the instrumental notion o f knowledge. The instrumental notion o f knowledge is valid 
only when society is considered as a giant machine in which one big language functions 
as the social bond. According to Lyotard, society has changed so as that the social bond 
becomes a fabric formed by the intersection of an indeterminate number o f language 
games. Lyotard argued that the nature o f the social bond in the postmodern condition 
increasingly relied on language games which are “heteromorphous, subject to 
heterogeneous sets o f pragmatic rules” (Lyotard 1984: 65). Lyotard understood the 
social in terms o f flexible networks of language games in which displacement or 
unexpected new moves are important. Thus, the precondition o f the instrumental 
knowledge changed. Lyotard refitted an overly reifying view of what is institutionalized 
even though he acknowledged the constraints of institutions that “function to filter 
discursive potentials, interrupting possible connections in the communication networks”
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(Lyotard 1984: 17). Lyotard (1984: 17) emphasized the flexible nature of institutions: 
“We know today that the limits the institution imposes on potential language ‘moves’ are 
never established once and for all (even if  they have been formally defined). Rather, the 
limits are themselves the stakes and provisional results of language strategies, within the 
institution and without.” In this sense, Lyotard saw society as consisting o f diversified 
groups equipped with their own language game. This pluralist notion of society is, 
however, different fi'om traditional one. Lyotard’s pluralist society emphasizes the 
incommensurability among language games.
Deleuze and Guattari claimed that capitalism subverts Being through its incessant 
cycles of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, and criticized traditional ontology 
such as “the root-book” and “the fascicular root,” and presented their alternative 
ontology, rhizome. The law of the root-book is “the law o f reflection, the One that 
becomes two” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 5). In the fascicular root, “the principal root 
has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; and immediate, indefinite multiplicity of 
secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development. This time, 
natural reality is what aborts the principal root, but the root’s unity subsists, as past or yet 
to come, as possible” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 5). The rhizome is characterized by 
several principles. First and second are “principles of connection and heterogeneity” in 
which “any point o f a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7). Third is the principle o f multiplicity: “A multiplicity has 
neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot 
increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws o f combinations 
therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 8).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
Last is the principle o f asignifying rupture: “against the oversignifying breaks separating 
structures or cutting across a single structure. A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a 
given spot, but it will start up again on one o f its old lines, or on new lines” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987:9). In short, Deleuze and Guattari considered the social as a complex of 
bodily intensities in a state o f continuous nonlinear movement, which is characterized by 
multidimensional and discontinuous logic. In this sense, they presented an aesthetic 
ontology, “a new ontology o f the social, o f social being, grounded in a philosophical 
ontology of Being as pure difference or Becoming" (Bogard 1998: 54).
Embracing a semiological view on society, Baudrillard claimed that signs and codes 
are the primary constituents o f the social in the postmodern world. From his early works 
such as The Mirror ofProduction and Critique o f  Political Economy o f  the Sign, 
Baudrillard claimed that under capitalism the commodity has become a sign in the 
Saussurean sense. The meaning of a sign is arbitrarily determined by its position in a 
self-referential system o f signifiers. Consumer culture produces a surfeit of images and 
signs that gives rise to a simulational world. Consumer society saturated with images and 
signs effaces the distinction between the real and the imaginary. In his later work In the 
Shadow o f  the Silent Majorities, Baudrillard (1983: 67) claimed that the social is 
disintegrated into a mass o f individual atoms thrown into the absurdity of Brownian 
motion: “our ‘society’ is perhaps in the process of putting an end to the social, o f burying 
the social beneath a simulation of the social.” The system continues to produce the social 
through polling, voting, etc., but the masses “don’t express themselves, they are 
surveyed. They don’t reflect upon themselves, they are tested” (Baudrillard 1983:20). 
Thus, the effort of the system at producing the social does not belong to a dimension of
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representing the masses, but to one of simulation of the masses. In his later work Fatal 
Strategies, Baudrillard (1990: 150) presented a kind of Sadean view o f the world: “this is 
a world where there is no such thing as chance. Nothing is dead, nothing is inert, nothing 
is disconnected, uncorrelated or aleatory. Everything, on the contrary, is fatally, 
admirably coimected—not at all according to rational relations (which are neither fatal 
nor admirable), but according to an incessant cycle of metamorphoses." In this aesthetic 
world, traditional dichotomies between appearance and reality, surface and depth, subject 
and object collapse into a flattened universe of simulacra controlled by simulation models 
and codes.
b. The Nature of Man
Lyotard claimed that postmodern man is exposed to a lot o f language games, 
occupying nodal points of specific communication circuits: “A se lf does not amount to 
much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric o f relations that is now more 
complex and mobile than ever before. Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a 
person is always located at ‘nodal points’ of specific communication circuits, however 
tiny these may be. Or better: one is always located at a post through which various kinds 
of messages pass’’ (Lyotard 1984: 15). The social subject dissolves in the dissemination 
of language games. But the social subject is not a total passivity. By contrast, an 
unexpected “move” by the social subject is important because o f the agonistic nature of 
language game. As a result, social interaction becomes temporary and fragile: “the 
temporary contract is in practice supplanting permanent institutions in the professional.
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sexual, cultural, family, and international domains, as well as in political affairs"
(Lyotard 1984:66).
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari claimed that capitalism fosters schizophrenia, 
“creative semiosis unlimited by fixed meaning” (Holland 1999:21), “because the 
quantitative calculations of the market replace meaning and belief-systems as the 
foundation of society” (Holland 1999: 2). In this sense, the schizophrenic, not the 
neurotic, is the dominant subject under capitalism. The schizophrenic refers to the 
historical category which developed under capitalism. Capitalism as the social- 
production fosters the appearance o f the body-without-organs, which “might be actively 
dis-organ-ized so as to enable the production o f other forms o f organ-ization—or no fixed 
organ-ization at all” (Holland 1999:28). In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari 
also valorized schizos, nomads, rhizomes, all o f whom favors difference and multiplicity 
over identity and dichotomy: “Schizos withdraw fi-om repressive social reality into 
disjointed desiring states, nomads roam freely across open planes in small bands, and 
rhizomes are deterritorialized lined of desire linking desiring bodies with one another and 
the field of partial objects” (Best and Kellner 1991: 103). Deleuze and Guattari situated 
the schizophrenia within the limits of capitalism. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the 
schizophrenia is constituted through their place in the circuit o f information flows: “one 
is enslaved by TV as a human machine insofar as the television viewers are no longer 
consumers or users, nor even subjects who supposedly ‘make’ it, but intrinsic 
components pieces, ‘input’ and output,’ feedback or recurrences that are no longer 
connected to the machine in such a way as to produce or use it” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987:458). The schizophrenia “passes from one code to the other” and “he deliberately
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scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the 
questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never 
invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983:15). What is at stake here is that the human subject loses his/her self: 
“the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983:2). As a result, the human subject can simulate other 
simulators, which is antithetical to the traditional subject who plays social roles: “The 
schizo has no principles: he is something only be being something else. He is Mahood 
only by being Worm, and Worm only by being Jones. He is a girl only by being an old 
man who is miming or simulating the girl. Or rather, by being someone who is 
simulating an old man simulating a girl. Or rather, by simulating someone..., etc" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 87).
Baudrillard claimed that the electronically-mediated media such as TV transformed 
the subject into a pure screen, a switching center for all the networks o f influence. 
Embracing McLuhan’s media theory, Baudrillard saw the media as cybernetic noise in 
which all content implodes into form. The media obliterates meaning through 
neutralizing and dissolving all content. There is no more meaningful communication in 
the media because the hyperreality the media produces undermines the solid basis for 
meaningful communication. Saturated with information, images, events and ecstasies, 
the individual becomes more and more like terminals o f media: “media have a chilling 
effect.. .which freezes individuals into functioning as terminals o f media and 
communication networks who become involved as part and parcel o f the very apparatus 
o f communication. The subject, then, becomes transformed into an object as part of a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
nexus of information and communication networks” (Kellner 1989b: 71). Individuals 
become the silent masses who passively consume the media. Thus, stable and persistent 
interaction between silent mass is difficult because “the mass is what remains when the 
social has been completely removed” (Baudrillard 1983: 6-7).
2) Epistemology
Lyotard refuted the totalizing experience which covers science, morality, and ethics. 
Instead, Lyotard accepted Kant’s notion of the sublime. According to Kant, taste refers 
to the form of pleasure, which is achieved in an accord between the capacity to conceive 
and the capacity to present an object corresponding to the concept. By contrast, the 
sublime comes fi*om the contradiction between the faculty to conceive o f something and 
the faculty to present something. In other words, the sublime takes place “when the 
imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a 
concept” (Lyotard 1984: 78). Lyotard argued that modem art found its impetus from the 
aesthetic of the sublime, but that it had a nostalgia for a reconciliation of the concept and 
the sensible. Lyotard saw the postmodern as part of the modem, but he wanted to put 
forward “the unpresentable in presentation itself’ in order to “impart a stronger sense of 
the unpresentable” (Lyotard 1984: 81). He argued that the effort to totalize all human 
faculties into a real unity led to terror. According to Him, each human faculty has its 
own language game. It is impossible to make one true language which cover all human 
faculties. Lyotard (1984: 82), thus, announced that “Let us wage a war on totality; let us 
be witness to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the 
name.” Lyotard argued that modem scientific knowledge wanted to totalize all human
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faculties into a real unity, relying on the two grand narratives: the idea of progress and 
the idea of education as promoting the health o f the nation. But these grand narratives 
have lost its credibility in postindustrial society and postmodern culture in which science 
separates itself from these grand narratives. Science itself has become a kind o f language 
game: “science plays its own game; it is incapable o f legitimating the other language 
games” (Lyotard 1984: 40). Science lost its own legitimate narrative, and thus, it repeats 
within itself. This new situation opens up the discursive field to the proliferation of new 
languages which do not need to be legitimated by a grand narrative. As a result, a variety 
of little narratives generate their own knowledge whose legitimation “can only spring 
from their own linguistic practice and communication interaction” (Lyotard 1984:41). In 
this sense, the postmodern condition is characterized by infinitely proliferating language 
games.
Deleuze and Guattari criticized traditional epistemology, what they called 
“arborescent,” that tried to build systematic knowledge from the first principles. 
Traditional epistemology distorts the real mode o f the unconscious, posing fixed meaning 
on it. The unconscious operates without meaning: “The unconscious poses no problems 
of meaning, solely problems o f use. The question posed by desire is not ‘What does it 
mean?’ but How does it workT" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 109). Against 
foundationalism. they proposed rhizomatic epistemology that aims to uproot arborescent 
epistemology: “The concept has no subject or object other than itself. It is an act.
Nomad thought replaces the closed equation o f representation, x = x = not y (l = 1 = not
you) with an open equation: — + y + z + a + . . . ( . . .+  arm + brick 4- window +__).
Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the
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One (=Two) of self-reflection, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set o f disparate 
circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesizes a multiplicity o f elements without 
effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging” (Massumi 
1996: 6).
Baudrillard (1983: 19) argued that signs “no longer represent anything and no longer 
have their equivalent in reality” because the boundary between representation and reality 
implodes. Baudrillard situated this crisis o f representation within the era o f simulacra of 
simulation. According to Baudrillard, the era o f representation is over by the wide spread 
of simulated reality that electronically-mediated media generate. Simulation replaces 
representation. The hyperreality or simulated reality loses its referent, ground, or source. 
In this era, the traditional distinction between the subject and the object is obsolete, and 
so are traditional disciplines based on them. Sociology is one of them: “sociology can 
only depict the expansion o f the social and its vicissitudes. It survives only on the 
positive and definitive hypothesis of the social. The reabsorption, the implosion o f the 
social, escapes it. The hypothesis o f the death o f the social is also that of its own death” 
(Baudrillard 1983:4).
3) Ethics/Politics
Lyotard (1993:24) asked, “can we today continue to organize the mass o f events 
coming from the human and nonhuman world by referring them to the Idea o f a universal 
history of humanity?” Lyotard said, “No.” The reason is that Lyotard considered the 
event as “the fact or case that something happens, after which nothing will ever the same 
again. The event disrupts any pre-existing referential frame within which it might be
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represented or understood” (Readings 1990: xxxi). In this sense, the event disrupts the 
discourse, the process of representation by concepts, and it could not narrated by a 
universal subject of history. Lyotard criticized the moral ideal of self-sufficiency. He 
distinguished between two notion of desire: “desire as a longing for the lost object 
represented in phantasy, as ‘forbidden in its very depths,’ as negativity, and desire as the 
positive energy which disrupts discourse in order to embody the figurality of phantasy" 
(Dews 1987: 131). Unlike Freud and Lacan who defined desire as negativity or lack, 
Lyotard embraced desire as positivity. Desire disorients, disrupts, transgress, and 
transforms everything it touches. Desire also continually reverses directions and invests 
itself elsewhere and otherwise. By the same token, desire disrupts the moral ideal of self- 
sufficiency, which aims to control desire by concept. Lyotard is perhaps one of the most 
radical postmodernists who attack the ideal of identity politics. He did not believe that 
there should just resolution between the two sides of a conflict. Rather, he argued for the 
différend, “a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably 
resolved for lack o f a rule of judgement applicable to both argument” (Lyotard 1992: xi). 
Politics should not aim to bridge between absolute differences because “applying a single 
rule of judgment to both in order to settle their différend as though it were merely a 
litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both o f them if neither side admits this 
rule)” (Lyotard 1992: xi). Rather, politics should evoke or testify to différends so as to 
resist the injustice which silences those who cannot speak the same language (see 
Williams 2000).
Deleuze and Guattari (1987:25) attacked the temporal order: “A rhizome has no 
beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
.Where are you going? Where are you coming from? What are you heading for? These 
are totally useless questions.” They criticized the ideal of self-sufficiency as internalizing 
self-denial and submitting to Oedipal authority. For them, the ideal o f self-sufficiency 
means the desire of the people for their own repression. According to them, men have 
come to want fascism through Oedipalization. What is needed is to schizophrenize the 
individual unconscious: “Destroy, destroy. The task of schizoanalysis goes by way of 
destruction—a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage. Destroy 
Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet o f the superego, guilt, the law, castration” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 311). Deleuze and Guattari criticized identity politics for 
being based on negation: x = x = not y (I = I = not You). They proposed pre- or a-social 
arrangement o f the social, in which no hierarchy exists: “The space o f nomad thought is 
qualitatively different fi-om State space.. .Nomad space or ‘smooth,’ or open-ended. One 
can rise up at any point and move to any other” (Massumi 1996:6).
Baudrillard also argued that the linear notion of temporality disappeared in 
contemporary society: “there are no longer any stable structures, nexuses of causality, 
events with consequences, or forms o f determination through which one could delineate 
historical trajectories or lines of development. Everything instead is subject to 
indeterminism and an unpredictable aleatory confluence that produces vertigo ” (Best and 
Kellner 1991: 133). Baudrillard made the moral ideal of self-sufficiency nonsense by 
way o f giving the agency to objects, not subjects. The moral ideal of self-sufficiency 
evaporates in the system o f objects. Masses are obliged to strive for happiness and 
pleasure in consuming the sign value o f objects. Fun morality replaces the moral ideal of 
the self-sufficient. Baudrillard’s fatal strategies challenged identity politics that aims to
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include all members in the social system. Baudrillard saw identity politics as 
subordinating to the hyperconformity. Rather, Baudrillard argued that the ironic power 
of the masses is dangerous to the social, “the ironic power of withdrawal, of non-desire, 
non-knowledge, silence, absorption then expulsion of all powers, wills, of all 
enlightenment and depths o f meaning” (Baudrillard 1990; 99). Indifference and inertia of 
the masses are their true, their only practice to refuse to participate in the recommended 
ideals, a form of resistance. In this sense, staying outside of the social is a new politics: 
“A fatal strategy pursues a course o f action or trajectory to its extreme, attempting to 
surpass its limits, to go beyond its boundaries” (Best and Kellner 1991: 131).
2. Critical Postmodern Social Theory 
Critical postmodern social theory has a dubious relationship with poststructuralism. 
On the one hand, critical postmodern social theory agree to some extent with 
poststructuralism that language does not represent the referent. On the other hand, 
critical postmodern social theory argued that language represents more than itself.
Critical postmodern social theory concentrated on something more than language. For 
critical postmodern social theory, this “something more than language” is the restless 
movement of capital. Critical postmodern social theory is poststructuralist insofar as it 
sees the restless transformative activity o f capital accumulation to be disseminated like 
Derrida’s meaning. Critical postmodern social theory is critical insofar as it nevertheless 
does not stop tracking the movement of capital and its effects on the social. In this sense, 
critical postmodern social theory, unlike poststructuralist postmodern social theory, does 
not give up Marxist political economy. Like poststructuralist postmodern social theory.
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critical postmodern social theory documented that the social has become fragmented or 
textualized to an extent that there doesn’t seem to be structuring principles in society any 
more. But critical postmodern social theory believed that the seemingly fragmented 
particles are in fact related to each other. Thus, it is too early to give up the possibility of 
a totalizing theory. The main force to arrange or disarrange the seemingly fragmented 
particles is the movement of capital. But critical postmodern social theory did not see the 
movement of capital as a mechanical, subjectless process, and wanted to preserve the 
notion o f the subject when theorizing postmodernism. Like poststructuralist postmodern 
social theory, critical postmodern social theory acknowledged that the human subjects 
have become flexible, fluid, decentered, dispersed, etc. Nevertheless, critical postmodern 
social theory did not give up the agency of human subjects, who can connect their private 
petty affairs with the public grand structures. For this, critical postmodern social theory 
tried to ground critical analysis in historical and social contexts. In this sense, critical 
postmodern social theory preserved the morally practical as the primary model of 
knowledge. Critical postmodern social theory tried to interpret and change the world of 
aestheticized commodification from the perspective o f the morally practical.
Roughly, critical postmodern social theory has two versions: Hegelian-Marxist 
postmodern social theory and post-Fordist postmodern social theory. Hegelian-Marxist 
postmodern social theory is developed out of the Hegelian Marxism associated with the 
Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School articulated the transition from the stage of 
market capitalism to the stage o f organized, or state, capitalism. The Franfurt School tried 
to theorize the new relationship between economy and the state in the totalitarian and 
democratic forms of state capitalism. In this process, the Frankfurt School proposed new
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theories o f consumerism and the development of the consumer society (see Held 1980; 
Jay 1973; Kellner 1989a). Hegelian-Marxist postmodern social theory followed this 
tradition, theorizing new relationships between base and superstructure in postmodern 
period of late capitalism. Hegelian-Marxist postmodern social theory is represented by 
Fredric Jameson. Jameson proposed a unique synthesis o f Hegelian-Marxist tradition and 
French poststructuralism. But in this synthesis, Jameson relatively ignored the movement 
of capital itself while concentrating on the cultural logic of late capitalism. This feature 
is an inevitable result of one-sided acceptance o f the Frankfurt School. Early Frankfurt 
thinkers such as Pollock and Horkheimer who developed Marxist political economy in 
the 1930s were relatively forgotten in the Frankfurt School. Rather, cultural analyses of 
reification and commodification were accepted as a main theoretical contribution of the 
Frankfurt School to critical theory. Jameson, a literary critic, was not an exception. His 
analysis o f postmodernism concentrated on the new forms of reification and 
commodification in postmodern period of late capitalism.
Post-Fordist postmodern social theory developed out of Marxist political economy. 
Unlike Hegelian-Marxist postmodern social theory, post-Fordist postmodern social 
theory directly dealt with the movement of capital itself and its impact on society in 
general. Post-Fordist postmodern social theory is represented by David Harvey. 
Modifying Marx’s political economy, Harvey paid attention to the change of the mode of 
regulation and its impact on other spheres o f society.
These two critical postmodern social theories agreed with poststructuralist 
postmodern social theory in that ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics in 
contemporary Western societies have become aestheticized. However, neither abandon
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the effort to discern the main force for this aestheticization. According to both, the main 
force is capital: it is the totalizing force underlying the process o f aestheticization o f the 
social and the individual. But they emphasized different aspects of capital. Following 
the Frankfurt School tradition, Jameson emphasized the expanding power of capital to all 
spheres. The commodifying logic of capital penetrates into all spheres including nature 
and the unconscious. Jameson implicitly suggested that capitalist commodity relations 
extend in an inexorably “smooth” way. By contrast, Harvey emphasized the inherent 
instability and morbidity o f the structures of capitalist accumulation. For Harvey, the 
notion of “crisis” is important.
Before presenting his unique position about postmodernism, Jameson was famous for 
being a Marxist literary critic, hi his early career, Jameson turned to the tradition o f 
European Hegelian Marxism through the works o f Sartre, Lukàcs, and the Frankfurt 
School. Marxism and Form (1971) represented this period. But in The Prison-House o f  
Language (1972), Jameson also tried to incorporate theories of Barthes, Althusser, 
Derrida, and other poststructuralists in his literary theory while criticizing their ahistorical 
and synchronic features. In this sense, Jameson synthesized Hegelian Marxism and New 
French Theory. In this synthesis, Jameson as a Hegelian Marxist favored a dialectical 
criticism, a double hermeneutic of ideological and utopian analysis: “thinking which 
contextualizes the object o f study in its historical environment; utopian thinking which 
finds utopian hope in literature, philosophy, and other cultural texts and which draws 
attention to these hopes as a vital source of critique and struggle” (Kellner 1989c: 13).
From the outset, Jameson did not abandon a totalizing theory which is characterized 
by inclusive and comprehensive framework. Following Lukàcs, Jameson considered
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“totality” to be a hallmark o f Marxist literary theory. Speaking in sociological terms, 
Jameson paid attention to both macro and micro levels. For instance, in The Political 
Unconscious (1981) Jameson investigated the complex relationship between modes of 
literary forms, bourgeois subjectivity, and various stages of capitalism. Jameson 
basically embraced Marx’s model o f base and superstructure, but he rejected a certain 
orthodox Marxist interpretation of base/superstructure, according to which culture is an 
ephenomenon of economy. Rather, Jameson proposed a dialectical view about the 
relation between base and superstructure, utilizing Althusser and Freud. Althusser and 
Freud provided categories such as overdetermination, uneven development, semi­
autonomy, reciprocal interaction, condensation, displacement, repression, etc., which 
enabled Jameson to overcome a deterministic interpretation of the relationship between 
base and superstructure. Jameson’s dialectic utilized imagination to make connections 
and to discern gaps, breaks, discontinuities, and contradictions between base and 
superstructure. “In this way, Jameson is faithful to the Marxian dialectic which relates all 
cultural and superstructural phenomena to the socio-economic foundation and which 
interprets stages of cultural and superstructural development in culture as part o f the 
trajectory of the history o f capitalism” (Kellner 1989c: 18). This totalizing theory does 
not presuppose the preexistence of reified, hypostatized totality. Rather, it aims to 
historically contextualize all subjects in order to properly explain, interpret, and change 
them.
Jameson soon turned from specialized literary theory and analysis to a more cultural 
theory and interpretation, which means the extension o f the totalizing theory to 
contemporary culture, and further, contemporary society in general. Jameson first
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presented his position about postmodernism in “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” 
(1983), in which he linked consumer culture with postmodernism. But here, Jameson 
merely attempted to distinguish some traits of postmodernist from modernist culture. In 
the follower year, Jameson published “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic o f Late 
Capitalism,” the expanded version of “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” in the 
New Left Review. As a response to poststructuralist postmodernists’ attacks of Marxism 
as an outmoded totalizing, productivist, and reductionist discourse, Jameson held onto 
Marxism and presented postmodernism as a new cultural totality and cultural dominant 
corresponding to a new stage o f late capitalism. Jameson basically agreed with 
poststructuralist postmodernism in that the social and the subject have become 
textualized, that a new methodology for investigating the social and the subject is needed, 
and that traditional ethics/politics based on the traditional notion o f subject should be 
abandoned. But Jameson did not accept that there is no structural force to (re)produce 
structured inequality. Thus, Jameson believed that a postmodern condition could be 
theorized within the framework of a neo-Marxist social theory. Following a Marxist 
totalizing theory, Jameson tried to theorize postmodernism as a wide range of cultural, 
social, economic, and political phenomena, not just as an aesthetic phenomenon. For 
Jameson, postmodernism must refer to cultural and aesthetic style, philosophical and 
political position as well as modes of social and economic organization. Thus, for 
Jameson postmodernism is much more than a purely cultural affair. For this, Jameson 
situated postmodern culture in the neo-Marxist model o f stages o f capitalist development. 
Following and modifying Mandel’s Late Capitalism (first published in Germany in 
1972), Jameson distinguished three periods within the history o f capitalism with their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
correspondences in the cultural forms: market capitalism and realism, monopoly or 
imperialist capitalism and modernism, and late capitalism and postmodernism. Late 
capitalism is capitalism in its late phase, which is in fact a purer, more developed, more 
realized form of capitalism. Postmodernism is a new stage of “cultural development of 
the logic o f late capitalism” (Jameson 1984a: 85).
Even though acknowledging the determining force of economic base, Jameson spent 
little time analyzing it in this article and subsequent articles. In fact, Jameson devoted 
virtually all of his attention to culture. This is the weakest point in Jameson’s analysis of 
postmodernism: Jameson did not “adequately provide a foundation for his theory in a 
systematic analysis of the political economy o f the present age” (Kellner 1989c: 28).
This weakness is perhaps a logical consequence when Jameson embraced the totally 
administered society thesis of the Frankfurt school. In the postmodern era, even culture, 
which used to resist the commodifying logic o f capital, is totally colonized by capital, 
serving a socioeconomic function to reproduce capitalism itself. Everything has become 
cultural, and thus, we don’t have to study the economic base separately.
Harvey’s postmodern social theory filled this gap, working within the horizon of 
post-Fordism. Post-Fordism emerged out of the economic downturn o f the 1970s 
onwards. If  information society theory emphasized the possibility o f rebirth of the 
advanced society, post-Fordist society theory paid attention to the nature and causes o f 
the economic downturn. From the late 1940s onwards, the economies of industrialized 
countries enjoyed continuous growth, with wages and profits steadily increasing in 
parallel. However, in the early-l970s, the rate o f growth suddenly declined. At the same 
time, a rapid rise in the price o f oil and other raw materials substantially increased the
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costs o f production. As in previous decades, national governments responded to the 
crisis by adopting reflationary policies. But, imlike in earlier recessions, this strategy 
didn’t work. Instead, the economies of advanced societies entered a period of persistent 
inflation, currency instability, and growing unemployment.
In the course of explaining these phenomena, the Regulation School emanated from a 
group of French intellectuals who were influenced by Marxist economic tradition. The 
Regulation School began with a critique of scientific Marxism of the inter-years, which 
argued general, eternal laws applicable to all socioeconomic systems. The Regulation 
School rejected simple economism, and recognized the complexity and 
multidimensionality o f modem capitalism (Boyer 1990; Brenner and Click 1991). The 
Regulation School also objected to the pure neoclassical model of the economy in which 
all markets, including labor markets, tend toward equilibrium, and thus, ensure full 
employment. In fact, the Regulation School grew mainly out of Althusserian Marxism 
and a simultaneous critical distantiation from it. Althusser showed the contradictory 
character o f social relations o f production. But many felt that Althusser’s notion of 
reproduction as a subjectless process was too static to explain economic crisis at the time: 
“Althusser had upset economist determinism, and advancing the concept of the mode of 
production as a structure articulated by three instances made it possible to complexify the 
analytical grid, and, advantageously, to leave the vulgate behind. But Althusserism was 
not satisfying for the regulationists when it described an essentially static reality and 
when, in the name o f combating historicism and evolutionism, it ignored transitions and 
changes” (Dosse 1997b: 289). The Regulation School did not take for granted “smooth” 
reproduction o f capitalism, and conceded the point that instability is part and parcel o f
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capitalist relations. The fundamental question asked by the Regulation School is: how 
does capitalism ensure its perpetuation in spite of this instability? As a response to this 
question, the Regulation School answered that there is the “mode of regulation” which 
manages instabilities. This argument was important in relation to structuralism: it not 
only conceived of instability o f capitalism, but also brought the subject back. The 
Regulation School reintroduced “actors in terms of groups and social categories, actors 
who were to become central to the analysis, particularly by inflecting the relationship of 
salaried workers, which became the most important instance in the long-term 
transformation of modes o f development” (Dosse 1997b: 294).
One o f the first works to present Regulation School theory to the United States is 
Michel Aglietta’s A Theory o f  Capitalist Regulation: The U.S. Experience (1979). In this 
historical study of transformation of American capitalism, Aglietta argued that Fordist 
regime o f accumulation, “a type o f  intensive accumulation based on mass production and 
consumption and on the accession of salaried workers to the American Way o f Life” 
(Dosse 1997b: 294), produced a post-War boom. In Fordist regime of accumulation, “the 
wage relation—the point at which workers exchange their labour for cash payment with 
which they must purchase the goods and services necessary to their maintenance— 
becomes the fulcrum o f capitalist development” (Heffeman 2000:25). But this post-War 
boom was only provisional, depending primarily on the ability of capital to stave off the 
“tendency for the rate of profit to fall.” As this tendency reasserted itself from the late 
1960s, the Fordist regime of accumulation began to break down, from which a neo- 
Fordist or post-Fordist regime might emerge. However, Aglietta did not see this 
breakdown as a mechanical breakdown in the system o f capitalist accumulation, but the
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exposure of the limits of a particular social formation. According to Aglietta. this 
exposure is expressed through struggles over the meanings o f  work, leisure and 
consumption:
[T]he crisis o f Fordism is first o f  all the crisis of a mode of labor 
organisation. It is expressed above all in the intensification of class 
struggles at the point o f production. By challenging conditions of work 
bound up with the fragmentation of tasks and intensification o f effort, 
these struggle showed the limits to the increase in the rate of surplus-value 
that were inherent in the relations of production organized in this type of 
labour process. This was the root of the crisis. It can be seen in the halt to 
the fall in real social wage costs that occurred simultaneously with the 
outbreak o f sporadic conflicts and endemic confrontations challenging 
work disciplines of the kind Fordism had established. But it is clear 
enough that the crisis extends to the sum total of relations o f production 
and exchange, and is upsetting the regime of intensive accumulation”
(Aglietta 1979:162).
Since Aglietta proposed his theme, the Regulation School has begun to attract some 
attention in both America and Europe. In the United States, Michael Piore and Charles 
Sahel’s The Second Industrial Divide (1987) popularized the theme of post-Fordism. In 
this book, they traced the origin of the crises in advanced societies since the 1970s. Piore 
and Sabel were very against both neoclassical view and neo-Marxist view because both 
of them considered mass production as the unique path o f technical progress. They 
argued that there is another tradition in the production system: a Proudhonist small-scale 
cooperative artisanal production (craft system). In the nineteenth century. Western 
societies stood on the way of the first industrial divide, and finally chose mass-production 
technologies, limiting craft system. Mass-production technologies entailed two decisive 
regulation crises in the late nineteenth century and in the 1930s. In the late nineteenth 
century, the large corporations emerged in order to deal with the first regulation crisis. In 
the 1930s, the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state appeared in order to deal with the second
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regulation crisis. But since the 1970s, the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state began to show 
its limit in regulating crisis. According to Piore and Sabel, this was due to the limitation 
of mass-production technologies. As an alternative to Fordism, they proposed “flexible 
specialization.” The saturation o f mass markets led to a growing differentiation of 
products, with a new emphasis on style and quality. More differentiated products 
required shorter nms and thus, smaller and more flexible production imits. This flexible 
specialization depended on new information technologies such as the computer. Flexible 
technology gave rise to flexible specialization and more highly skilled polyvalent 
workers to operate flexible technology. These highly skilled polyvalent workers did not 
need any more monolithic and bureaucratic Fordist trade-unions and political parties. 
Thus, the model of flexible specialization appeared more coherent in postulating a 
relationship between new technologies, new patterns of demand, and new forms of social 
organization of production.
These debates on the nature of economic change in the United States since the end of 
World War II developed independently of postmodern debates. But by the 1980s, 
debates on economic change and on cultural change began to intertwine with each other. 
A more comprehensive theory was needed. British sociologists were the first social 
scientists who began to see postmodernism as something worthy of serious attention 
(Bertens 1995: 209). These British sociologists were primarily Marxist-oriented scholars, 
especially post-Fordism-related scholars. In England, a variety o f post-Fordist society 
theory was presented by Marxists under the banner of “New Times.” This perspective 
was first stated in a series of articles in Marxism Today (the official journal of the 
Communist Party o f Great Britain) and then collections of these articles were published
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by the executive of the British Community Party as the Manifesto fo r  JVew Times (June 
1989). And in the same year, some critical articles in the Manifesto fo r  New Times and 
other critical responses to it were brought together in a book. New Times (Kumar 1995: 
50). Following Gramsci’s article “Americanism and Fordism,” the New Times School, 
unlike Piore and Sabel, defined Fordism in the broadest possible terms. As Hall and 
Jacques (1990: 12) put it: “Just as Fordism represented, not simply a form of economic 
organization but a whole culture.. so post-Fordism is also shorthand for a much wider 
and deeper social and cultural development.” The British version of post-Fordism tried 
to connect post-Fordist development with cultural phenomena.
Roughly, David Harvey, an American Marxist geographer, belonged to the New 
Times version o f post-Fordism. In The Condition o f  Postmodemity: An Inquiry into the 
Origins o f  Cultural Change (1989), Harvey generally identified Fordism with 
institutionalization of modernist precepts and experiences in culture and social life and 
connected the breakdown o f Fordism and the turn towards “flexible specialization” with 
the rise to cultural dominance of postmodernist features in social and cultural life. In 
short, Harvey focused on the socio-economic factors responsible for the transition from 
modernity to postmodemity.
In a nutshell, critical postmodern social theory can be summarized as the following: 
1) critical postmodern social theory is a project o f de-essentializing Marx; 2) critical 
postmodern social theory sees the social and the subject to be constituted by both the 
movement o f capital and human praxis; and 3) critical postmodern social theory utilizes 
political economy for investigating the social and the human subject.
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Critical postmodern social theory shared with poststructuralist postmodern social 
theory, to a greater or lesser extent, at least one argument that ontology, epistemology, 
and ethics/politics have been aestheticized since World War II. But the response of 
critical postmodern social theory to the process of aestheticization was very different 
from one o f poststructuralist postmodern social theory; critical postmodern social theory 
tried to retain a totalizing view on ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. From my 
perspective, this difference comes from the model of knowledge that each postmodern 
social theory adopted. Poststructuralist postmodern social theory embraced the aesthetic 
and critical postmodern social theory adopted the morally practical.
1) Ontology
a. The Nature of the Social
Following Mandel, Jameson (1984a: 78) distinguished “three fundamental moments 
in capitalism, each one marking a dialectical expansion over ihe previous stage: these are 
market capitalism, the monopoly stage or the stage o f imperialism, and our own— 
wrongly called postindustrial, but what might better be termed multinational capital.” 
Late capitalism is the purest form of capitalism in which capital expands into hitherto 
uncommodified areas including Nature and the Unconscious: “This purer capitalism of 
our own time thus eliminates the enclaves of precapitalist organization it had hitherto 
tolerated and exploited in a tributary way: one is tempted to speak in this coimection o f a 
new and historically original penetration and colonization o f Nature and the 
Unconscious: that is, the destruction of precapitalist third world agriculture by the Green 
Revolution, and the rise o f the media and the advertising industry” (Jameson 1984a: 78).
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This colonialization o f nature and the unconscious by commodifying logic o f capital 
corresponds to the radical separation of the signifier from the signified. This is part of 
the liberation of words and all other signifiers from signification, which results in the 
breakdown of all syntactic order and meaningful relationships in time. Jameson 
characterized the social in the postmodern space by the aesthetic; “The break-up of the 
Sign in mid-air determines a fall back into a now absolutely fragmented and anarchic 
social reality” (Jameson 1985: 201). In this sense, Jameson argued that the social has 
become cultural: “Culture itself falls into the world, and the result is not its disappearance 
but its prodigious expansion, to the point where culture becomes coterminous with social 
life in general: now all the levels become ‘acculturated,’ and in the society of the 
spectacle, the image, or the simulacrum, everything has at length become cultural, from 
the superstructures down into the mechanisms of the infrastructure itself' (Jameson 1985: 
201). Everything is mediated by culture saturated with images and signs. As a result, the 
distinction between the real and the imaginary disappears, which gives rise to a depthless 
aestheticized hallucination of reality. But Jameson went further, claiming that 
aestheticization of the social is governed by commodification. Jameson identified the 
main force of aestheticization of the social with the expanding logic o f capital: “the 
frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods 
(from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly 
essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation” 
(Jameson 1984a: 56).
Post-Fordism observed that the social has become dispersed, mobile, flexible, etc. 
Following Marx, Harvey (1989:181) argued that “the tendency towards
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overaccumulation can never be eliminated under capitalism.” Harvey (1989: 180)
defined the problem o f overaccumulation of capital as “a condition in which idle capital
and idle labour supply could exist side by side with no apparent way to bring these idle
resources together to accomplish socially useful tasks.” According to Harvey, there are
three options to deal with this problem. First is evaluation of commodities, of
productive capacity, o f money value, perhaps coupled with outright destruction” (Harvey
1989: 181). Second is “[mjacro-economic control through institutionalization of some
system of regulation” (Harvey 1989:181). Last is “[ajbsorption o f  overaccumulation
through temporal and spatial displacement” (Harvey 1989: 182). According to Harvey,
Fordism utilized these three options, among them the temporal and spatial displacement
“within” countries was the main strategy to give the advanced Western societies the post-
War prosperity. But during the period of 1973-1975 or 1980-1982, Fordism was in crisis
and superior regime o f capitalist production which “would assure a solid basis for further
accumulation on a global scale” (Harvey 1989: 186) was needed. Flexible accumulation
emerged as a response to the rigidities of Fordism. Flexible accumulation
rests on flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, 
products, and pattems of consumption. It is characterized by the 
emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing 
financial services, new markets, and, above all. greatly intensified rates of 
commercial, technological, and organizational innovation (Harvey 1989:
147).
Just as the success o f  Fordism came mainly from absorption of overaccumulation of 
temporal and spatial displacement, so “the crisis o f Fordism was in large part a crisis of 
temporal and spatial form” (Harvey 1989: 196). Flexible accumulation entailed two 
shifts: new patterning o f  uneven development both between sectors and between 
geographical regions; a new round of time-space compression, “the time horizons of both
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private and public decision-making have shrunk, while satellite communication and 
declining transport costs have made it increasingly possible to spread those decisions 
immediately over an ever wider and variegated space” (Harvey 1989:147). Among 
them, the second shift is crucial because it has changed the meaning of time and space. 
The speed-up in the turnover times of capital is the determining force in changing the 
meaning of time and space. The major consequence of the speed-up in the turnover times 
o f capital is to accelerate “volatility and ephemerality of fashions, products, production 
techniques, labour processes, ideas and ideologies, values and established practices" 
(Harvey 1989: 285). As Marx said, “all that is solid melts into air.”
b. The Nature o f Man
Jameson accepted that the subject itself is dead. But Jameson adopted the historicist 
position rather than the poststructuralist position. For Jameson the subject who is dead is 
the autonomous bourgeois monad or individual, “a once-existing centered subject, in the 
period o f classical capitalism and the nuclear family” (Jameson 1984a: 63). Jameson 
portrayed Edvard Munch’s expressionist painting The Scream as depicting the 
autonomous bourgeois monad or individual: “The very concept o f expression 
presupposes indeed some separation within the subject, and along with that a whole 
metaphysics of the inside and the outside, o f the wordless pain within the monad and the 
moment in which, often cathartically, that ‘emotion’ is then projected out and 
externalized, as gesture or cry, as desperate communication and the outward 
dramatization of inward feeling” (Jameson 1984a: 61). But in the postmodern period of 
late capitalism, the subject becomes aestheticized: “the alienation of the subject is
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displaced by the fragmentation of the subject” (Jameson 1984a: 63). Jameson (1984a:
71) said that Lacan’s account o f schizophrenia “seems to me to offer a suggestive 
aesthetic model.” Following Lacan, Jameson argued that schizophrenia represented the 
postmodern condition of subjective fragmentation. Under the postmodern condition, the 
subject becomes the schizophrenic who is imable to link signifiers together in a temporal 
order. To the schizophrenic, signifiers are experienced as a series of pure and unrelated 
presents in time. Jameson (1984a: 72) said that “[i]f we are unable to unify the past, 
present, and future o f the sentence, then we are similarly unable to unify the past, present, 
and future of our own biographical experience or psychic life.” Jameson explained the 
affective outcome o f this fragmentation o f subjectivity in terms of Lyotard’s “intensities.” 
Intensities are asignifying particles that “are now free-floating and impersonal, and tend 
to be dominated by a peculiar kind of euphoria” (Jameson 1984a: 64).
Post-Fordist postmodern social theory argued that people do not exist as a 
homogeneous group who has identical interests. The general speed-up in the turnover 
times of capital influences the human subject as both producer and consumer. The 
human subject as a producer is exposed to “vertical disintegration” (sub-contracting, 
outsourcing, etc.) and “an increasing roundaboumess in production even in the face of 
increasing financial centralization” (Harvey 1989: 284). For this, the new technologies of 
electronic control, small-batch production, etc. played an important role. “For the 
labourers this all implied an intensification (speed-up) in labour processes and an 
acceleration in the de-skilling and re-skilling required to meet new labor needs” (Harvey 
1989:285). Thus, the human subject as a producer is not stable, which results in 
tmdermining the collective interest. The human subject as a consumer is also exposed to
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the paralleling speed-up in exchange and consumption: “Improved systems o f 
communication and information flow, coupled with rationalizations in techniques of 
distribution (packaging, inventory control, containerization. market feed-back, etc.), 
made it possible to circulate commodities through the market system with greater speed. 
Electronic banking and plastic money were some of the innovations that improved the 
speed o f the inverse flow of money. Financial services and markets (aided by 
computerized trading) likewise speeded up, so as to make, as the saying has it, ‘twenty- 
four hours a very long time’ in global markets” (Harvey 1989: 285). What is more 
important than this acceleration o f the pace o f exchange and consumption is that the 
content o f consumption has changed from goods to services not only personal, business, 
educational, and health services but also entertainments, spectacles, happenings, and 
distractions. Consumers are exposed to the “image production industry” which tried to 
manipulate “desires and tastes through images that may or may not have anything to do 
with the product to be sold” (Harvey 1989: 287). Consumers “are living in a world of 
ephemeral created images” (Harvey 1989: 289).
2) Epistemology
Jameson pointed out that the traditional epistemology that favored “depth models” 
was in crisis because depth is replaced by surface or multiple surfaces. Jameson (1984a: 
62) enumerated four depth models: “the dialectical one of essence and appearance (along 
with a whole range of concepts of ideology or false consciousness which tend to 
accompany it); the Freudian model of latent and manifest, or o f repression...;  the 
existential model o f authenticity and inauthenticity, whose heroic or tragic thematics are
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closely related to that other great opposition between alienation and disalienation.. and 
finally, latest in time, the great semiotic opposition between signifier and signified." In 
postmodern culture in which there are no longer depths, traditional methodology which 
aimed to “represent” the deep truths is obsolete. But Jameson did not fully accept the 
poststructuralist position that representation is impossible. Jameson accepted Althusser's 
definition of ideology as “the Imaginary representation o f  the subject’s relationship to his 
or her Real conditions o f existence.” Following Althusser, Jameson argued that ideology 
is a necessary function in any form o f social life, telling a story of future that grips the 
masses. By contrast, Jameson (1988: 358) defined science as “a discourse (which is 
ultimately impossible) without a subject” like a mathematical equation. Science as an 
ideal discourse deals with the real with abstract conceptions independent of individual 
subjects. Thus, science does not teach people how to relate their own individual lives 
with the abstract larger structure. Science can do this only if  it becomes an ideology. 
Then, “we are back to aesthetics. Aesthetics is something that addresses individual 
experience rather than something that conceptualizes the real in a more abstract way” 
(Jameson 1988: 358). In this sense, Jameson challenged the sharp division between 
ideology and science. For Jameson, representation is the synonym of figuration itself: 
“all forms of aesthetic production consists in one way or another in the struggle with and 
for representation” (Jameson 1988:348). The representation as figuration is similar to 
cognitively mapping social space. Jameson historicized social space, claiming that social 
space has its different forms according to the three historical stages of capital. In 
classical or market capitalism, some older sacred and heterogeneous space was 
reorganized into geometrical and Cartesian homogeneity by a logic o f the grid. In this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
112
new emerging space, figuration would not be a big problem because “the immediate and 
limited experience of individuals is still able to encompass and coincide with the true 
economic and social form that governs that experience" (Jameson 1988: 349). In a sense, 
in this space essence and appearance, structure and lived experience do not contradict. 
Realism is a strategy to cognitively map this social space. But in the next stage, “the 
passage from market to monopoly capital, or what Lenin called the ‘stage of 
imperialism,’” the problems o f figuration “may be conveyed by way of growing 
contradiction between lived experience and structure, or between a phenomenological 
description of the life of an individual and a more properly structural model of the 
conditions of existence of that experience” (Jameson 1988: 349). Modernism is a 
strategy to overcome this dilemma. In the third stage referred to the moment of the 
multinational network, not only the older city but even the nation-state itself lost its 
former power due to multinational capitalism. This new stage produced a new 
postmodern space involvir.g the suppression of distance and the saturation of capital into 
nature and the unconscious, to the point where the postmodern subject is exposed to “a 
perceptual barrage of immediacy from which all sheltering layers and intervening 
mediations have been removed” (Jameson 1988: 351). In this sense, traditional forms of 
representation are obsolete. But the need to represent this space is still alive in order to 
get about in the world. Postmodernism is a strategy to cognitively map postmodern 
space. But this is not easy because o f the complex space o f multinational or late 
capitalism and the fragmentation of the subject. Jameson claimed that we need to use the 
strategies, techniques, and elements of postmodernism against postmodernism itself: “To 
undo postmodernism homeopathically by the methods o f postmodernism: to work at
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dissolving the pastiche by using all the instruments o f pastiche itself, to reconquer some 
genuine historical sense by using the instruments o f what I have called substitutes for 
history” (Jameson in Stephansonl989: 59). An aesthetic of postmodern cognitive 
mapping “seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its 
place in the global system” (Jameson 1984a: 92).
Post-Fordist postmodern social theory also recognized the crisis of representation, but 
it believed that Marxist tradition could overcome it. To post-Fordist postmodern social 
theory, the core methodology o f Marxism is political economy, which aims to historically 
trace the development of capital. Capital is the essence or form that manifests itself in a 
variety of matters. In this sense, post-Fordist postmodern social theory responded to the 
crisis o f representation with the aid o f the essentialist version o f the theoretical. Harvey 
claimed that the nature o f space and time, which were basic categories of human 
existence, has changed since modernism served to compress both time and space.
Harvey historically traced how this compression of time and space has occurred from 
European feudalism to the postmodern era. Harvey argued that the acceleration of 
compression of time-space in the postmodern era challenged human capacity to grapple 
with the realities because traditional notion of realities was based on the epistemology 
based on fixed and stable notion of time and space. But Harvey still believed that “It is 
possible to write the historical geography of the experience of space and time in social 
life, and to understand the transformations that both have undergone, by reference to 
material and social conditions” (Harvey 1989:327). To Harvey, material and social 
conditions refer first o f all to the law of capital accumulation and speculative change: 
“There are laws of process at work imder capitalism capable o f generating a seemingly
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infinite range of outcomes out o f the slightest variation in initial conditions or o f human 
activity and imagination. In the same way that the laws o f fluid dynamics are invariant in 
every river in the world, so the laws of capital circulation are consistent from one 
supermarket to another, fi'om one labour market to another, fi-om one commodity 
production system to another, fi’om one country to another and fi’om one household to 
another” (Harvey 1989: 343). But unlike orthodox Marxists, Harvey recognized that the 
future cannot be predicted in advance because the restless transformative activity of 
capital accumulation and speculative change is bound to context: “the degree of Fordism 
and modernism, or o f flexibility and postmodernism, is bound to vary from time to time 
and fi’om place to place, depending on which configuration is profitable and which is not” 
(Harvey 1989: 344). In this sense, post-Fordist postmodern social theory has a much 
more agnostic position on the outcome of postmodemization.
3) Ethics/Politics
Jameson (Stephanson 1989:46) argued that “[t]ime has become a perpetual present 
and thus spatial.” Mainly due to this new depthlessness, historicity has weakened both in 
our relationship to public history and in the new forms o f our private temporality. In this 
situation, traditional morality/politics seems to be obsolete because fragmented 
individuals are dominated by a peculiar kind o f euphoria. But Jameson believed that this 
is a transitional phenomenon which appears when people don’t yet invent inclusive and 
totalizing stories which can endow the individual subject with some new heightened 
sense o f its place in the global system. Thus, what is needed is to invent new inclusive 
and totalizing stories: “I am far firom suggesting that no politics at all is possible in this
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new post-Marxian Nietzschean world of micropolitics—that is observably untrue. But I 
do want to argue that without a conception of the social totality (and the possibility of 
transforming a whole social system), no properly socialist politics is possible" (Jameson 
1988: 355). These totalizing stories do not cease to imagine how a society without 
hierarchy, a society o f free people, can possibly cohere.
Harvey also recognized that the traditional notion o f temporality has fundamentally 
changed mainly due to the accelerating turnover time in production, exchange, and 
consumption. Volatility and ephemerality has replaced linear, accumulative, progressive 
notion of temporality, making it hard to maintain any firm sense of continuity. As a 
result, aesthetics of instant ecstasy in a world o f ephemerally created world makes 
obsolete traditional morality based on the promise of future rewards. As a Marxist, 
Harvey wanted to overcome the crisis of historical materialism. But unlike some post- 
Marxists who totally abandoned class politics, Harvey tried to retain the importance of 
class in postmodern condition while embracing postmodernist concern about difference 
and otherness. For this, difference and otherness should not be treated as "something to 
be added on to more fundamental Marxist categories (like class and productive forces), 
but as something that should be omni-present from the very beginning in any attempt to 
grasp the dialectics o f social change” (Harvey 1989: 355).
Some Historical Parallels o f the Aesthetic Moment 
1 have argued that the postmodern might be understood as the aestheticization o f 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/morality, which has proceeded from early 1960s to 
the present in advanced Western societies. As postmodern social theories have
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witnessed, the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics includes 
both intellectual and institutional processes. In fact, what is peculiar in postmodern 
debates is that postmodern social theories have documented that there are "substantive 
institutional” changes associated with the process o f aestheticization. But if  we take only 
the intellectual or philosophical dimension and leave the institutional level aside, we can 
easily find some historical parallels in Western intellectual history.
Gorgias, Sade, and Nietzsche might be some exemplars. Gorgias lived in ancient 
Greece around the fourth century B.C., Sade in the seventeenth century, and Nietzsche in 
the second half o f the nineteenth century. They all presented similar views that might be 
characterized by the aesthetic model o f knowledge. But their arguments did not gain 
popularity during their days. One of the main reasons for that is, I believe, that there was 
no or little “substantive institutional” process of aestheticization. Society in general was 
not yet substantively differentiated. As Durkheim showed in The Division o f  Labour, the 
aesthetic argument could not attract people in a society in which the degree of division of 
labor is low. In the postmodern era in which the degree of division o f labor is high 
enough to be called de-differentiation in which everything is saturated by images and 
signs, the aesthetic model of knowledge could be resonant in people. In this sense, we 
might say that the aesthetic model o f knowledge was latent and dominated in the whole 
Western history, but in postmodern era it becomes explicit and dominant.
In what follows I will show how Gorgias. Sade and Nietzsche presented their views 
on ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which were very similar to the aesthetic. I 
do not aim to present these thinkers as postmodern social theorists. I believe that the 
"philosophical” distinction between these thinkers and postmodern social theorists is
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highly superficial unless we situate each within its institutional contexts. We could even 
find some philosophical similarities between ancient Asian philosophies and postmodern 
philosophies. We need to situate ideas within the institutional contexts in which they are 
inscribed. Postmodern social theories are meaningful only when they are situated within 
the institutional change in society, which were often expressed in terms of consumer 
society, post-industrial society, information society, postmodern society, late capitalist 
society, fast capitalist society, etc. Nevertheless, this section is not totally useless 
because it will inform us that the aesthetic model o f knowledge is not entirely new in the 
Western intellectual history. It will also hint to us that what is new in the postmodern is 
certain institutional changes in which the aesthetic model o f knowledge gained power. 
Finally, it will reaffirm that sociological analysis o f institutional contexts in which the 
aesthetic bloomed is still needed.
1. Ancient Greek Sophist: Gorgias
Rejecting Protagoras, Gorgias, and all their followers as relativistic 
nihilists whose ides would lead to social decay, sexual perversity, and 
anarchy creates a comfortable certainty for Western thought. By rejecting 
sophistry. Western thought can play itself out as a history in which truth, 
after much tribulation, triumphs through its own self-righteous virtue and 
then remains available in the West forever (Neel 1988: 205).
Gorgias was one o f the Greek sophists who lived in the age of transition from 
mythology to a kind o f humanism. Before the fifth century B.C.. Greek thought was 
profoundly influenced by traditional patriarchal mythologies represented by Homer, 
Hesiod, and the so-called Orphic poems, in which the wills o f gods or o f superhuman 
heroes presided over the world. Gorgias was one o f the Greek sophists who changed this 
traditional worldview into a humanistic worldview. This transition o f  worldview
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occurred in an era of crisis. Politically, Athens grew enough to challenge the hegemony 
of Sparta: “[i]t was not until Athens had risen to power and had come into conflict with 
Sparta, especially during the long Peloponnesian War (430-400 B.C.), that social thought 
independent of religious tradition began to manifest itself’ (Ellwood 1971:9). But when 
Athens was defeated by Sparta, the sense of crisis spread wide: “Now, a major crisis in 
Greek institutions and social life occurred when Sparta overthrew Athens in the 
Peloponnesian War. Athens had built up a great empire after the Persian wars, and it 
must have been indeed a shock to the Athenians to see the imperial power o f Athens 
overthrown by Sparta and her allies” (Ellwood 1971: 10). Socially, Greece of the fifth 
century B.C. was experiencing rapid growth of democracy and expansion of scientific 
knowledge, which brought out a sense o f crisis (Barrett 1987: 6). Confronting this crisis, 
the Athenians began to ask what was wrong. In this respect, Ellwood’s remark is 
suggestive: “social thinking arises when the institutions and customs of the past no longer 
work well, perhaps break down, and have to be replaced by new adjustments, new values, 
which result in new customs and institutions” (Ellwood 1971:9). The Athenians 
increasingly did not find adequate solutions in their existing mythologies. Therefore, 
they began to shift their attention from the universe to man himself, and from cosmogony 
to morality and politics. The sophists were the first who represented this shift. Thus, the 
fifth century was often referred to as the “Age o f Sophists” (Burnet 1914:109), the “Age 
of Illumination” (Bury 1958: 376-397), the “Age of Enlightenment” (Guthrie 1971:48), 
or the “Greek Enlightenment” (Tamas 1991:25). Socrates was one of these sophists, and 
it was Plato who distinctly separated the true philosopher (Socrates) from the sophists.
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The sophists did not form schools, and most o f their works have been lost. Most 
information about the sophists, in fact, came from Plato who disliked them. Plato 
negatively defined and grouped the sophists mainly into two terms: first is that the 
sophists were merchants, retailers, and manufacturing traders of learning; and second is 
that the sophists were imitators o f the wise (see Notomi 1999:44-48). The sophists have 
been long forgotten partly due to this negative image long dominating the Western 
intellectual history: “Until the nineteenth centiuy, the first sophists had been buried under 
two millennia of neglect, and outcome of the passionate condemnation they provoked 
from two o f their contemporaries who have fared better in the histories, Plato and 
Aristotle” (Jarratt 1991: 1). But since Hegel revived the sophists as relativists in the 19*** 
century, many revisionist interpretations began to pour out. What the sophists did was to 
voice their objection to the ideal of the theoretical, which was then represented by 
Parmenides who argued that “Being has no coming-into-being and no destruction, for it is 
whole of limb, without motion and without end” (quoted in Romilly 1992: 95). Thus for 
Parmenides, the rigorous philosophical or scientific inquiry should rest on this ultimate 
and immutable foundation of being. The sophists in general refuted this view.
From my perspective, Gorgias lived in an aesthetic moment. In the opening o f  his 
treatise On the Nonexistent, Gorgias expressed the archetype of the aesthetic: “first and 
foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man; 
third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being 
expressed or explained to the next man” (Sprague 1972:42).
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Ontologically, Gorgias proposed a position o f  philosophical nihilism, according to 
which neither the existent nor the nonexistent exists. As Sextus (Sprague 1972: 43-44) 
put it:
[T]he nonexistent does not exist, for if  the nonexistent exists, it will both 
exist and not exist at the same time, for insofar as it is understood as 
nonexistent, it will not exist, but insofar as it is nonexistent it will, on the 
other hand, exist. It would, however, be entirely absurd for something to 
exist and at the same time not to exist. The nonexistent, therefore, does 
not exist. And to state another argument, if  the nonexistent exists, the 
existent will not exist, for these are opposites to each other, and if 
existence is an attribute o f the nonexistent, nonexistence will be an 
attribute of the existent. But it is not, in fact, true that the existent does not 
exist. <Accordingly>, neither will the non-existent exist. Moreover, the 
existent does not exist either. For if the existent exists, it is either eternal 
or generated, or at the same time eternal and generated. But it is neither 
eternal nor generated nor both, as we shall show. The existent therefore 
does not exist.. .So that if  the existent is eternal it is unlimited, and if  it is 
unlimited it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist.
Accordingly, if  the existence is eternal, it is not existent at all. Moreover, 
neither can the existent be generated. For if  it has come into being, it has 
come either from the existent or the nonexistent. But it has not come from 
the existent. For if  it is existent, it has not come to be, but already exists.
Nor from the nonexistent. For the nonexistent cannot generate anything, 
because what is generative of something o f  necessity ought to partake of 
positive existence. It is not true either, therefore, that the existent is 
generated. In the same way it is not jointly at the same time eternal and 
generated. For these qualities are mutually exclusive of each other, and if 
the existent is eternal it has not been generated, and if it has been 
generated it is not eternal. Accordingly, if  the existent is neither eternal 
nor generated nor both at once, the existent should not exist.
This argument reverses Parmenides’ argument that “What is, is; what is not, is not.” 
According to Parmenides, “what is” is the absolute unity and permanence of the One. 
“What is” excludes motion, change, and becoming because they necessarily harm the 
absolute unity and permanence o f the One. By contrast, “what is not” is something other 
than “is.” In other words, “what is not” is any alteration of “what is” and thus “what is 
not” is not. In this way, Parmenides sharply divided “what is” and “what is not” and
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gave ontological privilege to “what is” over “what is not.” Thus, anything that moves, 
changes, and becomes into being is not real. Gorgias disrupted Parmenides by arguing 
that nothing exists.
This argument has been interpreted in several ways (see Kerferd 1997: 7), but 1 would 
like to interpret it as the archetype of the aesthetic. Gorgias denied the dichotomy of 
being (the absolute unity and permanence o f the One) and becoming (the modification of 
being). In this dichotomy, being and becoming is in fact one, because becoming is some 
modification o f “being.” In this sense, being is original and becoming is a copy o f the 
original. Gorgias deconstructed this dichotomy. Nothing exists. In other words, “some 
more” exists. Some more follows the convention of pastiche. As Vitanza (1997: 261) 
put it:
One of the primary conventions of pastiche is that there is no origin, 
original, that is, no No. Pastiche is a paragenre that denegates a grand 
narrative founded on cause-effect, or on any other negative iopos or 
e/utopos. Pastiche is informed by the post-ontology and post- 
epistemology that a copy is a copy o f a copy of a copy, and infinitum.
This ontology might be applied to man even though Gorgias did not present a 
systematic view on man. If Protagoras is an agnostic, Gorgias is an atheist. Gorgias did 
not believe in the existence of God or the soul. In this sense, man is not a fixed substance 
whose essence is God-given reason but a ceaseless flux. Man refutes the binary 
opposition of Being and not-Being, and resides somewhere in between the two. 
Temporary “stop” o f this flux depends on changing contexts in which many competing, 
contradictory voices are deployed. In this sense, man is a historical process in which 
many competing, contradictory voices open up fixed binary positions, active and passive, 
and thus provide partial, multiple positions for man, which promotes an activity of
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endless desiring metamorphosis. These partial, multiple positions lead man to the 
irrational or nonrational states because they are beyond representation based on the 
binary opposition of “what is” and “what is not.” In this sense, man defies any fixed 
category which is necessarily based on negation of, or exclusion of. something which is 
beyond the category. In a sense, man is a pre-socialized fiux or a socialized neurotic who 
is haunted by something that is negated or excluded. This notion o f man is very radical 
when we think o f the Greek ideal of man, a self-sufficient being. Self-sufficiency not 
only demands perfection of being that calls for realization of being, but also excludes all 
limits, generating a positive infinity which refuses all determination. Gorgias directly 
opposed this view by deconstructing the binary logic of self-sufficiency, “is” versus “is- 
not.”
Methodologically, Gorgias reversed Parmenides. Parmenides argued that one can 
validly think only about what really exists. In this sense. Thought and Being are one and 
the same. By contrast, Parmenides argued that the non-existent cannot be known because 
it does not exist. We might perceive, not think, something that moves, changes, and 
comes into being, but its is not “what is.” Thus Parmenides sharply divided thinking and 
perceiving, and gave epistemological privilege to thinking over perceiving. As 
Parmenides put it:
Come now, I shall speak, and you must hear and receive my word. These 
are the only roads of enquiry that exist for the thinking mind: one road, 
that ‘IT IS,’ and that ‘IT CANNOT NOT BE’ is the path o f Persuasion, for 
Truth attends it. Another road, that ‘IT IS NOT,’ and IT [i.e. what is not]
MUST BE NON-EXISTENT’ is a road that I declare to be totally 
indiscernible. For you could neither know [or recognise?] what is non­
existent, for that is unattainable, nor could you describe it. For it is the 
same thing which is for thinking and for being (Luce 1992: 51).
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For Parmenides, thought is equated with logos, i.e., word and speech, and logos is
further equated with being. Gorgias argued that '"logos is not evocative o f the external"
(Sprague 1972:46). In other words, Gorgias argued that there is always the gap between
word and thing. In this way, Gorgias deconstructed the equation of logos and being. As
Crowley (1979: 281) put it:
[H]e [Gorgias] wants to free language from any ties to objective reality, in 
order that language may be exploited to its fullest potential as a medium 
for creating illusions and exciting the emotions.. .What Gorgias does here 
is to release logos from adherence to any other reality; the word has no 
necessary correlation to the world of Being.
This detachment of language from reality leads to a new notion of the rhetoric, i.e., 
“an art which employs words not to find truth, b u t.. to mold or impress the psyche, to 
create beautiful illusions, to ‘stop fear and banish grief and create joy and natural pity’” 
(Crowley 1979:282). In this sense, “the function of an orator is not logical 
demonstration so much as emotional presentation what will stir the audience’s will to 
believe. Thus, the power o f  persuasion involves deceiving ‘the emotional and mental 
state o f listeners by artificially stimulating sensory reactions through words ” (Kennedy 
1999: 36).
As a result, Gorgias will not “confine reality within a dogmatic scheme but allow it to 
rage in all its contradictions, in all its tragic intensity” (Untersteiner 1954: xvi). Thus, 
Gorgias leaves audiences confused. But for Gorgias, unlike for Protagoras, antithesis 
does not necessarily entail parataxis. The connection between antithesis and parataxis 
does not depend on the necessary correlation o f language and being, but on the mental 
participation of the audiences. If  they are “deceived” by language, parataxis for actions 
would be followed. But this is only a possibility. Playing with words is the cornerstone
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of Gorgias’ methodology, in which any kind of temporal copula between words, not 
between words and beings, goes if it succeeds in persuading the audiences. In this sense, 
some compare Gorgias’ rhetoric to advertising in the contemporary world: “Following 
the analogy, one might assign to rhetoric the place now occupied by advertising" (Guthrie 
1969: 50); “it is clear that we have already the elements of a theory of rhetoric which can 
stand comparison with modem accounts of the technique of advertising" (Kerferd 1984: 
82).
On the direction of history, Gorgias did not propose a systematic view. But we can 
draw some hints from his general view. Gorgias might argue that there is no direction of 
history because there is no design by the Supreme Being. History is subject to 
contingency, not to deteminism.
The moral implication of Gorgias s argument is nihilism or playfulness. In the 
Encomium o f Helen, Gorgias exempted Helen from responsibility for her actions. To 
defend Helen against blame for her part in the fall of Troy, Gorgias advanced four 
arguments: 1) she was fated by the gods; 2) she was raped; 3) she was seduced by 
discourse; or 4) she acted out o f love. In any case, Helen is not blamed for actions 
because she was not the master of her own actions. In the first case, “it is right for the 
responsible one to be held responsible; for god’s predetermination cannot be hindered by 
human premeditation’’ (Sprague 1972: 51). In the second case, Helen should not be 
blamed: “if she was raped by violence and illegally assaulted and unjustly insulted, it is 
clear that the raper, as the insulter, did the wronging, and the raped, as the insulted, did 
the suffering. It is right, then, for the barbarian who undertook a barbaric undertaking in 
word and law and deed to meet with blame in word, exclusion in law, and punishment in
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deed” (Sprague 1972: 51). In the third case, Helen should not be blamed because 
language has the power to impress the psyche: “Speech is a powerful lord, which by 
means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear 
and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity” (Sprague 1972: 52). In the last case, 
Helen is not responsible for her actions: “For if  it was love which did all these things, 
there will be no difficulty in escaping the charge of the sin which is alleged to have taken 
place” (Sprague 1972: 53). Thus, Helen is not responsible for her actions; she was not 
the master o f her actions. As Neel (1988:205) argued: “Those persuaded by the clever, 
he [Gorgias] contends, should be held blameless for their actions because the bewitching, 
hypnotic power of persuasion overcomes everyone sometime. By like token, those 
seduced by the passion of love, because they have fallen under the power of the god of 
love and because the need to love is a human frailty, should at worst be pitied; they are 
the victims o f fate merely obeying the compulsion of love, not free individuals with the 
strength of will to make a choice.” Then what man can do is to do what he has to do or 
what he is doing. There is no moral code, because man has no power to control his 
actions. This is very nihilistic, which Plato and his followers hated extremely.
Playfulness is directly connected with nihilism. Man can play with words without any 
restriction because language does not have any necessary relation to being or truth or 
reality. In a sense that human beings are not responsible for their actions, anything may 
go. No law is allowed.
The political implication is anarchy. No hierarchical organization is allowed because 
it would exclude “others” who threaten its fixed identity.
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2. The Anti-Enlightenment: Sade
[D]o everything you fancy, anything; to act, to riot, to react at your ease, 
without interference from anybody.. to say to yourself, here is an object 
Nature surrenders into my hands to do with absolutely whatever I please, I 
can smash it, I can bum it, I can maim it, I can dismantle it, 1 can torment 
it, I can fondle and annihilate it as I like, it is mine, nothing can deprive 
me of it, nothing save it from its fate (Sade, quoted in Sawhney 1999:91).
What 1 call “anti-Enlightenment” is in fact one extremity of the Counter-
Enlightenment. Berlin considered Romanticism to be the main force o f the Counter-
Enlightenment. According to Berlin (1999), the Romantic movement has two main
features. One is the morally practical, whose core idea is that society is constmcted
through the rhetorical and political activities o f man who changes with change o f society.
In addition to this, Berlin characterized the other feature o f the Romantic movement as
the aesthetic, whose core idea is that any kind of social, political, or religious
organization o f society and man is unnatural. Nature does not have any universal law
except for the law of permanent fluidity o f creation and destruction.
The second position—connected with the first—is that there is no 
structure of things. There is no pattem to which you must adapt yourself.
There is only, if not the flow, the endless self-creativity of the universe.
The universe must not be conceived of as a set of facts, as a pattem of 
events, as a collection of lumps in space, three-dimensional entities bound 
together by certain unbreakable relations, as taught to us by physics, 
chemistry and other natural sciences; the universe is a process of perpetual 
forward self-thrusting, perpetual self-creation.. (Berlin 1999: 119-120).
In fact, the second feature of the Romantic movement is significantly different from 
the main force o f the Counter-Enlightenment. Even before Schopenhauer (1788-1860) 
and Nietzsche (1844-1900), this view is found in one of the eighteenth-century figures. 
Marquis de Sade (1740-1814). I am very convinced that it is Sade who revitalized the 
aesthetic model o f knowledge that had been repressed since the Greek sophists.
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especially Gorgias. Sade attacked the Enlightenment and, moreover, the entire structure 
o f Western culture; he disrupted the traditional notion of the universe, seeing the universe 
as absurd and meaningless. Sade also disrupted the traditional notion of man. freeing the 
body from the confines o f social, political, religious, and ethical constructions. If there is 
a law, it is the law of permanent fluidity of creation and destruction.
Sade was enormously influenced by materialists such as La Mettrie and D 'Holbach, 
and pushed their materialist implication to the extreme. On the problem of God, Sade 
took an extreme atheist position. God does not exist; neither the anthropomorphic 
Christian God nor the Cartesian efficient cause nor the Newtonian mathematic God 
exists. Sade attacked the anthropomorphism of such doctrines as final causes which 
assume God’s province. In this sense, Sade went hand in hand with the empiricist 
version o f the Enlightenment. But Sade did not embrace the Cartesian efficient cause. 
Unlike the empiricist version, Sade did not assume any universally ordered law that 
governs universe and man. Nature does not have any universal law except for the law of 
permanent fluid of creation and destruction. Thus, Sade attacked all core ideas of the 
Enlightenment about the universe and man: both the First Cause and the Final Cause are 
rejected. Also Sade was differentiated from the main force of the Counter-Enlightenment 
as far as it defied any kind o f social, political, and religious organization of society and 
man. Bureaucratic hierarchy is the main enemy of the aesthetic version because it 
betrays nature which is characterized by the laws of perpetual creation and destruction.
In this sense, Sade might be seen to be the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century version of 
the aesthetic.
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Ontologically, Sade, like the empiricist version of the Enlightenment, held that there 
exists only nature which is matter in motion. But unlike the empiricist version o f the 
Enlightenment, Sade emphasized “motion” over “matter.” Nature is neither the created 
nor the substance. Rather, “Nature is a perpetuating force, a turbulent system, which 
casts organisms upon the surface of the earth. The cast o f Nature is a temporal 
suspension of material forces on a cosmic scale” (Sawhney 1999: 83). There is neither 
the First Cause nor the Final Cause. There is only the perpetual twin processes of 
creation and destruction of nature, through which infinite unlike entities are made and 
disappeared. In this scheme, the traditional notion o f being, self-same entity, disappears. 
Applying this ontology to the universe, Sade (quoted in Sawhney 1999: 79) argued as 
follows:
The universe is an assemblage o f unlike entities which act and react 
mutually and successively with and against each other; I discern no start, 
no finish, no fixed boundaries, this universe I can see only as an incessant 
passing from one state into another, and within it only particular beings 
which forever change shape and form.
For Sade, the universe is a perpetually revolutionizing system that creates diverse 
levels o f interaction through acts of destruction. Destruction is a basis of creation; 
without destruction, creation cannot be. Destruction, by nature, is amoral; it is beyond 
humane morality. Enormously influenced by materialists such as La Mettrie and 
D’Holbach, Sade opposed to the then dominant concept o f a rationally ordered universe 
(Crocker 1959: 8-11). Sade argued that disorder is the only order of the world. For Sade, 
disorder means that the world is full of tyraimy and injustice, because the strong always 
oppress and exploit the weak. Thus Sade held that evil is a universal law o f nature. As 
Sade (quoted in Crocker 1959:42) put it in one o f the characters in his novel:
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I raise my eyes over the universe, I see evil, disorder and crime ruling 
everywhere as despots.. .what ideas result from this examination? that 
what we improperly term evil really is not evil, and that this mode is so 
necessary to the designs o f the being who created us that he would cease 
being the master of his own work if evil did not exist universally over the 
earth.. .[God’s hand] has created [the world] only for evil, it takes 
pleasure only in evil, evil is its essence.. It is in evil that he created 
world, it is by evil that he maintains it, it is for evil that he perpetuates it. it 
is impregnated with evil that the creature must exist.. .the mode being the 
soul o f the Creator as it is that of the creature.
In these sentences, Sade seemed to believe in God, but he just pretended to do so 
purely for the sake of argument. Sade, an extreme atheist, deprived the world of 
meanings and morals. As a result, the world becomes meaningless, absurd, and cruel, 
because “in the world o f nature and men, the good (or synonymously, the weak) are 
destined to be the wretched victims of the vicious (or the strong)” (Crocker 1959:41).
For Sade, the social world is not a discrete world different from the natural world.
The cruel law of disorder dominates the natural world as well as the social world. 
Everything becomes permissible because there is no God nor morals. In this sense, the 
Sadean world is a world o f beasts that act instinctively without knowing God or morals. 
Thus, Sade proposed an anarchistic view on society, which is against the Enlightenment 
view in general as well as one o f the Vichian version o f  the Counter-Enlightenment. This 
anarchistic view on society is significant under the historical context of the rising 
bourgeois capitalism which is characterized by a ceaseless struggle for profit.
Applying this ontology to man, Sade robbed man o f  his privileged position in the
“Great Chain o f Being” by deconstructing it. Man is not an exceptional being any more.
Man is just one of many kinds o f  organism that nature casts upon the surface of the earth.
What is man? and what difference is there between him and other plants, 
between him and all the other animals o f the world? None, obviously. 
Fortuitously placed, like them, upon this globe, he is bom like them; like
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them, he reproduces, rises, and falls; like them he arrives at old age and 
sinks like them into nothingness at the close of the life span Nature assigns 
each species of animal, in accordance with its organic construction (Sade, 
quoted in Sawhney 1999: 83-84).
Thus, to place man in a privileged position in the universe is illogical because the cast 
of nature is only a temporal suspension of material forces. Man also follows a law of 
nature, a law of permanent twin processes o f creation and destruction. Like plants and 
beasts, man follows the supreme law of egoism. “There is,” thus, “only one law, the law 
of instinct, which makes us seek pleasure and happiness. No other law obtains, despite 
our self-delusion” (Crocker 1959:99).
In this sense, the dualism of body and soul is meaningless. Soul was conceived as the
core place in which morals such as pity, social duties, love of neighbor reside. But Sade
argued that this notion o f the soul is our self-delusion, because there is only the supreme
law of egoism in nature. Man is the body which follows the law of nature. Thus, Sade
wanted to criticize man’s pretensions that a sphere of reason and morals exists apart from
men. As Crocker (1959: 101-102) put it:
Sade conceived one of his main goals to be stripping the idol of love of all 
its false attractions, restoring it to its true status as animal pleasure in 
which we have the desire and right to wallow, to any excess. In Sade’s 
mind, this was one way o f uncovering the true man, man the animal, 
underneath the pretentious self-imposed halo of a being made in the image 
of God. Sade’s writings respond to the desire he expressed, in an essay on 
the novel, to reveal man not only as he shows himself, “but such as he 
may be, such as the modifications and all the shocks o f the passions may 
possibly make him.” It is this exploration which leads Sade to the great 
discovery that the vitalities in human life are destructive as well as 
creative, and in fact are essentially destructive when they are not chained 
and diverted into other channels. Sade, then, destroys the notion o f love as 
something pure and lovely; it is, rather, much worse than merely bestial; it 
is cruel, and its freest and fullest expression is in torture and death.. he 
was the first to present sex as necessarily, inherently and essentially evil.
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Methodologically, Sade tried to subvert the traditional epistemology in which
language (thought) is supposed to represent reality (being). Thus, in traditional
epistemology, only being is supposed to be represented and non-being is not supposed to
be represented. Against this, Sade held that everything, including being and non-being, is
exposed and seen. As Sawhney (1999; 86) put it:
Sade, most passionately, aspires to document all that is forbidden to 
thought, to categorize all that lies outside the realm of reason, a strategy 
that is entirely compatible with his philosophy that everything must be 
exposed, however monstrous and inhumane it may be.
Sade tried to express the inexpressible. Transgression is the most intellectual activity 
which tries to express the inexpressible; to transgress is to pass beyond any limit or 
boundary which has discrete form and discrete identity. Transgression demands the 
complete overthrow o f any vestige of order, because order itself constrains and dictates 
only certain possibilities of personal action. Transgression takes place, in each case, 
according to the particular type of restriction that is imposed on his freedom. Thus,
“Sade variously proposes blasphemy, immorality, crime, incest, murder, violation, lies, 
slander, theft, rapacity, irrationality, sodomy, hate, and every other kind of violence, 
perversion, or aberration conceivable—each of these a specific and considered tactical 
operation to serve the strategic movement o f the libertine’s transgressive itinerary” 
(Allison 1999:211).
On the direction o f change, Sade argued that there is no direction in history because 
there is only the twin permanent processes o f destruction and creation in the world. Sade 
argued that there is neither start (the First Cause) nor end (the Final Cause). One o f the 
most important moral implications in this is the extremist secular hedonism. He could 
not but negate the transcendental imperative o f universal Christian morality. He denied
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the concept of immortality because he did not believe in the existence of spiritual soul.
Thus, the hope of the postmortem rewards for the spiritual control over corporeal desires
vanishes. The spiritual control over the corporeal desires or the subordination to any kind
of supernatural authority is illogical because “Nature, when she cast us into the world,
created us free and atheists” (Sade, quoted in Sawhney 1999; 84). Man is completely
free of moral constraints because he is living in an absurd and meaningless universe,
utterly deprived of purposes and moral values. In this way, Sade tried to free man from
the confines of social, political, religious, and ethical constructions. Morality is
experienced only in a form o f induced illusion or habituation. Thus, true morality is
desire in cosmic flows. From this follows the extremist position that it is natural that the
strong tries to despoil the weak and obtain pleasure at his expense. Even crime is
celebrated because it’s the extreme form of self-love or egoism.
Crime is nought but the means Nature employs to attain her ends in regard 
to us and to preserve the equilibrium so indispensable to the maintenance 
of her workings. This explication alone suffices to make clear that it is not 
for man to punish crime, because crime belongs to the Nature that 
possesses every right over us and over which we dispose of none (Sade, 
quoted in Sawhney 1999:83).
Crime is the instrument by which social, political, ethical assemblages are destroyed and
recreated in order to (re)integrate desire back into the flux o f Nature.
One of the most important political implications is extremist anarchism. Sade 
criticized state interventions that “embody desire into homogeneous realms, that is, 
instances of state institutions suspending the material forces of desire in order that desire 
serve a higher purpose, such as God, church, or government. Sade argued that this 
suspension of desire is a mechanism o f control that lies outside the flux o f Nature” 
(Sawhney 1999: 80). The state plays the role in stabilizing and suspending desire
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through hierarchical stratification. The state interventions change the temporal
suspension o f matters to a higher transcendent purpose. By so doing, the state
interventions eliminate desire’s incessant passing from one state into another. This
elimination betrays the law of nature because it suspends the regenerative (creative and
destructive) materiality o f Nature. Sade aimed to restore desire to cosmic fiuxes. As
Sawhney (1999: 85) excellently put it:
Sade asks: Why then should the individual follow the laws, rules, norms, 
dictates, and values of society when it is evident that social systems are in 
direct conflict with the laws of perpetual destruction within Nature?
However much the human race attempts to harness and manipulate 
Nature, “she” always acts according to “her” own laws. Why, asks Sade, 
does the state machinery thwart the impulses of Nature by 
institutionalizing desire, a process that imprisons desire tlnough inhibition, 
prohibition, and taboo, even though Nature’s laws state that desire is 
always in “a perpetual variation, a perpetual permutation.. .a perpetual 
movement?”
3. Nietzsche
Everything is false! Everything is permitted (Nietzsche 1968: 326).
Nietzsche (1844-1900) lived in the second half of the 1800s, when positivistic belief 
in progress was offset by the dark sides of industrialization, urbanization, technical 
advances, etc. New developments in the physical and biological sciences informed 
people that contingency was important when explaining society and man. The aesthetic 
model o f knowledge, which lost its power in the first half o f the century, began to attract 
some intellectuals. Schopenhauer was one of them. Schopenhauer claimed that human 
beings have not only ideas, the categories through which human beings see the world, but 
also the will to life, a categoryless force that pushes toward certain ends. Schopenhauer 
conceptualized the will to life as a kind o f energy or force which expresses itself through
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the multiplicity of phenomena in variegated ways. In fact, the notion o f will to life is a 
philosophical version of biological and physical notion o f force which was then 
prevalent. Schopenhauer exerted a powerful influence on Nietzsche, who developed a 
more materialist version o f will as a virtual asocial biological force. Nietzsche presented 
the will to power as a weapon against philosophy, religion, and morality, all of which 
submitted to herd instincts. What Nietzsche hated is the homogenizing and leveling 
effect of philosophy, religion, and morality. Nietzsche (1968: 175) wanted to rescue “the 
charm of rareness, inmitableness, exceptionalness and unaverageness" from traditional 
philosophy, religion, and morality. For Nietzsche, art can do this task: “Art reminds us of 
states of animal vigor; it is on the one hand an excess and overflow of blooming 
physicality into the world o f images and desires; on the other, an excitation of the animal 
functions through the images and desires of intensified life;—an enhancement o f the 
feeling o f life, a stimulant to it” (Nietzsche 1968:422). In this sense, it would be argued 
that Nietzsche adopted the aesthetic as the primary model of ontology and epistemology. 
What have been repressed, silenced, marginalized, etc. should be expressed.
Ontologically, Nietzsche refuted the traditional ontology, which is based on dualism 
of being and non-being. Nietzsche wanted to abolish the world of being as the real 
world: “The apparent world and the world invented by a lie—this is the antithesis. The 
latter has hitherto been called the ‘real world,’ ‘truth,’ ‘God.’ This is what we have to 
abolish” (Nietzsche 1968: 254). For Nietzsche, what is existent is a kind of natural force, 
the will to power, which Nietzsche borrowed from the physical science’s energy-flow 
model. The will to power denies the existence of being as being opposed to becoming. 
Nietzsche tried to reverse the hierarchy o f being and becoming by deconstructing the
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binary opposition of being and becoming; “To impose upon becoming the character of 
being—that is the supreme will to power” (Nietzsche 1968: 330). Being does not exist; 
rather, it is humans who invented it. For Nietzsche, the will to power is a basic instinct o f 
all organisms or bodies for their own expanded reproduction. As Nietzsche (1968: 550) 
put it:
This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end;. .  a 
play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, 
increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea o f forces 
flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, 
with tremendous years o f recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms;
. .  .a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my 
Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self- 
destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my 
“beyond good and evil,” without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a 
goal.. .The world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you 
yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!
On the nature o f man, Nietzsche identified individuality with bodily intelligence and 
multiplicity. The genuine self is a nonsocial, irreducible, individual particularity. This 
genuine self is contradictory to the herd-like ego, the social self. For Nietzsche, human 
beings and their societies are in an endless struggle between the principles of 
instrumental rationalism and the necessity for sensual satisfaction in the lives of human 
beings. Superior cultures nurture particularity by providing resources to express bodily 
drives. But the culture of Western society have repressed bodily drives so severely that 
the herd instinct o f obedience and consequent guilt, illness, and nihilism prevail.
Nietzsche saw how new modes o f communication and technologies began to destroy 
individuality and community while producing homogenized herd conformity (Best and 
Kellner 1997: 57). In this sense, Nietzsche criticized the Enlightenment notion o f the 
rational subject, which portrays reason or mind as a higher faculty governing the body.
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Nietzsche rejected the positive evaluation of reason, rationality, and the rationalization
processes. Nietzsche emphasized the body instead of subjectivity, the soul and the mind:
The awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and nothing else; 
and soul is only a word for something about the body. The body is a 
great reason, plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a 
shepherd. An instrument of your body is also your little reason, my 
brother, which you call “spirit”—a little instrument and toy of your great 
reason.. .Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a 
mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name is self. In your body he 
dwells; he is your body (Nietzsche, quoted in Love 1986:29).
Epistemologically, Nietzsche refuted the traditional epistemology which has been
based on the dualism of the subject and the object. “If we give up the effective subject,
we also give up the object upon which effects are produced. Duration, identity with
itself, being are inherent neither in that which is called subject nor in that which is called
object: they are complexes o f events apparently durable in comparison with other
complexes—e.g., through the difference in tempo of the event” (Nietzsche 1968:298).
There exists neither the subject nor the object. Thus, traditional epistemology based on
the dualism of the subject (doer, cause) and the object (deed, effect) is senseless. For
Nietzsche, the distinction between cause and effect is achieved as an effect of language in
which the grammatical subject (I) is believed to “do something, suffer something, ‘have’
something, ‘have’ a quality” (Nietzsche 1968: 294). Thus, the dualism of the subject
(cause) and the object (effect) is fictitious. The problem is not in the relationship
between cause and effect; rather, it is in the difference o f power between the two:
Two successive states, the one “cause,” the other “effect”: this is false.
The first has nothing to effect, the second has been effected by nothing. It 
is a question o f a struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new 
arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure o f power of 
each of them. The second condition is something fundamentally different 
from the first (not its effect): the essential thing is that the factions in 
struggle emerge with different quanta of power (Nietzsche 1968: 337).
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In this sense, Nietzsche nullified the traditional epistemology which saw science as
the autonomous pursuit of truth. Nietzsche connected the scientific pursuit o f truth with
the “will to power.” As Nietzsche (1968: 298) put it:
Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of 
the false character of things, a reinterpretation o f it into beings. “Truth” is 
therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered—but 
something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or 
rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end—introducing truth, as 
a processus in infinitum, an active determining—not a becoming­
conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a world 
for the “will to power.”
Our belief in science has no objective validity; we hold this belief insofar as it
functions towards the expanded reproductions o f bodies. The genealogy of knowledge is
an inquiry into the self-deception that Western reason has succumbed to in its quest for
power. Nietzsche also criticized the empiricist epistemology then represented by
positivism. He criticized positivism in general and positivistic sociology in particular.
According to Nietzsche, nobody has privileged position which enables him/her to grasp
the “facts,” because there are no facts. Everything is in flux, incomprehensible, and
elusive, which opens up the possibility of plural interpretations.
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena—“There are only facts"—I 
would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.
We cannot establish any fact “in itself’: perhaps it is folly to want to do 
such a thing.. .In so far as the word “knowledge” has many meaning, the 
world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning 
behind it, but countless meanings.—“Perspectivism” (Nietzsche 1968:
267).
On the direction of change, the aesthetic did not believe any specific direction of 
history. It would be irrelevant to ask whether societies or the various forms o f 
objectification of the will succeed one another temporarily or not, because the will does
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not know time. Therefore, we could not adequately explain history through tracing a 
sequence of developmental stages. Nietzsche did not accept the Enlightenment argument 
that the modem society brings human beings happiness and welfare: “Progress.—Let us 
not be deceived! Time marches forward; we’d like to believe that everything that is in it 
also marches forward—that the development is one that moves forward.. .‘Mankind’ 
does not advance, it does not even exist.. Man represents no progress over the animal ” 
(Nietzsche 1968: 55). While Enlightenment thinkers argued that modernity is 
characterized by individual freedom and welfare, Nietzsche insisted that nearly identical 
“useful, industrious, handy multipurpose head animals” prosper in modem society rather 
than genuine diversity. According to Nietzsche, modem Westem culture is characterized 
by “slave morality” that promises salvation for the obedient and punishment for the 
dissolute. Nietzsche saw Christianity as the prototypical slave morality: “The promise of 
equality and salvation to all the ‘subjugated and oppressed’ and of eternal damnation to 
all nonbelievers demanded unparalleled denial of the body, absolute obedience, mortal 
hostility,’ and ‘hatred o f those who think differently’ and of ‘multiplicity’” (Antonio 
1995: 8). The Enlightenment and bourgeois revolutions made the process even more 
extensive and inclusive. Thus, Nietzsche argued that the modem age has developed 
ethics of utility that was destroying the sovereign individual. Antonio (1995: 6) said, 
“Nietzsche equated rationalization with cultural homogenization and liquidation of 
particularity.”
Nietzsche criticized universalist morality because he believed that one has no rational 
foundation for choosing one mode of behavior over another. Nietzsche refuted 
traditional grounds for universalist morality such as God and nature. Nietzsche (1966:
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85) argued that “[t]here are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation o f 
phenomena.” Then, isn’t there any morality? Nietzsche argued that one should create his 
own morality. The aesthetic is decisive in creating morality. The one who creates his 
own morality is “[h]e who can command, he who is by nature ‘master,’ he who is violent 
in act and bearing” (Nietzsche 1989: 86). This man is one o f the conquers whose natures 
“come like fate, without reason, consideration, or pretext; they appear as lightening 
appears, too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too ‘different’ even to be hated. Their 
work is an instinctive creation and imposition of forms; they are the most involuntary, 
unconscious artists there are” (Nietzsche 1989: 86). In this sense, Nietzsche attributed to 
“art an ontogenetic, that is, a world-making significance” (Megill 1987: 31). A slave 
does not create his/her own morality; rather, s/he dogmatically follows a master morality. 
What Nietzsche hated is the normalizing effect o f slave morality: “To accommodate 
oneself, to live as the common man’ lives, to hold right and good what he holds right; 
this is to submit to the herd instinct. One must take one’s courage and severity so far as 
to feel such a submission as disgrace" (Nietzsche 1968: 252). In this sense, Nietzsche 
saw socialization in a negative light.
Politically, Nietzsche was opposed to both socialism and democracy. He believed 
that they aimed to make man mediocre and lower his value: “1 am opposed to 1. 
socialism, because it dreams quite naively of “the good, true, and beautiful” and of “equal 
rights” (—anarchism also desires the same ideal, but in a more brutal fashion); 2. 
parliamentary government and the press, because these are the means by which the herd 
animal becomes master” (Nietzsche 1968: 397). Nietzsche wanted to liberate life from 
philosophy, religion, and morality and he wished to make a society in which only quanta
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of power determine ranks. The strongest man equipped with the strongest will to power 
should rule society. This man will be “artist-tyrants" who will work like artists. Unlike 
the herd, artists create new values. They are commanders and legislators who say how 
things are to be.
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CHAPTER 4
VULNERABILITY OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE AESTHETIC CHALLENGE
I have argued that the postmodern might be understood as the aestheticization of 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which has proceeded from early 1960s to the 
present in advanced Western societies. I have also claimed that postmodern social theory 
documented that 1) there emerged a qualitatively new form o f aesthetic society entangled 
with the emergence of a qualitatively new form o f aesthetic subject, that 2) the 
aestheticization o f the social and the subject undermined traditional 
epistemology/methodology based on the traditional subject-object distinction, proposing 
trans- or multi-disciplinary methods, and that 3) the aestheticization of the social and the 
subject produced new morality/politics based on difference rather than identity.
This argument of postmodern social theory challenged fundamental assumptions of 
sociology about ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. Classical European 
sociology emerged out o f the complex mixture o f the Enlightenment and the Counter- 
Enlightenment, but modem American sociology mainly followed the Enlightenment 
vision of science, especially positivism, in the course of its development. In 
this sense, sociology was a product of modernity associated with the Enlightenment. In 
fact, from the outset sociology was hostile to the aesthetic. Sociology 
saw the aesthetic as being pre- and/or anti-social.
141
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In what follows, I will show how sociology happened to exclude the aesthetic, and 
will present some fundamental assumptions o f classical European sociology and modem 
American sociology, which are vulnerable to the aesthetic challenge.
Classical European Sociology as the Exclusion 
of the Aesthetic
Most sociologists considered Comte, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel 
as “fathers” of sociology who built a new discipline called sociology. Many sociologists 
also recognized that these classical European sociologists tried to synthesize the 
Enlightenment tradition and the Counter-Enlightenment tradition (Saiedi 1993; Seidman 
1983). This effort at synthesis was not a new phenomenon that first appeared in the 
nineteenth century. The so-called “forerunners” o f sociology in the eighteenth century all 
tried to complement the extremity of the Enlightenment with the Counter-Enlightenment: 
Montesquieu (1689-1755), Rousseau (1712-1778), the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
such as Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790), Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), 
John Millar (1735-1801), etc. The so-called “fathers” o f sociology such as Comte (1798- 
1857), Marx (1818-1857), Spencer (1820-1903), Durkheim (1858-1917), Weber (1864- 
1920), and Simmel were similar. The Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment 
traditions were two common tacit intellectual references on which the “fathers” o f the 
classical European sociology relied. All of them tried to synthesize the Enlightenment 
and the Counter-Enlightenment traditions in their own ways.
But when we look more closely, we can find a very important fact with regard to the 
emergence o f classical European sociology: the so-called “fathers” o f classical European
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sociology criticized the individualist approaches to man and society. To them, the most 
representative of the individualist approaches were the technically practical and the 
aesthetic. But ways to deal with these two individual approaches were very different.
For the technically practical, classical European sociologists tried to complement the 
extremity of the technically practical with the theoretical and/or the morally practical. By 
contrast, classical European sociologists rejected the aesthetic as a model o f knowledge 
for investigating the social.
In the early nineteenth century, classical political economy and utilitarianism were 
social versions of Newtonian physics. The most representative of classical political 
economy were Malthus (1776-1834) and Ricardo (1772-1823), both of whom followed 
and modified Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) claim that man’s self-interest is the counterpart 
of Newton’s principle of gravitational attraction. The most representative of 
utilitarianism were James Mill (1773-1836) and his son John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), 
both of whom followed and modified Bentham (1748-1832)’$ psychological proposition 
that man is by nature a being whose behavior is governed by desire for pleasure and 
aversion to pain. Classical political economy and utilitarianism were more popular in the 
early nineteenth-century England. For classical political economy and utilitarianism, 
“natural” means “physical.” But by the mid-century, this position was challenged by 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection. For Darwin’s theory, “natural” means “biological” 
rather than “physical.” But the technically practical soon realized that this difference was 
not essential because both “physical” and “biological” were materialistic. Gordon (1991 : 
494-495) explained it well:
From the standpoint o f man’s conception o f himself and his relation to the
cosmos, the development of the theory o f evolution in the nineteenth
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century was no less than a second scientific revolution, but in terms of the 
philosophy of science it was a continuation or extension o f the first, 
applying to organic phenomena the same conception o f the world as 
governed by laws that are essentially ‘materialistic’ in nature and thereby 
reducing still further the significance of spiritual, and indeed mental, 
factors in the explanation of reality.
Darwin’s theory of natural selection was easily combined with classical political
economy and utilitarianism: “Social Darwinism represented a biologized form of
classical economics, an attempt to modernize and refurbish the social ethic of
competitive individualism by appealing to the authority of Darwin’s version of natural
selection’” (Fine 1979: 23-24). The technically practical interpreted Darwinian
evolutionism in terms of the struggle for survival among atomistic individuals. As
Darwin said in The Autobiography o f  Charles Darwin:
In October 1838.. .1 happened to read for amusement Malthus on 
Population, and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for 
existence wliich everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of 
the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these 
circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved and 
unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the 
formation of new species. Here, then, I had at last got a theory by which 
to work.. .(quoted in Gordon 1991: 505).
A hallmark of all three (classical political economy, utlitarianism, and Darwin’s 
theory o f natural selection) is reductionism, in which the social is reduced to the 
individual. All kinds o f human behaviors are reduced to a simple law of natural selection 
or the survival of the fittest.
In the late nineteenth century, the technically practical saw another development: 
statistics. Even though the Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874) presented 
his first work in 1835 and a huge interest in the collection o f social statistics occurred in 
England in the 1830s, it was in the late nineteenth century that statistics began to become
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the most important alternative to other models of the technically practical. In fact, 
statistics was revolutionary as far as the nature of the technically practical was concerned. 
The technically practical used to believe that social phenomena, like natural phenomena, 
are law-governed. This law is essentially a mechanical law that does not allow any 
variation. But the substantive findings o f sciences betrayed this view. Statistics resolved 
this problem by construing social phenomena as statistical in nature. The governing laws 
of social phenomena are probabilistic. Thus, the term “positivism” gained new meaning, 
that social sciences can be reduced to just collecting the facts and formulating them as 
general laws.
Classical European sociologists criticized this individualistic view, but they did not 
totally devaluate it. Rather, they tried to complement it with the theoretical and the 
morally practical. In this nineteenth century there were mainly two forms of the 
theoretical: positivistic organicism' and Hegelian essentialism. A hallmark of two 
versions is that they attacked the Newtonian mechanical world characterized by its 
inability to explain “the change, the temporality, the novelty, in a word, the 
progressiveness, of the human world” (Kumar 1978: 18) and that they retained the 
spiritual or divine nature of man and society.
For the explanation of change, positivistic organicism depended on Platonian 
transcendentalism and more directly on French Enlightenment tradition and evolutionary 
biology. Positivistic organicism “arose as an integration of two formerly discrete strands 
o f Western thought: the idealistic theory of society, and a positivistic program of social
'. The nineteenth century positivism maybe designated as “positivistic organicism” as 
distinguished from the 20 century logical positivism or logical empiricism represented 
by the Vienna School o f 1920s (Martindale 1981:68).
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reform” (Martindale 1966:4). Positivistic organicism as the idealistic theory o f society 
was a modem version of the idealism that developed since Plato. This tradition relied on 
an organic analogy: “Society is considered to be a living entity, at least, as similar 
thereto—perhaps organic, perhaps spiritual” (Martindale 1966: 5). Some version of the 
French Enlightenment followed this tradition. French Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Turgot and Condorect created an entity, mankind, whose essence is ideas, conceptually or 
by a priori reasoning about human nature, that was supposed to have undergone 
continuous development through time (Bock 1978). In France, the concept of organism 
developed as a vital independent unity without any specific reference to biology. French 
organistic school followed the Platonian transcendentalism inasmuch as they believed 
that the change of things must come through the change of ideas. For them, ideas, not 
matters (appearances), are real (Maus 1962: 36-43). Positivistic organicism as a 
positivistic program of social reform relied on the empiricist version of the 
Enlightenment, which wanted to apply the methods o f natural sciences to the realm of 
human society in order to refonn peacefully and organize rationally human society.
It was the achievement o f evolutionary biology that made it possible to combine these 
two different thoughts. Pre-Darwinian positivists such as Saint-Simon (1760-1825) 
argued that the principles o f order and change in the biological evolution could be applied 
to ones in the social evolution because social evolution was conceived as a special case of 
biological evolution. But there is a fundamental difference between them: for the social 
evolution it is “ideas” that maintain society as an organic whole or equilibrium.
In fact, the term “positivistic organicism” is self-contradictory as Martindale (1981: 
68) defined it as the following:
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Organicism refers to that tendency in thought that constructs its picture of 
the world on an organic model. By an organismic metaphysics is meant 
the attempt to explain reality, or the world, or the universe, or the totality 
o f everything as if it were a kind o f organism or had properties like an 
organism such as being “alive,” having a “vital principle,” or displaying 
relations between parts like those between the organs o f a living body.
Positivism, on the other hand, refers to that tendency in thought which 
rigorously restricts all explanation o f phenomena purely to phenomena 
themselves, preferring explanation strictly on the model of exact scientific 
procedure, and rejecting all tendencies, assumptions, and ideas that exceed 
the limits o f scientific technique.
As a theory of being, organicism refers to the “metaphysical” ontology, which argued
that there exist some metaphysical beings beyond the limit o f physical beings. But as a
theory of knowledge, positivism designates a positive or phenomenological epistemology
that can be defined as the following:
[T]he thesis, which can be expressed in various ways, that “reality” 
consists of sense impressions; an aversion to metaphysics, the latter being 
condemned as sophistry or illusion; the representation of philosophy as a 
method of analysis, clearly separable from, yet at the same time parasitic 
upon, the findings of science; the duality of fact and value—the thesis that 
empirical knowledge is logically discrepant from the pursuit o f moral aims 
or die implementation o f ethical standards; and the notion of the “unity of 
science”—the idea that the natural and social sciences share a common 
logical and perhaps even methodological foundation (Giddens 1978: 237).
Evolutionary social theory had already emerged quite independently of Darwin 
(Burrow 1970). But pre-Darwinian organicism or biological metaphor was 
fundamentally different from Darwin’s theory o f natural selection concerning the nature 
of evolution: for the former biological evolution meant the evolution of distinct organs, 
the wing, the hand and so one while for the latter the evolution of species as such. Pre- 
Darwinian evolutionary theory conceived o f evolution as gradual, peaceful, piecemeal 
adaptation o f some organs of a specific organism to its environment while Darwin’s 
evolution theory saw evolution as radical breaching transformation o f species as such.
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Even since Darwin’s impact, positivistic organicism interpreted Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection through the eyes of more traditional idealism.
By contrast, Hegelian essentialism relied on Aristotelian notion of change and more
directly on Spinozian version o f the Enlightenment. Spinoza influenced the Romantic
movement in general, and its later movement in particular. For Spinoza, the only one
substance or God is an absolutely infinite totality the essence o f which is infinitely
expressed in infinite attributes. Likewise, for Hegel (1770-1831) the only one substance
or absolute Spirit is an absolute infinite totality, whose essence is reason, the activity of
absolute Spirit. As Hegel put it in his Lectures on the Philosophy o f  World History :
[R]eason.. is substance and infinite power; it is itself the infinite material 
of all natural and spiritual life, and the infinite form which activates this 
material content. It is substance, i.e., that through which all reality has its 
being and subsistence; it is infinite power,. .  and it is the infinite content, 
the essence and truth o f everything, itself constituting the material on 
which it operates through its own activity (quoted in Harris 1995: 201).
As the Spinozian God is the organizing principle of the universe, the Hegelian 
absolute Spirit is the organizing principle of society. Hegelian essentialism believed that 
society as an organism has its essence and that its growth or development is the 
realization o f its essence. In this sense, society develops of necessity from its essence. 
For Hegel, this essence is ideas called Geist, Spirit or God. But unlike Platonian 
transcendentalism, ideas are not transcendental ideals that exist beyond this world, but an 
immanent force that determines the structure and development o f the universe. Thus, the 
essence o f society objectifies itself in all customs, habits, institutions. Hegelian 
essentialism also conceived man as a living organism, not mechanical matter. Man has 
his own essence and his growth or development is the realization o f his essence. The 
Hegelian subject does not have fixed transcendental essential nature. Rather, through
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expressing his purpose in life, he achieves his essence as a finite spirit. He is always in 
the process of movement in order to acquire the True. This implies that the Hegelian 
subject moves towards a certain direction, the True. The reason why the Hegelian subject 
can move is that he is a living substance: “the living Substance is being which in truth 
Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of 
positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself’ (Hegel 1977: 10). Only 
the living substance can move because it has its own contradiction. “This Substance", 
says Hegel, “is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the 
bifiucation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the 
negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis [the immediate simplicity]’’ 
(Hegel 1977:10). In this way, man and society retains their spiritual or purposive 
dimension, which was deprived by the Newtonian physics. Both society and man are 
organic totality rather than mechanic atoms, in which the infinite essence of absolute 
Spirit is expressed.
Positivistic organicism was more popular in the mid-19'*’ century in France while 
Hegelian essentialism was more popular in the early 19'*’ century in Germany. Comte, 
Spencer, Durkheim mainly adopted positivistic organicism while Marx embraced 
Hegelian essentialism. But classical European sociologists did not restrict themselves to 
the theoretical model of knowledge. Marx, Weber and Simmel also embraced the 
morally practical.
In the nineteenth century the morally practical appeared in the early Romantics who 
acted against “a too narrow constructing of human experience in terms o f reason alone” 
and who celebrate experience, “in its infinite richness and color and warmth and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
complexity” (Randall 1954: 399)’. The most representatives of the early Romantics 
were Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845), and 
Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829). The early Romantics emphasized the experience of life 
in the inner flow of consciousness, rather than abstract principles. The early Romantists 
also emphasized that individuals are qualitatively unique. Individuals are not abstract 
human beings like the abstract economic man, but concrete individuals who are bound to 
their own unique spatio-temporal, linguistic, or socio-psychological contexts. The early 
Romantics considered reason as part o f life and history. Thus reason is limited by its 
own historicity, and context is more important than foundational axioms. But these early 
Romantics were soon eclipsed by transcendental subjectivism and finally Hegelian 
essentialism. Since then, the morally practical lost its intellectual power until the late 
nineteenth century.
But in the late 19'*’ century, the morally practical was revitalized in a transatlantic 
community of discourse. The most representatives were Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), 
Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882), Henry Sidgwick (1838-1912), Alfred Fouillée (1838- 
1912), William James (1842-1952) (see Kloppenberg 1986). These thinkers were 
basically post-Darwinians. Unlike the technically practical which interpreted Darwin’s
’. 1 borrow the distinction between the early Romanticism and the late Romanticism from 
Saiedi (1993). Saiedi considered Romanticism mainly as a German movement and he 
distinguished the early German Romanticism from the later German Romanticism: “Early 
German Romanticism focuses on the idea that individual human beings are qualitatively 
unique and that they are free and autonomous. On the other hand, later German 
Romaticism defines individuals as passive embodiments of a universal history and 
celebrates tradition and religion” (69). I considers the early Romanticism mainly as an 
heir o f the Vichian version of the Counter-Enlightenment, especially it hermeneutic 
approach to reality. But I do not deny that it also contains some o f the Sadean version of 
the Counter-Enlightenment, especially its characterization of reality by paradox, mystery, 
contradictions, and chaos.
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theory of selection as the struggle for survival among atomistic individuals, these thinkers
emphasized the adaptive capacity of conscious human beings and recognized that
contingency is important when explaining man and society (Wiener 1965). These
thinkers fully accepted Darwin’s emphasis that “evolution was essentially a branching
process, the creation of variety, rather than a main line of development with subsidiary
ones” (Burrow 2000: 72), and recognized that context was more important than abstract
principles. As a result, these thinkers situated practical reason in concrete sociohistorical
settings, not in a priori ahistorical category. Thus we might say that the hallmark of the
morally practical is contextualism that rejects excessively abstract, deductive and formal
modes of thought. The morally practical, like the theoretical, preferred the organicist
vision of the world to the mechanical one. But unlike the positivistic organicism that
tended to see society as a transcendental entity that exists regardless o f man’s
participation, the morally practical conceived society as a cultural, not a biological,
whole. Also unlike Hegelian essentialism that saw society as a substance, the morally
practical saw society as the interaction of its elements, i.e., individuals. For example,
Dilthey saw society as an intricate web o f multiple relations established among
individuals in constant interaction with one another.
[T]he individual.. .is an element in the interactions \ Wechselwirkungen\ 
of society, a point of intersection of the diverse systems o f these 
intersections who reacts with conscious intention and action upon their 
effects (Dilthey, quoted in Frisby 1984:47).
The morally practical advocated the Vichian subject, the self-creating as well as 
society-creating subject. The morally practical shared the traditional ideal o f the whole 
man with the theoretical, but the morally practical argued that this ideal could be 
achieved in society. The growth o f man comes together with the growth of society. The
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whole being who belongs to a cultural community is characterized by his/her wholeness 
within him/herself, uniqueness and freedom, which were possible only in the process o f 
his/her communion with society. According to this tradition, human beings could not be 
reduced to a part o f a machine that had only a specific fimction because they were a self- 
sufficient cosmos. The morally practical did not see reason as a universal entity existing 
across time and space but as a historical product produced in specific historical, social, 
cultural, economic, and geographical contexts of each society. Human reason is a 
dynamic complexity situated in a specific history and tradition, in which human beings 
live, feel, desire, love, hate, eat, drink, create, worship, etc. Every society has its own 
reason, because every society has its own specific tradition, culture, and history. Every 
individual also has its own reason, but this reason is similar to other individuals’ reasons, 
because every individual reason is constructed within the same community.
Classical European sociologists utilized the theoretical and the morally practical when 
they criticized the technically practical. By contrast, they excluded the aesthetic, which 
was then represented by Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Early Romanticism as the aesthetic 
lost its power in the mid-nineteenth century. Since then, the aesthetic did not attract 
European intellectuals until the late nineteenth century when the irrational forces of 
modem European civilization began to appear more clearly. Schopenhauer saw human 
beings as having not only ideas (the categories through which human beings see the 
world), but also a will to life (a categoryless force that pushes toward certain ends). 
Schopenhauer had a powerful influence on later thinkers, especially Nietzsche and Freud, 
both o f whom developed more materialist version of will to life. But later sociologists 
expunged the main advocates of the aesthetic model o f knowledge such as Nietzsche
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(1844-1900) and Freud (1856-1939), who are nowadays considered to be forerunners of 
postmodernism, from the canon of sociology.
There might be two reasons for this exclusion of the aesthetic model from classical 
European sociology. The first is related to the newly emerging discipline called 
sociology. Classical European sociologists considered the aesthetic model of man and 
society as predominantly pre- and/or anti-social. The second is related to the historical 
context o f the nineteenth-century. Classical European sociologists observed how German 
Romanticists turned into patriots, reactionaries and irrationalists afrer they had 
experienced the Terror and the military humiliations of Germany by the armies o f 
Revolutionary France and o f Napoleon. Classical European sociologists recognized the 
political and moral implication of the aesthetic model of knowledge: anarchy or Fascism. 
Considering their times as a transitional era from the traditional to the modem eras, 
classical European sociologists thought that the aesthetic could not provide any solid 
foundation on which a new social order would be established. Thus, they excluded the 
aesthetic model o f knowledge from sociology.
Classical European sociologists such as Comte, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber,
and Simmel struggled with the urgent contemporary problems of the times by utilizing
intellectual resources derived from both the Enlightenment and the counter-
Enlightenment traditions. But there was a generational difference between Comte, Marx,
and Spencer on the one hand, and Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel on the other hand.
Comte, Marx, and Spencer belonged to the mid-nineteenth century. Becker (1963: 96)
characterized this period as follows:
The phrase “break with the past” came spontaneously to the lips of the 
nineteenth-century historians because they were so much concerned with
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the “continuity o f history,” the evolution o f institutions. After twenty-five 
years of revolution and international war, most people felt the need of 
stabilizing society; and the most satisfactory rationalization of this need 
was presented by those historians and jurists who occupied themselves 
with social origins, who asked the question. How did society, especially 
the particular society of this or that nation, come to be what it is? The 
unconscious preconception involved in this question was that if men 
understood just how the customs of any nation had come to be what they 
were, they would sufficiently realize the folly o f trying to refashion them 
all at once according to some rational plan.
Comte, Marx, and Spencer were not firee from this rational plan and they concentrated 
tremendous efforts to synthesize the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment 
traditions in order to achieve it. They all produced grand narratives in part due to the 
efforts at synthesizing the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment traditions.
Their commonality is that they all excluded the aesthetic.
Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel belonged to the late nineteenth century which was 
characterized by the growing awareness o f the dark sides o f industrialization and 
urbanization. Due to this historical fact, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel could pay more 
attention to the dark sides o f modernity, especially the alienating effect of 
industrialization and urbanization. As a result, they were more sensitive to the aesthetic 
model of knowledge as compared to the previous generation. Nevertheless, Durkheim 
and Weber did not go far enough to embrace the aesthetic. In this respect, Simmel was 
exceptional. Among other classical European sociologists, Simmel was most sensitive to 
the aesthetic model o f knowledge even though he was also influenced enormously by the 
Enlightenment traditions. Although Simmel presented many views similar to the 
aesthetic, later sociologists robbed him of his aesthetic character. Especially, early 
American sociologists translated Simmel as a formal sociologist. As a result, the 
aesthetic character o f Simmel was expunged firom sociology. That is why some
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sociologists tried to reevaluate Simmel as a postmodernist (see Weinstein and Weinstein 
1993).
Fundamental Assumptions o f Classical European Sociology
Classical European sociologists (Comte, Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber) 
shared, to a greater or lesser extent, an hostility against the aesthetic model o f knowledge. 
As a result, classical European sociology presented some fundamental assumptions about 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
1) Ontology;
a. The Nature of the Social
On the nature o f society, Comte rejected the technically practical while accepting the 
positivistic organicism of the theoretical. Comte objected to individualist approaches to 
society because he believed that society is an organic whole. Comte borrowed this view 
from biology, but unlike biological thinking, Comte conceived society mainly in terms of 
its mental aspects. It is ideas that make a society as an organic whole. This thinking is in 
fact part of long tradition of rationalism according to which reality itself is in the nature 
of ideas. In a sense, society is superior to the individual because society had the greater 
diversity of its functions: “The main cause of the superiority o f the social to the 
individual organism is according to an established law; the more marked is the 
specialization o f the various functions fulfilled by organs more and more distinct, but 
interconnected; so that unity o f aim is more and more combined with diversity of means” 
(Comte 1968:289). But once society was constituted, a division of labor to make 
individuals interdependent was required for its continued existence. Here the biological
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analogy was employed again. More developed biological organisms like the human 
beings had more differentiated functions which did not result in chaos or disorder of the 
organism. “Structural differentiation” was ensued by functional integration. As the 
higher animal had more differentiated organs that had specialized functions, so did the 
higher society. In this higher society all parts functioned smoothly and peacefully with 
each other to integrate the whole. But society is not a simply division o f labor, as the 
Smithian political economy argued. With the division o f labor, the guidance o f the state 
is needed to integrate society: “Without State guidance and the division of labour no 
society could exist at all; and conversely without society authority and the division of 
labour would be nothing” (Maus 1962: 14). Society as an organism develops over time 
according to the law o f three stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. 
Each stage has its own form o f social organization: society is ruled first by pagan priests 
and soldiers, then by Christian clergy and lawyers, and finally, by industrialists and 
scientists.
Marx saw the social as an organic unity that is necessarily moving from potentiality 
to actuality. Marx’s notion of labor plays the role of the fbnn-giving, unifying element 
that brings objects back into the organically conceived production process. Society 
develops from the simplest substance, labor: “we must begin by stating the first premise 
of all human existence and, therefore, o f all history, the premise, namely, that man must 
be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ But life involves before 
everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The 
first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the
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production of material life itself’ (Marx and Engels 1995:48). Society is a living 
organism whose character is determined by the method o f organizing labor.
To explain the nature o f society, Spencer did not take the technically practical 
tradition of the Enlightenment, but rather took the theoretical tradition o f the 
Enlightenment. Even though Spencer was influenced more by the technically practical 
tradition of the Enlightenment, he did not follow it in regards to an ontology on society 
because he fully knew the anarchical implication of the its individualistic approach on 
society. Like other classical European sociologists, Spencer believed in a kind of social 
realism; he argued that society should be regarded as a distinctive level of reality. For 
Spencer, “the constant relations among its [society’s] parts make it an entity” (Spencer 
1905:448). But Spencer argued that there was the discreteness of the social organism 
standing in marked contrast with the concreteness of the individual organism: “The parts 
of an animal form a concrete whole; but the parts o f a society form a whole which is 
discrete. While the living units composing the one are bound together in close contact, 
the living units composing the other are free, are not in contact, and are more or less 
widely dispersed” (Spencer 1905:457). In spite of this wide dispersion, the social 
organism maintains its wholeness by means of culture. Spencer’s society is not a 
totalitarian organism; rather it consists of highly differentiated structures that fulfill their 
own specific functions so as to form a relatively loose, but stable whole. According to 
Spencer, this feature of society is a product o f evolution. Not all societies share this 
feature; only the highly developed societies have it. This historical or emergent feature 
o f society gave Spencer a conviction that a society could be regarded as an organism
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Durkheim objected to both the technically practical and Hegelian essentialism, and 
accepted primarily positivistic organicism. Against the utilitarians who “supposed that 
originally there were isolated and independent individuals who thus could only enter into 
relationships with one another in order to co-operate,” Durkheim argued that “[cjollective 
life did not arise from individual life; on the contrary, it is the latter that emerged from 
the former” (Durkheim 1984: 220, 220-221). Like other classical European sociologists, 
Durkheim believed in a kind of social realism; he argued that society should be regarded 
as a distinctive level of reality. But unlike Hegelian essentialism, Durkheim did not see 
society as a mystic whole entity whose development is a necessary realization of its 
substance. Rather, Durkheim followed the tradition of positivistic organicism which cam 
from Saint-Simon, Comte, and Spencer. Following them, Durkheim saw society as a 
living organism whose development can be explained in terms of the law o f division of 
labour. Durkheim knew well that the term of division o f labour came from Smithian 
economics, but he did not want to restrict its implication to the economic field.
Durkheim argued that biological works confirmed that the law of division of labour is a 
general law applicable to all organisms. Society is not an exception. But the division of 
labour in society is not exactly the same as one in organisms because, unlike organisms, 
society is “above all a composition of ideas, beliefs and sentiments o f all sorts which 
realize themselves through individuals. Foremost o f these ideas is the moral ideal which 
is its principal raison d'être" (Durkheim 1953: 59). In different words, the division of 
labour in society entails specific solidarity which binds individuals together to form 
societies. Durkheim argued that the structure o f society depends on the nature o f its 
specific form o f solidarity. According to him, there are two ideal types o f solidarity:
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mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity is a form o f social 
integration o f the less developed society in which the division o f labour is based on 
resemblance or sameness. In the “self-same type o f society,” society is like an entity 
which totally absorbed all its members. Thus there are no individuals who have their 
own subjectivities because the collective consciousness possesses most power. By 
contrast, organic solidarity is a form of social integration of the more developed society 
in which the division o f labour is based on differences. As the higher animal had more 
differentiated organs that had specialized functions, so did higher society. As a higher 
organism is a system of diverse organs each of which has its own individuality, a higher 
society is a system of diverse institutions each of which has its own individuality.
Weber was a little different. Salomon (1935:68) argued that “Weber operates 
entirely without concept of society.” In fact, Weber seldom used the term “society” 
(Bendix 1977:476), and did not give any reified status to the notion of society. Society 
is not a reified entity which operates automatically without the participation of actors. 
Rather, society is a man-made pattern: “When reference is made in a sociological 
context to a state, a nation, a corporation, a family, or an army corps, or to similar 
collectivities, what is meant is . . .only a certain kind of development of actual or possible 
social actions of individual persons” (Weber 1978:14). Nevertheless, Weber did not 
deny the social as a distinctive character in its own right. Society is “modes o f patterning 
action” through which course o f actions are repeated by actors.
b. The Nature of Man
Comte rejected the technically practical that saw human beings as matters as well as 
the theoretical that saw human beings as wholly rational. Instead, Comte proposed a
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position nearer to the morally practical. While not totally accepting the Vichian notion of 
human beings: “He [Comte] would not have said that man created himself through the 
ages” (Aron 1998: 107), he accepted the basic idea of the morally practical, i.e., one that 
the growth o f man comes together with the growth of institutional life of society. Comte 
believed that both human beings and society in general would go hand in hand through 
the three stages and argued that there were essential dispositions, which were present 
from the beginning and did not change through the ages. They are feeling (affection or 
sentiment), thought (intelligence), and action (will). Comte argued that all these three 
dispositions could be differently combined through the ages. Comte, in fact, argued that 
there were two ways of synthesis o f human dispositions: the theological and the positive 
ways. The metaphysical ways was just a transitional way from the theological to the 
positive ways. Comte (1975: 7) argued that “[t]he Theological synthesis depended 
exclusively upon our affective nature.” In the theological stage, human beings’ affections 
were stronger than their intellect, within which their egoistic, selfish instincts were 
stronger than their benevolent, social ones. In this synthesis the intellect was a slave of 
feeling; it was reduced to abject submission. Thus this synthesis was purely subjective 
because “the objective basis was supplied by spontaneous belief in a supernatural Will” 
(Comte 1975: 19). Thus this subjective system “could not harmonise with the necessarily 
objective tendencies and stubborn realities of practical life” (Comte 1975: 7). This is the 
necessary basis for the development o f the positive synthesis. Metaphysical and 
scientific intellect began to subvert all theological social order. But the intellect was not 
sufficient for harmonizing all human faculties. The emotional always was the basis for 
the task to harmonize all faculties o f human beings: “the question o f co-ordinating the
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faculties of our nature will convince us that the only basis on which they can be brought 
into harmonious union, is the preponderance of Affection over Reason, and even over 
Activity” (Comte 1975:11). With regard to this task, the intellect had mainly a 
methodological significance. The intellect discovers the external order, which became 
the basis of the further positive synthesis o f our all faculties. Through the positive 
synthesis, the subjective synthesis of theology could begin to gain its objective attribute. 
Based upon the external order, the positive synthesis will “bring the three primary 
elements of our nature into harmony” (Comte 1975:9). This development of human 
beings goes together with the development of institutions such as the family, the state, 
etc. Within the family, “Man comes forth fi-om his mere personality, and learns to live in 
another, while obeying his most powerful instincts” (Comte 1968: 281). Through the 
family, human beings learn obedience and command; they learned how to modify their 
egoistic affections by the altruistic rules set up by the family. Within the state, human 
beings leam how to cooperate with other extra-familial people.
According to Marx, man is a self-creative being, who develops the capacities peculiar 
to his “species” as he lives and works with his fellows and who, in this process, acquires 
his ides of the world and of himself. For Marx, self-creative means that man produces 
and reproduces the means of his existence as well as himself by his productive labor. 
Man’s labor is characterized by man’s capacity o f thinking conceptually. Marx agreed 
that only man is self-conscious, but he added the term “species.” The term “species” is in 
fact the counterpart of the Aristotelian term “substance.” Species is the category of the 
possible, denoting in particular those potentialities which mark man off from other living 
creatures. These potentialities are achieved in so far as the conditions of communism
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allow an individual to develop and express all that he is capable o f as a human being. In 
short, man becomes self-conscious in the process of becoming a species (Plamenatz 
1975: 68). In other words, a human being, a specific being different from other creatures, 
is “species man” or communist man (Oilman 1971: 151). “Species man” means that man 
becomes self-conscious as he becomes aware of others. Becoming self-conscious, 
becoming aware o f other selves and coming to recognize oneself as a being o f a certain 
kind are intimately interconnected with each other; they are inseparable. Therefore, man 
is characterized by being self-creative, self-conscious, and world-conscious.
Spencer believed that human beings are originally asocial individuals. But through 
an unconscious, essentially biological hereditary process, originally asocial individuals 
become gradually tamed and increasingly integrated to form a society. The process of 
becoming a social being follows the general law of evolution from an indefinite, 
incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. Spencer argued that 
civilized man is physically superior to primitive man in terms o f size and structure. 
Likewise, civilized man is emotionally more complex and flexible than primitive man.
The evolution of emotion proceeds as the evolution of society proceeds. With regard to 
intelligence, civilized man is also intellectually more complex and flexible than primitive 
man. Intelligence such as abstract ideas is compounded out o f simple intelligence such as 
concrete ideas and so there is progressing integration and complexity. What is at stake 
here is that Spencer connected the evolution of physical, emotional and intellectual 
dimensions of human beings with the evolution o f society.
Durkheim (quoted in Miller 1996:25) emphasized the real man’s social situation and 
situatedness: “The real man, whom we know and whom we are, is more complex; he is of
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a time and place, he has a family, a city, a country, a religious and political faith, and all 
these and many other concerns come together, combine in a thousand ways, cross and 
crisscross in their influence so that it is not at first sight possible to tell where one begins 
and another ends.” The real man is an integral part of society. Durkheim admitted the 
old belief that human beings are composed of two parts: “Far from being simple, our 
inner life has something that is like a double center o f gravity. On the one hand is our 
individuality—and, more particularly, our body in which it is based; on the other is 
everything in us that expresses something other than ourselves” (Durkheim 1973: 152). 
But Durkheim explained this duality of human nature without recourse to a metaphysical 
transcendence. Durkheim situated the origin o f the individual self in the body and the 
origin of the social self in society. Durkheim argued that the relationship between the 
soul and the body can change over time. In the self-same type o f society, the soul as the 
collective ideal tended to totally absorb the body, not allowing the genuine individual to 
arise. By contrast, in the pluralist type o f society, the soul tended to develop enough to 
allow the genuine individual to arise. In this way, Durkheim connected the nature of 
human beings with the nature o f society. Human nature historically changes in relation 
to the change o f the nature of the division o f labor.
According to Weber (quoted in Wallace 1994: 14), both “material and ideal interests 
directly govern man’s conduct.” For Weber, interests refer to ends. Additionally, human 
beings also possess certain material and ideal means of pursuing those interests or ends. 
Thus “All serious reflection about the ultimate elements of meaningful human conduct is 
oriented primarily in terms o f the categories ‘end’ and ‘means’” (Weber 1968: 52). What 
is at stake here is that both ends and means are culturally given. What are culturally
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given means that “the meaning of the world is not fixed and inherent in the world; it is a 
variable and changeable construct—a labeling of some features of the world as means, 
and other features as ends, o f given actions” (Wallace 1994: 16). In this sense, human 
beings are primarily cultural beings who can attribute meanings to objects as means as 
well as ends. But this capacity is not of pre-cultural substance within the transcendental 
subject. Instead of using the term “transcendental subject,” Weber used the term 
“personality.” For Weber, personality is “not a pre-cultural, pre-evaluative core, but a 
self which has found an anchorage for itself in a value, a value which not only mediates 
between self and world, but defines the meaning o f that selfs activity. More than this, it 
is through this relationship to value that individuals are able to take a position towards 
the world” (Turner C. 1992: 58). “The capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude 
towards the world and to lend it significance” is culturally learned. The meaning o f an 
object lies in its relation to human action in the role of means or of ends in a specific 
society. But Weber emphasized the meaning o f an object as “ends” of human action 
because he believed that social action driven by ends is more meaningful than one driven 
by means.
2) Epistemology
Comte criticized the strict empiricist epistemology o f Francis Bacon and John Locke 
who contended that knowledge is only the product o f direct experience via the physical 
senses. Comte wanted a theory-guided empirical study: “No real observation of any kind 
o f phenomena is possible, except in as far as it is first directed, and finally interpreted, by 
some theory” (Comte 1968: 242). Comte basically accepted the theoretical when he 
conceived sociology as the abstract theoretical science o f  social phenomena. In fact.
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Comte’s three laws of human development “were not laws in any real sense of the word, 
but descriptions o f mental processes that could conceivably have followed one another in 
the course o f human development” (Abraham 1973: 87). But Comte rejected the 
Enlightenment thinkers who considered mathematics as the model of science and wanted 
to apply mathematics to the area of human society. Comte did not believe that all 
scientific problems had a mathematical solution. According to Comte, the sciences 
formed a series o f increasing complexity and decreasing generality. The more simple 
phenomena are, the more general they are, and vice versa. In a word, every science has 
its own separate subject matter that should be studied by its own specific scientific 
method. This classification of sciences was not just nominal; science depended on phases 
and stages o f development. Comte traced how scientific knowledge was historically 
formed and developed. Mathematics represented the origin of positive philosophy; 
mathematics showed that the sciences should study invariable relationships between 
independent and even apparently isolated phenomena, rather than search for causes or 
substances. Astronomy was the first science to reach the positive stage; then came 
physics, next came chemistry, and after these three had reached the positivistic stage, 
thought about organic phenomena could become more positivistic. In this sense,
Heilbron (1990: 155) names Comte’s theory of science a “historical and differential 
theory of science.” Sociology was the last science that would soon reach the positive 
stage. Biology, a science o f living organisms, can provide the basis for sociology; 
biology showed that progress was the development of order. Human society was like 
biological organism; the dominant force in the human world is the development of human 
ideas or civilization. Sociology is the positive study o f all the fundamental laws
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pertaining to social phenomena. Only sociology could grasp social phenomena by 
inserting them into the general social evolution. In this sense, historical methods or 
historical comparisons o f the consecutive states of humanity are important; they put the 
different periods o f civilization into the law of general social evolution. In this sense, 
sociological knowledge is general.
Marx did not see the world as a collection of unconnected appearances, but 
distinguished essential events from accidental events (see Meikle 1985). For Marx, the 
essence o f things is a concrete universal, from which the essential movements of things 
follow necessarily. Thus, Marx concentrated on finding a concrete universal and its 
necessary historical movement &om potentiality to actuality. Marx traced how capitalism 
developed from commodity as the simplest capitalist social form. In Capital, Marx 
began with the elementary commodity, or “The Simple, Isolated, or Accidental Form of 
Value.” From this elementary commodity, the Equivalent Form, a contradictory unity of 
use-value and exchange-value, necessarily develops. Money is simply a more developed 
expression of this contradictory unity of use-value and exchange-value. In this sense, 
that “The simple commodity form is .. .the germ of the money-form” (Marx 1990; 163). 
Capital is the final form attained by the value-form in its process of development. As 
Meikle (1985: 71) rightly pointed out: “The commodity-form is made the point of 
departure in ‘the method o f presentation,’ because the enquiry had revealed it to be, as 
Marx repeatedly describes it, the ‘embryonic form’ o f the essence whose necessary 
changes and realisations o f potentials culminate in the attainment o f the final, finished 
form o f that essence: capital.” For Marx, this essentialist method was intimately 
connected with historical method. But Marx’s historical method is not a simple
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comparative method which aims to attain a generalization from a comparison of historical 
data. Marx believed that an explanation requires the elucidation o f inherent tendencies to 
particular sorts of change.
Spencer believed that there is a fundamental reality belying all appearances, but that 
we could not arrive at the true knowledge o f this fundamental reality a priori. Rather, we 
can acquire the true knowledge o f this fundamental reality through discerning 
“persistence in consciousness”: “The real, as we conceive it, is distinguished solely by 
the test of persistence; for by this test we separate it from what we call the unreal” 
(Spencer 1900: 143). This persistence of fundamental reality in consciousness is what 
Spencer called “relative reality.” This has a dissoluble relation with fundamental reality. 
Considering space, time, matter, motion, and force as relative realities standing in 
dissoluble relation with fundamental reality, Spencer confidently argued that we could 
build up our science upon them. In First Principles, Spencer drew his First Principles 
from the physics of his time: the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, and 
the persistence of force. The universal law o f evolution was achieved from systematic 
deductions from the First Principles. After formulating the law of universal evolution, 
Spencer tried to apply it to all areas, such as astrogeny, geogeny, biology, psychology, 
sociology, and ethics. Spencer firmly believed in the unity o f all sciences because he 
believed that the law o f evolution operated in physical, biological and social relations.
Durkheim presented two seemingly contradictory trends. In his methodological 
works such as The Rules o f  Sociological Method (1895), Durkheim proposed positivistic 
methods that aimed to provide objective and universally valid descriptions of reality. By 
contrast, Durkheim proposed a contextual approach to knowledge in his substantive
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works such as The Elementary Forms o f  Religious Life (1912) in which the validity of 
any truth-claim was not universal but was bound to designated historical contexts. These 
two trends are not in fact contradictory because Dmkheim was neither a naïve positivist 
nor phenomenalist who would argue that reality consists of only sense impressions and 
thus the researcher should rigorously restrict all explanation o f phenomena purely to 
phenomena themselves. Even his famous methodological argument that “Sociological 
method as we practice it rests wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be 
studied as things, that is, as realities external to the individual” (Durkheim 1951: 37-38) 
is not positivistic in the rigid sense of positivism. According to Durkheim, social facts 
are prior to the individual, and they exercise control over the individual through 
compelling and coercive power. But this power of social facts is possible only when 
social facts mold and penetrate the individual and the individual in turn internalizes them. 
In this sense, social facts exist only through individual consciousness. Then, how can we 
study the social facts that exist through individual consciousness as we do the natural 
facts that do not exist through individual consciousness? In different words, how can we 
study collective consciousness, i.e., the cause o f individual actions? In this sense, we 
cannot directly address social facts such as solidarity; we just address them through their 
objectifiable effects, i.e., laws and the social effects of breaking them. In this sense, 
Durkheim was not content with a positivistic explanation of superficial phenomena.
Weber argued that we could only know a slice of reality through knowledge or 
science because knowledge is an approximation of reality. But Weber did not fully 
accept this relativistic epistemology because he believed that the researcher could escape 
the trap of relativism through the formulation o f ideal types. As a way o f escaping from
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relativism and skepticism, Weber proposed the so-called “ideal type.” But the ideal type 
does not aim to exhaust the totality of reality: “An ideal type is formed by the one-sided 
accentuation o f one or more points of view and by the synthesis o f a great many diffuse, 
discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, 
which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified 
analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct 
{Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia" (Weber 
1968: 90). When constructing an ideal type, the researcher picks up some distinct and 
essential features that seem to be “practically” relevant from his value. But before that 
happens, the researcher should carefully analyze a situation in depth in order to discover 
its distinct and essential feature. In this sense that the researcher’s value is involved in 
the process of constructing the ideal type, the ideal type is not an objective picture that 
exhausts the totality o f reality, but a subjective distortion of it in a sense. According to 
Weber, the unique individual character o f cultmal phenomena could be grasped through 
historical research o f it, for the criteria o f choosing its distinct and essential features 
could be achieved through acknowledging its cultural significance at a specific historical 
juncture. The ideal type should be a logically coherent statement of the characteristic 
properties of a particular social phenomenon. As such, it is not a pure objective 
foundation (an autonomous, self-evident Platonian ideal) of knowledge, but a logico- 
historical and heuristic construction useful for understanding the unique individual 
character o f cultural phenomena. Thus, if the ideal type tries to set forth the general, 
external, impersonal, objective forms of social actions, then it is in order to address the 
problem o f their meaning for subjective life within a particular culture.
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3) Ethics/Politics:
Comte believed that progress in science and technology would lead to the 
improvement of material well-being of individuals and societies and further the moral 
perfection of man and society. He distinguished four senses of progress according to the 
rule o f increasing generality and complexity in phenomena: material, physical, 
intellectual and moral progresses. Like the hierarchy o f sciences, these notions of 
progress are hierarchically interconnected with each other: the lower conditioned, but dis 
not determine, the higher. Material progress is “the least elevated stage of progress, but 
being the easiest it is the point from which we start towards the higher stages” (Comte 
1975: 84). Physical progress entailed the extension of the length o f life, increased 
security for health, etc, whose influence on the well-being o f man is much greater than 
material progress. Compared to these two notions o f progress, “Intellectual and Moral 
progress, then, is the only kind really distinctive of our race” (Comte 1975: 85). But 
moral progress is more decisive for determining our well-being than intellectual progress. 
This belief in progress is directly connected with Comte’s vision o f ethics. Comte 
criticized utilitarian morality because he believed that it belonged to the theological and 
the metaphysical stages. Furthermore, Comte conceived utilitarian morality as one o f the 
main causes o f mental, and further social, anarchy. Comte also rejected the 
transcendental morality that advocated the absolute triumph of reason over other human 
faculties. He was modest in so far as he argued that “true morality requires a deep and 
habitual consciousness o f our natural defects” (Comte 1975:25). Without institutions 
that check our egoistic instincts, we can never achieve true morality. According to 
Comte, individuals begin to learn altruism in social institutions such as family and society
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in general. To achieve altruistic morality, individuals should leam how to subordinate 
their animal instinct to social morality in institutions. Institutions are important in so far 
as they inform human beings that there is an external order that they should follow. The 
political implication of this view is a combination of liberalism and aristocracy. Unlike 
the conservatives, Comte recognized that it was inevitable that the division of labor 
would bring about individual diversities. Using the biological metaphor, he recognized 
that diverse individuals would depend on each other and thus form a mutually dependable 
whole. But the real condition of Comte’s time seemed to betray this belief. Thus, in 
addition to the biological analogy, Comte pointed out another solid basis of integration 
for society: government. The government is a centralization of authority to coordinate 
exchanges of parts. But in addition to that, the government should develop a common 
morality or spirit among members.
Marx believed that history in general is moving from potentiality to actuality. He 
explained this progress in terms of Aristotelian logic according to which each society 
developed necessarily out of an inherent conflict. For Marx, this conflict is inherent 
between the forces o f production and the relations of production, both of which 
necessarily developed out o f substance, i.e., labor. Marx saw his time as a transitional era 
from a capitalist to a communist society. Marx believed that his contemporary capitalism 
was entering into a phase o f decay which would in turn become a potential matter for a 
more developed form of society. In the long run, history will achieve its telos. Marx 
argued that the good life consists o f the activity of human life in accordance with the 
nature of human species. The moral implication o f this view is also Aristotelian. In 
Nicoachean Ethics, Aristotle argued that the good life was activity of human life in
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accordance with virtue or excellence. Marx similarly argued that the good life was 
activity of human life in accordance with the nature o f human species. Thus Marx tended 
to propose a universal ethics, which must be established in the course of history. Such a 
universal ethics was rooted in the natme o f human beings; human species was a germ of 
imiversal ethics. In this sense, Marx was different from the morally practical vision o f 
morality in which morality was bound to a context. Marx also recognized the relativity 
of morality, but he considered it as a transitory or underdeveloped morality-form. The 
reason why Marx criticized capitalism on moral grounds was that it prevented human 
beings from living the good life by depriving them of their nature as human species. 
Utilitarianism, the representative of capitalist morality, is an underdeveloped morality- 
form. Politically, Marx was against both liberal democracy of the technically practical 
and totalitarianism o f the theoretical. According to him, liberal democracy was based on 
atomistic view on society while totalitarianism was based on a false abstract, i.e., a 
totality abstracted from and set above human individuals. Marx believed that both o f 
approaches conceived society as an abstract vis-a-vis the individual. As an alternative of 
them, Marx proposed a kind o f corporate liberalism, which was based on his notion of 
human beings as species. Following Aristotle, Marx argued that a good man was he who 
fulfilled his human potential and all men had the potential to become good men. But 
under formal democracy, men’s potential to fulfill their potential could not be fully 
actualized. Marx advocated true participatory democracy in which man’s process o f 
realisation o f himself as a real species being is achieved through the co-operation of 
mankind and as a result o f history.
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Spencer believed that there is a universal direction of evolution from “an indefinite, 
incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity.” What is at stake here is 
that Spencer connected homogeneity with disintegration or lack o f mutual 
interdependence and heterogeneity with integration or mutual interdependence. 
Differentiation means specialization of fimctions while integration means mutual 
interdependence of the structurally differentiated parts and coordination of their 
functions. The moral implication o f this view is also evolutionary. According to 
Spencer, egoism and altruism has existed since earlier stages, and the conflict between 
them has been maintained. But historical data has showed that this conflict was in the 
process of gradual disappearance. As societies evolved into the trebly-compound 
industrial type, human beings adapted themselves to highly-differentiated organisms in 
which mutual interdependence o f human beings will be reached. In this organism, the 
personal pursuit of happiness will be achieved in furthering the welfare of others because 
others’ welfare is intimately connected with his/her own welfare in this highly- 
differentiated organism. The political implication o f this is also evolutionary. Spencer’s 
ideal society was based on the notion o f a definite, coherent heterogeneity. The true real 
superorganism permits all of its parts to act freely, which will naturally lead to their 
cooperation. Spencer believed that heterogeneity is more stable than homogeneity.
Durkheim believed that history is in a state of progress from societies characterized 
by mechanical solidarity to societies characterized by organic solidarity. Following 
Malthus, Durkheim emphasized the importance o f an increase in population which entails 
an increase in the geographical proximity o f individuals. What is at stake here is that 
Durkheim connected an increase o f  population density with moral density. According to
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Durkheim, an increase in population density leads to an increase in frequent 
commiuiications between people and the need for transformation, which in turn leads to 
an increase in moral density, intrasocial relations, and frequency o f contact between 
individuals. Durkheim considered morality as a product of social forces. Durkheim 
proposed “moral individualism.” A moral individual is “an active member of a political 
community whose duties and desires are directed toward that community and whose 
benefits (such as those in the Declaration of the Rights of Man) are protected by it” 
(Cladis 1992:16-17). On the political dimension, Dmkheim also knew well the danger 
of the technically practical as well as the theoretical. He believed that the technically 
practical which was then represented by utilitarianism wrongly assumed that the state had 
a limited role to protect what exist in human nature prior to society. According to 
Durkheim, individual rights are not natural rights but civil rights that are given by 
society. Diurkheim also believed that the theoretical which was then represented by 
Hegelian essentialism wrongly assumed that the state is a mystic entity only for which the 
individual exists. Against both of them, Durkheim accepted the morally practical 
according to which individualism had developed into a major principle of social order 
precisely as the state had become stronger. Thus the relationship between the individual 
and the state is not a static, fixed relationship, but a dynamic, historical relationship. In 
the past, the state was not developed enough to permit individualism. In the transitory 
present, individualism was not developed enough to support a more complex form of 
social order. His whole work can be said to reflect his effort to reconcile liberalism and 
communalism. But in the coming age, individualism and the state will not contradict 
each other: “On the one hand we admit that the state goes on developing more and more;
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on the other hand that the rights o f the individual, which seem to be opposed to those o f 
the state, develop in a similar way” (Durkheim, quoted in Hall 1987: 154). Durkheim 
envisioned the future as a highly differentiated society in which every individual has 
his/her specific function in the society as a whole, morally bound to each other. Thus, we 
can argue that Durkheim proposed a participatory democracy, which is the basic 
argument o f the morally practical.
Weber believed that history develops toward the increase of power over nature and 
social environment, even though the tone o f his narrative was imbued with the Counter- 
Enlightenment lamentation on the trade-off o f the Enlightenment achievement. Weber 
argued that the emerging modem world characterized by the increasingly scientific and 
technical control over nature, society, and human being forced human being to fall into a 
moral dilemma. Following Nietzsche, he argued that the security which had been offered 
by an absolute God had disappeared, but science could not fulfill the function that God 
had performed. As a Kantian, Weber claimed that we had to choose our own meanings 
according to knowledge which is partial but relevant to us. Without recourse to any kind 
o f an absolutist monistic God, modem individuals should choose and legitimate values 
that are relevant to them: “so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own 
terms, it knows only an unceasing struggle o f these gods [ultimate values] with one 
another. Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes towards life are 
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. Thus 
it is necessary to make a decisive choice” (Weber, quoted in Owen 1997: 126). Weber 
observed the process o f dominance o f the bureaucratic élites over ordinary people and 
stated that the bureaucratic elites were armed with formal rationality and bureaucracy was
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the formidable agency o f  it. Weber worried about the development of the modem 
bureaucratic state that tended to effectively reduce the general populace to mass political 
subservience. Against this, he advocated a kind o f liberalism in which each member of 
specialized occupational groups “seeks to realize a personally chosen value by its 
translation into worldly ends pursued in their respective institutional sphere” (Seidman 
1991a: 160). Through his political life, Weber fought for parliamentary mle and full 
citizenship of the workers.
Modem American Sociology as the Exclusion of the Aesthetic 
Modem American sociology was similar to classical European sociology with regard 
to excluding the aesthetic when establishing sociology as a science. Except for the 
aesthetic, modem American sociology utilized all models of knowledge. But unlike 
classical European sociology, modem American sociology was not critical of the 
technically practical, but accepted it as the primary model of knowledge. Modem 
American sociology also positively accepted the morally practical because it was 
favorable to the American mind of heroic individualism and capitalism. In addition, 
modem American sociology utilized the theoretical model, but there was a significant 
difference between America and Europe. In Europe, the essentialist version of the 
theoretical such as Marxism and structuralism strongly influenced European academe 
including sociology. But in America, the essentialist version failed to find a foothold in 
sociological discourse because American secular science could not endure its 
teleological, thus nonscientific, implication. Rather, modem American sociology utilized 
the transcendentalist version o f the theoretical.
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In short, in the course of establishing sociology as a scientific discipline, modem 
American sociology excluded the aesthetic model of knowledge, but made use o f other 
models of knowledge such as the theoretical, the technically practical, and the morally 
practical. The aesthetic did not find its space in modem American sociology, and 
developed outside of sociological discourse. As formerly stated, the aesthetic strives to 
go beyond the boundary of the social. The task o f the aesthetic is to blaspheme the 
sacred nature of the social, and thus, to deconstruct the artificial distinction between the 
social and the nonsocial. Avant-garde art represented the aesthetic model, but did its task 
within the boundary of art. Art was conceived as an autonomous realm independent of 
science and ethics. As a result, the aesthetic couldn’t be a serious challenge to modem 
American sociology. In what follows, I will review this process briefly. For the 
convenience of discussion, I will divide modem American sociology into four periods; 
1880s to 1915/18, I9I5/I8 to 1945/50,1945/50 to early 1960s, and early 1960s to early 
1980s.
The first department of sociology was established in the United States, not in Europe. 
Albion Small (1854-1926) established the department o f sociology in the United States at 
University o f Chicago in 1892, and founded the first sociological joumal, the American 
Journal o f Sociology there in 1895. Charles R. Henderson (1848-1915) and George 
Vincent (1864-1941) were the other members of the department. Later, Small brought to 
the department people such as William I. Thomas (1863-1947), Robert E. Park (1864- 
1944) and Emest W. Burgess (1886-1966). Pragmatism influenced Chicago sociologists, 
but during the first period it could not be said that they formed the so-called Chicago 
School of sociology yet: “Pragmatism at Chicago was early recognized to constitute a
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school o f philosophy. The same was not true o f sociology or political science, whose 
schools only developed a generation later. The foundations for the school o f sociology 
was laid at the earlier period, but in the form o f necessary institutional conditions rather 
than high intellectual achievement” (Bulmer 1984: 32). Rather, the spirit o f the so-called 
Chicago School could be found in Charles H. Cooley (1864-1929). In fact, Cooley 
taught at University o f Michigan and was never on the Chicago faculty, but “his 
psychical presence was far more significant than his corporeal absence” (Lewis and 
Smith 1980: 162).
Along with the Chicago School, there were other foimders o f American sociology 
such as William Graham Sunmer (1840-1910), Lester Frank Ward (1839-1913), Franklin 
Henry Giddings (1855-1931), Edward Alsworth Ross (1866-1951), all of whom taught at 
the Ivy schools. Ward spent nearly forty years in government service, and went to Brown 
University to teach there. Ward was the first president of the American Sociological 
Society. Sumner, the second president o f the society, taught at Yale. Giddings, the third 
president of the society, taught sociology at Columbia. Ross taught sociology at Stanford 
University until his dismissal from the school in 1900, and few years later he moved to 
University o f  Nebraska and then to University o f Wisconsin where he taught for some 
thirty years.
Virtually all early American sociologists were greatly influenced by Darwinian and
Spencerian evolutionary naturalism. According to Hinkle (1980: 16-17), evolutionary
naturalism designates three appropriate tenets:
(I) it is possible and desirable to offer a naturalistic, rather than a 
supematuralistic, explanation o f social or societal phenomena (which are 
thus a domain in and of nature and which involves social forces); (2) the 
appearance of social phenomena can be accounted for (causally) in terms
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of other more basic, elementary or genetic phenomena, states, or 
conditions, out o f which social phenomena arose gradually; and (3)
Darwinian (and Spencerian) views of organic evolution are held to afford 
an acceptable model for interpreting the stability-instability o f modes of 
human association as effective adaptations or adjustments to the 
conditions of human existence.
Evolutionary naturalism was a British version of Darwin’s evolutionism, which was
characterized by individualistic and deterministic interpretation o f Darwin’s
evolutionism. This British version was prominent in America until the 1920s because of
“American provincialism and intellectual dependence upon Britain” (Connell 1997:
1561). Early American sociologists fully accepted the individualistic feature of this view.
Martindale (1966: 22) described the social ambience of the United States where an
individualistic approach to society was welcomed as such.
In the United States, a somewhat special circumstance eclipsed the 
significance of holistic social theories from the beginning. The United 
States had never had a powerful traditional aristocracy. Thus, the 
revolution left the country in the hands of the middle classes, but without 
the urgent necessity to consolidate the socio-political order against 
possible counterrevolution by traditional aristocracies, on the one hand, or 
against an activated proletariat, on the other. Furthermore, a great 
continent remained to be exploited. As a result, there was no need for the 
sharp reversal o f the philosophical and ideological outlook comparable to 
the European movement from enlightenment rationalism to romanticism, 
from laissez faire individualism to sociological holism.
Early American sociologists tried to eliminate or minimize the deterministic feature 
of evolutionary naturalism, preserving the belief in the progress or evolutionary 
development o f humanity from the simple origin to the complex present (or future).
Early American sociologists tried to debunk the organicists’ reification of social structure 
and development by emphasizing the on-going process. This emphasis on the on-going 
process fitted well to most early American sociologists’ aspiration to reform society with 
the aid o f scientific knowledge. In this post-Civil War era, America underwent rapid
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industrialization and urbanization in which American sociologists saw advances o f 
material life as well as decline of the traditional Protestant morality. American 
sociologists were very conscious o f the ethical and political implications of the historical 
changes, as the vast majority came from rural and religious (Protestant) environments and 
was educated in the Protestant ethics that demanded every individual to work hard in 
order to believe that he is chosen by God. Every individual is a solitary pilgrim who has 
to go his own way, not having any choice but to believe that s/he is chosen by God. 
Nobody can decide who I am and what I do. This Protestant heroic individualism led 
American sociologists to the Enlightenment belief in progress, one that men can reform 
society towards betterment o f humankind through applying scientific knowledge to 
society (see Greek 1992). But American sociologists had observed a lot o f urban 
problems and the decline o f the Protestant ethic. American sociologists wanted to 
preserve the traditional Protestant ethics by reforming social problems with scientific 
knowledge, believing that if  they would discover laws about human organization, these 
laws could be used for the progressive betterment o f society. These laws were usually 
expressed in terms of evolutionism; “the survival o f the fittest.” Except for some extreme 
liberalists, most American sociologists who observed the chaos of industrialization, 
urbanization, and immigration believed that the social system should be reformed and 
that it could be reformed without revolution. In this sense, early American sociologists 
wanted to be both scientific and moralistic.
Regardless of which school the early American sociologists belonged to, there were 
two different interpretations o f evolutionary naturalism: the “social forces group” and the 
“interactionist group.” The “social forces group” mainly followed the technically
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practical when modifying evolutionary naturalism. The technically practical that the 
social forces group accepted was mainly based on the model o f Newtonian physics that 
tries to find universal laws like the laws of gravity. This kind o f the technically practical, 
like the theoretical, employed abstract and grand discourses. By contrast, statistics, 
which characterized the post-Newtonian model of the technically practical, was not yet 
employed. Following the technically practical, the “social forces group” emphasized 
individualistic and behavioristic aspects o f evolutionary naturalism. The “social forces 
group” believed that some basic interests, desires or forces are universal or nearly 
universal characteristics of human beings, which impel people to do things. The social 
forces group believed that society or organization emerged out o f the interaction of 
individuals, each o f whom is trying to satisfy some kind o f individualistic interest, desire 
or force. This group did not emphasize the rigid and objective feature of society, but 
recognized the importance o f  the social process that is a perpetual relation between forces 
lodged in individuals. The “social forces group” was represented by Small^, Sumner, 
Ward, and Ross. Giddings also accepted the technically practical but his position was 
significantly different from other social forces group members. Unlike them, Giddings 
did not conceive early humans as egoistic, individualistic, selfish, atomistic, solitary, etc. 
Rather, he believed that “Human nature is [characteristically and] preeminently social 
nature” (quoted in Hinkle 1980: 107). Despite this difference, Giddings basically 
accepted the technically practical, but unlike the social forces group that accepted the 
Newtonian model o f the technically practical, Giddings argued that statistics was needed
Despite Small having established the Chicago sociology, he was not directly influenced 
by pragmatism (Bulmer 1984:31). Rather, Small was similar to other Ivy school 
sociologists.
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for sociology to become a reliable science. Even though statistics was relatively little 
used among sociologists up to 1930, Giddings became the forerunner of neo-positivistic 
sociology.
The “interactionist group” adopted primarily the morally practical when modifying 
evolutionary naturalism. This humanistic modification of evolutionary naturalism was 
possible with the aid o f pragmatism which developed the basic tenets o f the morally 
practical. Ontologically, pragmatism rejected the deterministic worldview which saw the 
world as inherently structured and determined in and of itself. Rather, it presented 
pluralistic worldview according to which contingency and ambiguity were considered as 
main features o f the world. Reality is not ready-made and complete for all eternity but is 
still in the making. This indeterminate notion o f the world was intimately associated with 
an emphasis on human beings as an active beings. Following the Darwinian notion of 
evolution, pragmatism saw the individual as an active flexible being who “continuously 
adapts to his environment, changing his action to meet the exigencies of the situation and 
transforming the situation to satisfy his practical needs” (Shalin 1986: 11). According to 
pragmatism, the individual and the environment mutually constitute each other. Action 
connects the individual and the environment. Knowledge of the world is neither a 
speculative pursuit of the eternal Truth nor the blind accumulation o f bare facts. Rather, 
knowledge is an instnunent by which man adapts better to the environment. Thus, what 
is important is to experience the world through action although knowledge is always 
partial because the world is still in the making: “the state of indeterminacy endemic to 
reality cannot be terminated once and for all. It can be alleviated only partially, in 
concrete situations, and with the help o f a thinking agent” (Shalin 1986:10). On the
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direction of history, pragmatism basically shared the belief in human progress with the
aid of knowledge, but it did not believe that the mechanism of progress was determined a
priori. The concrete manifestation o f progress depends on interactions between human
actors and the environment. On morality, pragmatism emphasized the moral autonomy
of human beings; they are responsible for their actions. This morality is intimately
connected with a kind of participatory democracy which presupposes the pluralist
organization o f society. As Joas (1993: 18) excellently summarized:
The concept of rationality and the normative ideal of this mode of thought 
are theoretically grasped in the idea of self-regulated action.
Pragmatism’s theory o f social order, then, is guided by a conception of 
social control in the sense of collective self-regulation and problem­
solving. This conception o f social order is informed by ideas about 
democracy and the structure of communication within communities of 
scientists.
Pragmatism was not a unified school, and generally accord unqualified primacy to 
neither individual nor society: the individual is explained in terms o f society and society 
in terms of individual. Still we could find a significant division between nominalist and 
realist pragmatists. Peirce represented the realist version of pragmatism. Compared to 
Peirce, James and Dewey were more nominalist than realist (Lewis and Smith 1984)^. 
These two version of pragmatism influenced American sociologists even though Peirce 
did not influence them as James and Dewey did. Similarly, we can distinguish between 
two groups o f interactionist sociology: the psychical interactionist and the social 
interactionist.
In fact, this division was not determinate because the two groups basically shared the 
basic tenets mentioned above (see Shalin 1986). Inspite of this, we could identify that 
these two groups emphasized one over the other among the individual and structure. We 
believe that this distinction would be helpful for further mapping the development of 
interactionist sociology.
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The psychical interactionist group “draws attention away from the biological givens 
and centers the actual field o f interpersonal interaction as the primary source of social 
organization. The psychical interactionists were more aware that the biological 
universals can be accommodated through a wide variety of social structures. It is, 
therefore, impossible to explain the diverse array o f concrete forms of social 
organizations by pointing to a list of universal ‘instincts’ or ‘forces.’ Rather, each form 
must be interpreted through the specific interpersonal and historical processes that 
conditioned its occurrence” (Lewis and Smith 1980: 157-158). Unlike the social forces 
group which took the technically practical, the psychical interactionist group basically 
accepted Dewey’s claim that we live in “ a universe which is not all closed and settled, 
which is still in some respects indeterminate and in the making.. an open universe in 
which uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, novelties, and possibilities are naturalized” 
(Dewey, quoted in Kennedy 1950: 52). James, Dewey, and Cooley could be 
representatives of the psychical interactionist group.
If the psychical interactionist group shifted the focus from the biological to 
consciousness, the social interactionist group shifted the focus from consciousness to the 
objective world. Mead represented this view, recognizing that “a great deal has been 
placed in consciousness that must be returned to the so-called objective world” (Mead 
1962: 4). Mead gave priority to society over the individual: “the whole (society) is prior 
to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of 
the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts” (Mead 1962: 7). To Mead, “the 
social whole precedes the individual mind both logically and temporally. A thinking, 
self-conscious individual i s . . .logically impossible in Mead’s theory without a prior
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social group. The social group comes first, and it leads to the development of self- 
conscious mental states” (Ritzer 1996: 184). Compared to the psychical interactionist 
group that emphasized the open, flexible universe. Mead emphasized the universal and 
objective feature of society in which the individual participates through taking the roles 
of others: “Mead’s approach is compatible with the recognition that relatively to the most 
general co-operative acts there are highly invariant features o f the world” (Morris 1962: 
xxx). Mead’s views are well presented in his famous book Mind, Self, and Society 
posthumously published in 1934 by his students. In fact. Mead’s views were “developed 
from 1900 on at the University o f  Chicago in the widely known and highly influential 
course, ‘Social Psychology’” (Morris 1962: v). One of the recent works showed well 
how Mead developed his views from Dewey’s 1896 article “The Reflex Arc Concept in 
Psychology” (Cook 1993). Thus, we consider that Mead’s views were basically 
developed during the first period (1880s-l9l5/18).
In the second period (1915/18-1945/50), American sociologists started doubting their 
optimistic belief in progress and began to make efforts to control social problems. The 
massive violence of World War 1 made it no longer possible “to take ‘progress’ 
unproblematically as the reality to be studied, the object of knowledge” (Connell 1997: 
1533). Also a varuety of “social problems” associated with the acceleration of 
industrialization, urbanization, and immigration were enough to challenge the optimistic 
belief in human progress. In parallel, America began to change into an organized 
bureaucratic society as large corporations and large-scale industries developed. Large 
bureaucratic organizations demanded that sociologists devise social skills to explain, 
predict, and control the social world, and offered huge amounts o f fimding to American
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sociologists in return for solving social problems. The “efficiency” of the theory to solve 
social problems was the funding agents’ main concern (Ttumer and Turner 1990). This 
condition led American sociologists to detach themselves fi-om evolutionism, regardless 
o f whether it was mechanistic or dialectical, which proposed a grand narrative about the 
origin of humanity and its subsequent evolution of humanity. Indeed, there were still 
some scholars who continued to use the evolutionary scheme, but they increasingly lost 
their currency (Hinkle 1994: 65-148). Rather, American sociologists began to study the 
concrete social problems around them (Hinkle 1954, 1994; Turner and Turner 1990). 
Answering the demands of the funding agency, they devised sophisticated 
methodological strategies to explain, predict and control social problems. Sociology as a 
“genuine” science became conceptualized as inductive, empirical research: “Perhaps, the 
most characteristic concern o f the second period was to make sociology a genuine 
science through a devotion to inductive, empirical research” (Hinkle 1994: 30). The 
effort to turn sociology into a science encouraged the detached and objective study of 
society, which allowed no room for the subjectivity of the researcher. Sociology became 
increasingly equated with the scientific method.
With regard to the notion o f a scientific method, there were two main positions. One, 
proposed by the so-called Chicago sociology, took the morally practical as the model of 
sociology as a scientific method. 1 consider thus Chicago sociology as a sociological 
version o f pragmatism which could be seen as an heir o f the morally practical. As 
previously stated, the most important feature o f the morally practical is the emphasis on 
the freedom o f human beings in the open universe. Likewise, pragmatism believed in 
men’s conscious activity (rationality) to define and solve problems encountered in the
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course o f their conduct. For pragmatism, science is a type o f activity, i.e., a problem­
solving activity. Also, pragmatism believed that social order could be maintained only 
through active participation o f actors.
As we have seen, pragmatism had two versions; James, Dewey, and Cooley’s 
nominalist version and Peirce and Mead’s realist one. The psychical interactionists such 
as Cooley followed a nominalist version. In the second period, although psychical 
interactionism was developed by Thomas, Ellwood, and Blumer (Lewis and Smith 1980), 
Thomas would be considered as its main representative because it was Thomas who set 
up this tradition at Chicago. Thomas challenged any kind o f reified vision of society and 
man, revitalizing their subjective dimension. Thomas placed more emphasis on man’s 
power to define a situation than on the obdurate nature o f the situation. Social structure 
or situation matters only when it is experienced by actors. Social structure is pluralistic 
because actors experience it in different ways. In this sense, social structure is fluid and 
dynamic enough to accord formative power to actors.
The realist version was developed by Park and his followers. In the Introduction to
the Science o f Sociology (1921), Park distinguished social nominalism from social
realism, and rejected social nominalism which saw society as consisting o f “a group of
independent individuals who created social organization through psychical interactions”
(Smith and Lewis 1980: 185). Park shifted the interest from social nominalism to social
realism even though these two positions were intermingled:
On the macrolevel question of the relationship between consciousness and 
social organization. Park w as.. .a self-professed realist. Yet when 
required to provide an account o f the process through which social 
consciousness is formed. Park relied upon the American tradition o f 
Dewey, Cooley, and Thomas. The structural component of Park’s thought
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was definitely realistic, but his processual analysis remained essentially 
nominalistic (Smith and Lewis 1980; 186-187).
These two intermingled positions make it difficult to precisely grasp Parks’s position. 
Indeed, Park did not present his view in a systematic way, but 1 want to emphasize Park’s 
realist side because his students’ studies of cities were based on his realist view to study 
“society as it is”: “Under Park’s guidance, urban ethnography, the study o f social 
behavior in its ‘natural setting,’ became the fulcrum o f research at Chicago” (Lai 1990: 
2). The subsequent monographs published in the 1920s and the 1930s such as The Hobo, 
The Gold Coast and Slum, The Gang, The Taxi-Dance Hall, and The Pilgrims o f  Russian 
Town were developed under Park’s guidance, and formed the dominant tradition at 
Chicago (Bulmer 1984). The most important feature o f these studies is that the authors 
gathered the data from their firsthand acquaintance with the society aroimd them. The 
realist ontology underlies these studies, according to which “a sociologist is merely a 
more accurate, responsible, and scientific reporter” (Park, quoted in Bulmer 1984:91).
The other, proposed by the so-called neo-positivist sociologists, accepted the 
technically practical as the model of sociology as a scientific method. Neo-positivist 
sociology was developed mainly by Giddings’ graduate students at Columbia or students 
o f their students. It is by the end of the 1920s that these “two major and antagonistic 
conceptions of science and scientific method are beginning to crystallize, one centering 
on statistics and the other on case study” (Hinkle 1994: 34). Up to 1930 American 
sociologists mainly used qualitative methods. Indeed, up to then statistics had been 
relatively little used (Harvey 1987: 74). But after the 1930s, neo-positivist sociology, 
which mainly used statistics, increasingly dominated American sociology. We consider 
neo-positivist sociology as an heir of the technically practical, but unlike positivist
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
189
sociology, neo-positivist sociology aimed to find truths with a small “t”: they are 
conditional and subject to revision o f the accumulation of new knowledge. During the 
second period, neo-positivist sociology was developed mainly by F. Stuart Chapin (1888- 
1974), William F. Ogbum (1886-1959), George A. Lundberg (1895-1966), etc. (Hinkle 
1994). Neo-positivist sociology became the most dominant trend in American sociology, 
especially after 1930. Lundberg was considered to be the most representative figure by 
his contemporary sociologists (see Simpson 1949; Timasheff 1950). His Social Research 
(1929) set up subsequent development of positivistic sociology.
These two versions of American sociology, i.e., pragmatic sociology and neo­
positivist sociology, were more interested in scientific “methods” than scientific 
“theories.” But by the 1930s, a new interest in the general theory emerged. Pitirim 
Sorokin (1889-1968) and Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) represented this trend. While 
Sorokin did not exert any significant influence on the subsequent development of 
American sociology. Parsons set up the dominant theoretical position in modem 
American sociology. Before the publication of The Structure o f  Social Action in 1937, 
modem American sociology had been virtually equated with methods or methodologies. 
As we have seen, the models of the morally practical and the technically practical almost 
eliminated the need for the theoretical. In this respect, Parsons was outstanding; he 
helped American sociologists revitalize their interest in the theoretical.
Parsons was critical for his times, because most sociologists were busy doing 
empirical research. These empirical sociologists assumed that theory is a metaphysical or 
mystical remnant that should be expunged from the establishment of scientific sociology. 
By contrast. Parsons argued that all empirical researches already worked with reference
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to generalized theoretical categories. Thus, from his early career. Parsons began to 
propose “generalized analytic theory” against a variety o f empiricism (positivistic 
empiricism, particularistic empiricism, and intuitionist empiricism) as well as idealism. 
Parsons’ term “generalized analytic theory” could be thought o f as a sociologization of 
the transcendentalist version of the theoretical. Just as this version tried to retain the 
spiritual dimension o f man and society while criticizing the harsh materialism of the 
Enlightenment, so Parsons wanted to retain the spiritual or normative dimension of 
human beings while criticizing the extremes of positivism and behaviorism. Parsons 
argued that positivism was inappropriate for the study o f human beings because it used 
the models o f the physical sciences which deal with an inanimate matter. Further,
Parsons rectified the basic tenet o f the theoretical, one that there is a necessary relation 
between the structure of mind and its external referents: “empirical reality.. .is a factual 
order. Furthermore its order must be o f a character which is, in some sense, congruent 
with the order of human logic” (Parsons 1968: 753). Parsons proposed the “action frame 
o f reference” as an equivalent to Kant’s categories of time and space through which we 
experience or organize things themselves. Concrete entities are “constructed entities, the 
construction being determined by the structure of the frame o f reference employed” 
(Parsons 1968: 754-755). In this sense, we can call Parsons a Neo-Kantian (Hinkle 1994: 
53).
In the second period, American sociologists tried to preserve the liberal idea, but they 
felt that traditional liberalism was deficient in securing order. Those who embraced the 
morally practical and the technically practical kept working under the assumption of the 
liberal ideal o f autonomous individuals. Roughly up to the 1930s, they claimed that
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study on the normative dimension was not their jobs as genuine scientists because 
genuine scientists transcended the normative dimension. But what they really did was to 
defend American liberalism characterized by individualistic notion o f society and 
reformative politics. To American Uberalists, the social system was established and 
maintained by the voluntary consensus among individuals, and social problems could be 
solved on the individual level. Thus, they concentrated on devising methods to measure 
individual “attitudes.” But confronting a series of social events during the 1930s such as 
the Great Depression, the rise o f labor movement, and the rise of fascism and Nazism, 
American sociologists became to feel that American liberalism was threatened. On the 
social level, perceived threat was manifested as a “corporate liberalism,” characterized by 
“administered markets and government regulation, with the rise, legitimation, and 
institutionalization of the corporate-capitalist order, and hence with the dominant position 
in the market o f the corporate sector o f the capitalist class” (Sklar, quoted in Woodiwiss 
1993: 15). Parsons’ voluntaristic theory of action was devised before corporate 
liberalism emerged as an alternative for traditional liberalism. As a result. Parsons 
worked under the framework o f traditional liberalism. But since then Parsons began to 
move away from traditional liberalism towards corporate liberalism. In this sense, 
modem American sociologists in the second period had a strong normative interest in 
securing American liberalism.
The third period (1945/50 to early 1960s) was characterized by prosperity in the 
United States. The United States emerged from World War II as the most stable 
industrial society in the world, and seemed to many to have solved the fundamental 
problems o f social survival and growth. Socially, this period could be expressed as a
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great success of corporate liberalism. The welfare state seemed to successfully 
administer unstable markets through fiscal and monetary management, and the welfare 
state also seemed to solve the problem of economic inequality by income reallocations 
through taxation. The welfare state extended its power to intervene deliberately in 
society, and as a result, demanded a lot of technocrats armed with administrative skills to 
rationally control society. Much of applied sociology developed in this social context. 
Many modem American sociologists adopted the technically practical model of 
knowledge that deployed statistics for the empirical studies of social problems that the 
welfare state demanded them to study.
Parsons’ functionalism idealized this, as reflected the prosperity of the domestic 
economy as well as the hegemony of America all over the world after World War II. 
Parsons saw the stmcture of society as mutually supportive and tending toward a 
dynamic equilibrium. His main concem was the maintenance o f order within the social 
system. This equilibrium vision of society was Parsons’ intellectual response to the 
“smooth” development of American capitalism after World War II. As Martindale 
(1966: 23) put it:
Only after the closing of the American frontier, the rise of mass industry, 
two world wars, and the Great Depression was the collective and its 
problems brought to central focus in the American outlook as had long 
been the case in Europe. The time was finally ripe for the major 
development of a form o f sociological holism. Sociological holism 
eventually emerged in American sociology under the name of 
functionalism or, as it is sometimes called, structural functionalism.
Parsons’ functionalism showed some inherent conflict with the theory of the welfare 
state because the theory o f welfare state acknowledged that there existed “inherent social 
'imbalances’ o f a sort that needs to be corrected, changed,” rather than to assumed that
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“there is, fundamentally, a self-maintaining social system" (Gouldner 1970: 348).
Parsons dealt with this conflict by proposing a cybernetic hierarchy among subsystems.
What is important to us is that Parsons adopted the transcendentalist version o f the
theoretical. Martindale (1966: 30) rightly pointed out that Parsons’ functionalism was a
revised version o f positivistic organicism, the modem rendition o f the transcendentalist
version of the theoretical:
Actually, sociological functionalism is a revised version o f positivistic 
organicism.. .In contrast to the various branches o f social behaviorism, all 
of which treated the individual and various o f his properties as primary 
social realities, in a manner reminiscent o f the positivistic organicists, the 
functionalists take some form of collectivity as the primary unit o f social 
life. Sociological functionalism rests on the premise that social life is 
organized into organic systems. It also assiunes that any item in the social 
system is embedded in a functionally interdependent set o f relations within 
the whole (Matindale 1966: 30).
Even though he did not give up the voluntaristic theory of action totally (Turner and 
Beeghley 1974), Parsons shifted his interest from the voluntaristic actor to the normative 
forces o f the social system (see Scott 1963, 1974). This shift already began when 
Parsons published “Values, Motives, and Systems of Action’’ and The Social System in 
1951. But it was not until 1956 in Economy and Society (coauthored with Smelser) that a 
more elaborated explanation o f functionalism was developed (Brownstein 1982).
Parsons elaborated his theory in decidedly more functionalist and formalist terms. 
Relying on his analytic realism. Parsons concentrated on building a systematic theory, 
which assumed a systematic world of phenomena as its counterpart. From our 
perspective. Parsons faithfully followed the basic tenet o f the theoretical that the order 
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Thus, what is 
important is to build the “order and connection’’ o f ideas. Individual idea or concept is
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not important unless it is systematically coimected to others that form the whole system 
o f ideas. In this model, a concept should have coherence with the total system of 
assertions within which it belongs. It is thus collectivity, not individuality, that counts. 
This holistic position hints that Parsons’ functionalism is an heir o f the transcendentalist 
version o f the theoretical. Following the transcendentalist version o f the theoretical. 
Parsons tried to invent sociological theory as “grasping the most abstract, fundamental, 
and universal features of society and weaving them into a general theory that aspired to 
comprehend all societies—past, present, and future ” (Seidman 1994: 112-113). Just as 
ideas or forms are a transcendent and immaterial realm of ideal entities, so Parsons’ 
theory is “an autonomous, intellectual enterprise, unsullied by social interests or moral 
advocacy, whose sole justification lay in the general truths that it inspired to reveal’’ 
(Seidman 1994: 113).
C. Wright Mills (1916-1962) criticized corporate liberalism as an ideology o f the 
power elite from the perspective of a small-scale world o f small entrepreneurs and 
farmers. He did not see the United States as a functionally integrated system or well- 
administered welfare society, but an exploiting system in which the power complex 
dominated the middle and the mass. Mills also criticized both empirically-oriented 
applied sociology and Parsons’ functionalism for justifying corporate liberalism. When 
criticizing Lazasfeld’s “abstracted empiricism’’ and Parsons’ “grand theory,’’ Mills 
utilized the realist version of the morally practical. Starting early on in his career. Mills 
was enormously influenced by pragmatism. From the perspective o f pragmatism, grand 
theory or grand narrative is useless because neither counts for individuals. In the revised
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version of his dissertation Sociology and Pragmatism, Mills (1964: 268) expressed this
below by quoting James.
Damn great Empires! including that o f the Absolute.. .Give me 
individuals and their spheres of activity.. .1 am against bigness and 
greatness in all their forms, and with the invisible molecular moral forces 
that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the crannies of 
the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing o f water, 
and yet rending the hardest monuments o f man’s pride, if you give them 
time. The bigger the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the 
more mendacious is the life displayed. So I am against all big successes 
and big results; and in favor o f the eternal forces of truth which always 
work in the individual.
Mills accused grand theory of not connecting with substantive problems and thus 
providing ideological support for the status quo. Mills also criticized trivialized 
technically practical model o f knowledge then represented by Lazasfeld, and criticized 
abstracted empiricism for its conducting of trivial studies which were psychologistic in 
orientation, and lacking any sense o f connection with the wider social structure.
The core, from which Mills criticized both grand theory and abstracted empiricism, is 
one o f the basic tenets of the morally practical: contextualism. But Mills’ acceptance of 
the morally practical is significantly different from the nominalist version o f the morally 
practical. While the nominalist version was mainly concerned with the “situational” 
feature of contextualism. Mills’ version o f the morally practical was primarily concerned 
with the “structural” feature of contextualism. While the nominalist version tended to 
concentrate on the micro level of social processes in which meaning is the most important 
sociological problem. Mills paid more attention to “power,” and criticized the formalistic 
aspect o f pragmatism, which disengaged itself from politics and pressing social issues.
The fourth period (early 1960s to mid-1980s) could be characterized by the crisis of 
the 1950s’ achieved modernity. In the 1950s, most mainstream sociologists held the
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triumphant belief that, for the first time in history, industrial society had solved the
fundamental problems of social survival and growth. But starting at some point in the
1960s, this belief began to disintegrate. Kumar (1978: 187) documented the ambience of
the time as the following:
The ‘end o f ideology’ is itself denounced as an ideology, the ideology o f a 
complacent, short-sighted and one-sided materialist society. There is the 
discovery, or rediscovery, of the dark side of industrialism.. The 
economic benefits o f industrialism are seen to be purchased at the cost of 
increasing ‘dis-economies’ to the society at large: pollution, crowding, the 
exhaustion o f the natural fossil fuels on which the industrial economy 
itself depends. The main currents of industrialization—rationalization and 
bureaucratization—nm into an impasse, and increasingly large-scale 
hierarchical organization seems productive mainly of inefficiency and 
irrationality.
This decline of belief in triumphant industrialism was further ignited by the new 
social movement: the civil rights movement, women’s liberation movement, the anti-war 
student movement, the New Left, the hippie counterculture (“sex, drugs, and rock n’ 
roll”), and the gay-lesbian movement. These new social movements criticized corporate 
liberalism in general and academic discourse in particular as a dominant ideology that 
justified the white/Anglo-Saxon/Protestant/masculine/middle class/aged/heterosexual 
worldview. These movements extended the subject of knowledge and generated new 
social knowledges such as African-American studies, feminism, lesbian and gay studies, 
cultural studies, etc. But up to the early 1980s these new knowledges did not 
fundamentally challenge the modernist framework o f American sociology that saw 
scientific knowledge (the theoretical and the technically practical) as the primary model 
o f knowledge. Most of these new knowledges were produced outside o f mainstream 
American sociology. Compared to other human studies, American sociology was 
relatively slow to integrate these new forms o f knowledge.
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But some American sociologists tried to embrace these new knowledges. They 
thought these new knowledges would endorse the realist version of the morally practical. 
Feminist sociology represented this trend. Modem feminism in general emerged from 
the so-called second-wave women’s movement in the late 1960s through the 1970s; it 
emerged as an interdisciplinary effort to theorize this movement in such fields as 
philosophy, history, economics, anthropology, political science, psychology, literature, 
religion, and sociology. Modem feminism appeared in several forms; the liberal, the 
Marxist, the radical, the socialist, and the psychoanalytic feminism (see Tong 1989). 
These different types of feminism are “modem” insofar as they mimic the modem notion 
of science directly inherited from the Enlightenment tradition; rationalist foundationalism 
and empirical cause-effect model.
Rationalist foundationalism tried to discover some fundamental foundations on which 
society as well as tme human knowledge are systemically organized. Modem feminism 
also tried to discover some fundamental foundations of gender inequality in society, on 
which feminist knowledge is systemically organized. These fundamental foundations 
had different names for different types of feminism; “a set o f customary and legal 
constraints” for liberal feminism, “class system” for Marxist feminism, “patriarchal 
system” for radical feminism, “dual system o f class and patriarchy” for socialist 
feminism, and “Oedipal logic” for psychoanalytic feminism. According to this 
foundationalism, gender inequality was a manifestation o f some fundamental laws 
governing all social phenomena; therefore, modem feminists tried to establish an abstract 
grand system o f knowledge on gender inequality, deducing from these some fundamental 
laws.
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Modem feminists also believed that causes operate at the level o f measurable 
variables. According to this, women were reduced to a measurable variable (gender). 
Modem feminists wanted to add one more variable called gender in order to establish “a 
general theory” that could explain the causes of gender inequality. Research was 
designed using a deductive form of logic wherein theories and hypotheses were tested in 
a cause-effect order. These empirical studies were considered a key task in developing 
knowledge on gender inequality. Modem feminists believed that sexism and 
androcentrism in scientific inquiry are the consequence of science badly conducted, and 
that better scientific knowledge on society will be achieved if feminists eradicated these 
biases in scientific inquiry. Modem feminists mainly challenged the incomplete way 
scientific methods were practiced, not modem Westem science itself.
The new social movements also provided a social ambience in which Parsons’ 
functionalism appeared untenable. Society could no longer be seen as an integrated 
system. Instead, many emerged new trends in sociology that challenged Parsons’ 
functionalism. They are symbolic interactionism, dramaturgical analysis, 
phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology, exchange theory, conflict theory, etc. 
These theories adopted new models of knowledge different from Parsons’ functionalism. 
Broadly speaking, symbolic interactionism, dramaturgical analysis, phenomenological 
sociology, and ethnomethodology followed the nominalist version of the morally 
practical that emphasized action (individuality) over stmcture (collectivity). They all 
considered meaning the most important sociological problem and considered language 
the primary source o f social meaning (Lemert 1979). They all followed the nominalist 
version o f the morally practical: “these subjective-idealist theoretical orientations easily
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199
could have revived Cooley, Ellwood, and other American psychical interactionists with 
whom they are metatheoretically continuous” (Lewis and Smith 1980: 247).
Symbolic interactionism is associated with Herbert Blumer who coined the term 
“symbolic interactionism” in 1937. Blumer wrote a series of articles attacking the 
established sociological position, which were collected in 1969 in Symbolic 
Interactionism: Perspective and Method. There Blumer presented the nominalist version 
of the morally practical. Blumer argued that society is made up of active individuals who 
have selves. Individual actors form society in the ongoing processes o f interacting with 
each other; without consistent interaction between individual actors, society would stop 
existing. Goffinan’s dramaturgical analysis embraced the nominalist version of the 
morally practical. Against prevailing theoretical abstractions and research methods to 
capture “reality,” Goffinan was concerned with how realities are socially constructed in 
concrete interactions. Social order is the result of social interaction as well as the 
foundation for on-going interaction. Phenomenological sociology took the nominalist 
version o f the morally practical, and traced its roots in German philosopher Edmund 
Husserl (1859-1938). In their book The Social Construction o f  Reality (1966), Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckman developed Husserl’s insight into sociologically significant 
inquiry. Berger and Luckman (1966: 18) asked “How is it possible that subjective 
meanings become objective facilities?” They emphasized the subjective experience of 
the reality of everyday life. “In contrast to Goffinan, whose actors appear to be reading 
scripts which were written by others, Berger and Luckman’s actors improvise and create 
their own scripts” (Wallace 1994:263). Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology also adopted the 
nominalist version of the morally practical. According to him, the social world is orderly
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organized, but this order is not “out there.” Rather, it is achieved by active participants 
who share “common sense knowledge o f social structures.”
It should not be ignored that in this period there began the rapid development o f new 
technologies in mass media represented by the launching of the Russian Sputnik in 1957. 
The first landing on the moon in 1969 convinced people that the space age which 
technologists and men o f science would lead had begun. With the sense of crisis, a new 
optimism armed with the technological determinism began to spread. In this context, 
renewed concerns with social change emerged. Futurology became the fashion of the 
time. Many social scientists, most of whom were prominent announcers of the “end o f 
ideology” in the 1950s, presented post-industrial society as the future. Herman Kahn and 
Anthony Wiener’s The Year 2000 (1967), Z. Brzezinski’s Between Two Ages: America's 
Role in the Technotronic Era (1970), Peter Drucker’s The Age o f  Discontinuity (1971), 
and Daniel Bell’s The Coming o f  Post-Industrial Society (1973) were the representative 
books during those days. But among the post-industrial society theories. Bell’s theory 
was the most representative. Daniel Bell, a sociologist and the Chairman o f the 
Commission in the Year 2000, was intellectually an heir of the Enlightenment thinkers 
such as Turgot and Condorcet, and more directly of the 19'*’ century evolutionists such as 
Saint-Simon, Comte and Spencer. But unlike his forerunners who had conceived of 
industrial society as the last stage of evolution of human history. Bell added one more last 
stage to it: the post-industrial society. But the basic logic o f Bell’s post-industrial society 
theory was the same as one o f the industrial society theory imagined by his intellectual 
precursors. This optimistic belief in technological progress generated a social ambience 
in which positivistic sociology equipped with the technically practical model of
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knowledge flourished. Positivistic sociology was confident with the sociologists’ ability 
to understand, predict, and control men and society with scientific knowledge.
George Homans’ exchange theory and Randall Collins’ conflict theory represented
this positivistic orientation. They tried to synthesize the technically practical and the
transcendentalist version o f the theoretical. They are intellectual heirs of Newton as far
as trying to explain everything in terms of a few concise principles. In 1961 Homans
published Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. Since then, exchange theory soon
became a widespread movement throughout the social sciences including sociology.
Exchange theory “gained not only major adherents but influential revisers.. and it deeply
affected sociological work in virtually every empirical field” (Alexnader 1987: 157).
What is important is that Homans tried to synthesize the technically practical and the
transcendentalist version o f the theoretical. In his previous work The Human Group
(1950), Homans was more concerned with empirical generalization. But in Social
Behavior, Homans went further than mere empirical generalization he wanted to explain
them in terms of deductive reasoning:
The inevitable next step is to ask why the empirical propositions should 
take the form they do, and this is to ask for explanations. Once you have 
established that the height o f the tides varies with the phases o f the moon, 
your next step is to ask why this proposition should hold good. And once 
you have established that the higher a man’s rank in a group, the more 
closely his activities conform to its norms, you will ask why it should be 
so. The only way to get an answer is to borrow from somebody else’s 
work, if you can, or invent for yourself, if you must, a set o f more general 
propositions, still o f the same form as the empirical ones, from which you 
can logically deduce the latter under specified given conditions. To 
deduce them successfully is to explain them (Homans 1961: 9-10).
For this task, Homans borrowed higher-order propositions from the behaviorist 
psychology o f B.F. Skinner and what he called “elementary economics.” But the
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fundamental logic Homans followed is the Newtonian synthesis ofreductionism (the 
technically practical) and deductionism (the theoretical). Homans’ exchange theory 
adopted Newtonian physics as the primary model of science of social behavior or true 
exchange. As Newtonian physics reduces organized wholes to their simplest units, 
Homans’ exchange theory reduces the social to individual behaviors, and further, 
individual human to individual animal behaviors. Individual animal behavior is the most 
simplest unit of all behaviors, and thus, basic propositions about individual animal 
behavior is generally applicable to all behaviors. Homans considered these basic 
propositions as the First Principles in his deductive system. For Homans, these First 
Principles are indemonstrable: “As we move towards more and more general 
propositions, we reach, at any given time in the history of science, propositions that 
caimot themselves be explained” (Homans 1961: 26). As previously stated, the First 
Principles should be invented or borrowed from other sciences. Homans called this 
process o f borrowing or inventing the more general propositions “induction.” This 
process is “an act of creation, which has no rules of procedure that will ensure you 
success” (Homans 1961: 10). In a sense, these First Principles do not guarantee an 
empirical referent in the empirical world. In this sense, Homans can be seen as a 
Platonist. But Homans was not content with induction because he wanted genuine 
explanation. For Homans, explanation is “the process of deriving the empirical 
propositions from the more general ones” (Homans 1961: 10). Explanation has definite 
rules o f logic. As Newtonian physics explains all phenomena in terms o f three laws o f 
motion, Homans’ exchange theory tries to explain all social behavior in terms o f five 
general psychological propositions about human behavior. Homans ambitiously claimed
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that “My strategy is that deductive explanations should be inductively arrived at" 
(Homans 1961: 10).
In his work Conflict Sociology: Towards an Explanatory Science (1975), Randall 
Collins also tried to change sociology into a science. Collins criticized both naïve 
positivism which equates science with precise measurement and careful statement, and 
the theoretical in sociology (functionalism) that searches for universals because 
“phenomena that are truly universal cannot be explained in any testable fashion, but only 
speculated about” (Collins 1975:6). For Collins, real science provides generalized 
explanation. The essence o f science is the “capacity to give the conditions under which 
some things happen rather than others'' (Collins 1975: 2). In other words, the real 
explanation of science provides conditions for variations in phenomena, but a 
pseudoexplanation o f  pseudoscience doesn’t. For Collins, real science achieves the 
scientific ideal to explain everything in terms of a few concise principles. These 
principles should be ceaselessly applied to other phenomena so their explanatory power 
can be tested. Formulating some universal principles is not sufficient if it leaves “the 
problem of stating conditions under which things happen or do not happen.. .Without 
such a statement o f conditions for variation, there is no proof that explanation is right, 
that the way of conceptualizing the phenomenon captures its essential features ” (Collins 
1975: 6). For Collins (1975: 2-3), “the method of validating a theory—of showing that 
its explanations are true—ultimately depends on its capacity to act as an economical and 
coherent filter for our experience in the broadest sense.” In this sense, Collins’ conflict 
theory synthesized the technically practical and the transcendentalist version of the 
theoretical. As the following statements show well:
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The scientific ideal is to explain everything, and to do it by making causal 
statements which are ultimately based upon experience. The most 
powerful scientific theory is the one that can get the most explanatory 
mileage out of the most concise body of principles. Science is a way of 
finding the conunon principles that transcend particular situations, of 
extrapolating from things we know to things we do not know, a way of 
seeing the novel as another arrangement o f the familiar (Collins 1975: 2).
Fundamental Assumption o f Modem 
American Sociology 
In sum, modem American sociology utilized all models of knowledge except the 
aesthetic. While mainstream American sociology mainly adopted the technically 
practical and the theoretical, critical sociology and interactionist sociology embraced the 
morally practical. In this sense, we can identify three types of modem American 
sociology. The following is a brief summary:
1) The Technically Practical Version of Sociology (“Positivistic Sociology'): 
Positivistic sociology was first developed by the “social forces group” in the first period 
Small, Summer, Ward, and Ross adopted the model of Newtonian physics, and like him. 
they tried to find the universal laws of society and man. The social forces group claimed 
that there exist universal basic interest, desires or forces that impel people to do things, 
and thus human behaviors could be explained in terms o f those basic social forces. 
Positivistic sociology was further developed by neo-positivist sociologists in the second 
period. George A. Lundberg represented this period. Unlike the social forces group, 
neo-positivist sociologists did not adopt the model o f Newtonian physics that aimed to 
find absolute universal laws. Rather, they adopted statistics as the primary model o f 
knowledge, which aimed to formulate empirical generalization. Neo-positivist sociology 
has dominated modem American sociology. In the fourth period, positivistic sociology
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also began to reemerge in George Homans’ exchange theory and Randall Collins’ 
conflict theory. Following Newtonian physics, they tried to explain all social behavior in 
terms of a few general propositions.
2) The Morally Practical Version o f Sociology (“Critical Sociology” and 
“Interactionist Sociology”): The morally practical was associated with the American 
pragmatism of Peirce, James and Dewey. Pragmatism in general accords unqualified 
primacy neither to the individual nor to society, but a significant differentiation between 
the nominalist version and the realist version could be found. The nominalist version of 
pragmatism emphasized the power of human agency to shape the world which is 
indeterminate. By contrast, the realist version of pragmatism emphasized the 
contextually-bound realities which shape people’s lives. These two versions of 
pragmatism had their counterparts in sociology. The nominalist version of pragmatic 
sociology (“interactionist sociology”) was first developed by Charles H. Cooley and 
William I. Thomas in the first and second periods. Later, interactionist sociology was 
developed into Herbert Blumer’s symbolic interactionism, Goffinan’s dramaturgy, 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, Berger and Luckman’s phenomenological sociology, etc. 
Interactionist sociology tended to concentrate on the micro level of social processes in 
which meaning is the most important sociological problem. The realist version of 
pragmatic sociology (“critical sociology”) was first developed by George H. Mead and 
Robert Park in the first and second periods. Later, critical sociology became associated 
with C. Wright Mill’s radical sociology that paid a more attention to “power. ” Mills 
criticized formalistic aspect o f pragmatism, which disengaged itself from politics and 
pressing social issues. Through Mills, critical sociology developed to encompass a
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variety of critical thoughts associated with Marxism, feminism, gay-lesbian thoughts, 
African-American thoughts, etc. Even though these critical thoughts relied to some 
degree on Marxism, they did not accept the essentialist version of the theoretical that 
Marxism had.
3) The Theoretical Version o f Sociology (“Functionalist Sociology”): Functionalist 
sociology was developed by Talcott Parsons in the second and third periods. Beginning 
early in his career. Parsons was very critical of the technically practical model of 
knowledge, what he called utilitarianism. Following the tradition of positivistic 
organicism. Parsons proposed a kind of transcendentalist version of the theoretical, and 
tried to devise a systematic theory, which assumed a systematic world of phenomena as 
its counterpart. In this sense. Parsons faithfully followed the basic tenet o f the 
theoretical, one that considers the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things. Thus, what is important is the “system” o f individuals, not the 
individuals themselves. An individual idea or concept does not count unless it is 
systematically coimected with the total system of assertions to which it belongs. Like 
Plato’s Idea, Parsons’ system of ideas is more “real” than individual things that do not 
belong to it. Parsons’ functionalism was an expression o f the most abstract, fundamental, 
and universal features o f society.
All these types o f modem American sociology shared the hostility against the 
aesthetic model of knowledge even though the degree of hostility differed from one to the 
other. As a result, all these types of modem American sociology shared some 
fundamental assumptions about ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
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I) Ontology
a. The Nature o f the Social
Positivistic sociology in general assumed that the social world showed recurrent or 
persistent patterns as the physical world did. Compared to neo-positivist sociology, 
positivist sociology emphasized more deterministic character of the social world. 
Positivist sociology assumed that the social world is orderly and integrated like a 
machine whose parts operate according to mathematical laws of dynamics. Neo­
positivist sociology saw the social world as recurrent patterns of interaction among 
individuals, rather than as a reality 5uz generis. Neo-positivist sociology replaced 
absolute laws with more modest empirical generalization, but it still assumed that 
patterns of interaction among individuals would show orderly organized characteristics.
Both interactionist sociology and critical sociology assumed that the social world 
shows orderly recurrent or persistent patterns, which are not natural but made by human 
beings. Interactionist sociology saw the social world as a negotiable fluid order that 
ultimately resides in the interaction of individuals. Even though emphasizing the 
“negotiable fluid” nature o f the social world, interactionist sociology does not question 
the “orderly” nature of the social world. By contrast, critical sociology emphasized more 
the “orderly” nature of the social world than the “negotiable fluid” nature of it. As a 
result, critical sociology emphasized the temporal or historical dimension of social 
patterns.
Functionalist sociology believed that the social world is as orderly and integrated like 
a living organism. The social world is seen as a reality sui generis. All parts are orderly
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interconnected to form an integrated whole. The social world is a self-maintaining 
system.
b. The Nature of Man
Positivistic sociology believed that man is an animals whose behavior is mechanically 
governed by the attainment o f pleasant experiences and the avoidance of painful ones. 
Humans are “naturally” disposed to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. In this sense, 
all humans are naturally identical, and hence stable and persistent interaction between 
them is possible.
Both interactionist sociology and critical sociology drew the line between man and 
animal. Possession of a social self is the mark that separates man from animal; through a 
social self, man becomes an agent of interpretation, definition, and action within a social 
field. Interactionist sociology emphasized that self-indication or self-reflectivity is 
acquired through social process, thanks to which man can become an autonomous, 
socially responsible actor who acts in a stable and predictable way. As a result, stable 
and persistent interaction between humans who have selves is possible. While 
interactionist sociology tacitly assumed ahistorical or universalistic notion of self, critical 
sociology argued that the nature o f self or identity differs from context to context. But 
critical sociology also believed that occupying the same structural position necessarily 
results in forming an identical self. For instance, people who occupy the same structural 
position such as the working class should result in forming the same identity. As a result, 
stable and persistent interaction between those who share the same structural position is 
possible.
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Functionalist sociology believed that man shows recurrent or persistent patterns of 
behaviors, because he is a system o f action with its four subsystems to satisfy four 
functional requisites. Man is an autonomous self-sufficient being who is equipped with 
four subsystems, whose action is determined by the interchange and coordination of these 
four subsystems. Thus, stable and persistent interaction between those who are fully 
socialized is possible.
2) Epistemology;
Positivistic sociology believed that social reality could be best represented when 
values are not be involved in the research process. Sociological research is a value-free, 
unbiased, and objective activity. Sociological researcher should occupy an objective 
transcendental position free of values. Positivistic sociology usually uses formal 
languages as transparent tools to measure reality. Some of them are variables, 
hypotheses, units of analysis, and causal explanations. Positivistic sociology usually 
aims to develop generalizations that contribute to sociological theory which enables one 
to better predict, explain, and understand some phenomena.
Both interactionist sociology and critical sociology believed that social reality could 
be best represented when sociological researchers enter into the world of the researched 
and understand not just what the researched do but why they do what they do. To 
interactionist sociology, the privileged position to represent reality is not an objective 
transcendentalist position but the inner position of the researched. Participant 
observation along with focus groups will allow the researchers to study actions in terms 
o f their subjective meaning to the researched. Critical sociology believed that everything 
researchers do is value-loaded rather than value-neutral. In contrast to relativism, critical
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sociology believed that there is a structural vantage point from which the true “essence” 
o f reality could be grasped. Methods should be devised so as to capture not only the 
patterns but also their historical origins, development, and contradictory features because 
truth is assumed to be total, not partial.
Functionalist sociology aimed to devise a general system of concepts so as to 
represent universal features shared by all systems. Concepts do not have direct empirical 
referents in the real world but analytic constructs. Thus when abstracting concepts from 
the real world, value-involvement is unavoidable. What is at stake is to construct 
concepts so as that they are logically related to each other in the propositions. Logical 
integration o f propositions is the most important. In this sense, sociological researcher is 
similar to a transcendent god. Sociological theory should be structured as a direct 
representation of the mind of the sociologist. The general system of concepts should be 
generally applicable to all systems.
3) Ethics/Politics
Positivistic sociology believed that human history is in a state of naturally determined 
linear progress toward perfection. Man is naturally disposed to maximize pleasure and 
minimize pain and s/he learns how to rationally do this according to the social system of 
reward and punishment. In this sense, men should rationally restrain and deny their 
immediate desires. Liberal society can be maintained by the market system which is 
capable of performing coordination functions without the extensive operation of the 
coercive and constraining power o f the state. For these coordination functions, the 
natural law of the survival o f the fittest is important. The competitive individuals, the 
fittest, lead society in general toward more survivable form in which the weakest
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naturally vanish. Consequently, all surviving members are similar or identical instances 
of a common humanity.
Both interactionist sociology and critical sociology argued that human history is open 
and its progress depends on human acts. Nevertheless, both o f them shared the belief that 
human history has tended to move toward a more progressive state. Self-restraining and 
self-denying morals are needed, hiteractionist sociology emphasized that man can adjust 
his/her desire to others’ expectation, thanks to the possession of a self. This adjustment 
requires man to repress or manage his/her own desire. Critical sociology emphasized that 
man can overcome his/her own private interest, thanks to sharing the same structural 
position in society. Politically, both interactionist sociology and critical sociology 
advocated participatory democracy in which nobody is alienated from society. 
Interactionist sociology tended to believe that the structural arrangement of society is 
flexible enough to allow all members to actively participate in decision-making in 
society. By contrast, critical sociology emphasized that the structural arrangement of 
society is too strong and unequal for some members to participate in decision-making in 
society.
Functionalist sociology believed that history is in a state o f differentiation entailing 
cultural or moral integration among parts, which has improved humanity. Humans are 
supposed to restrain or deny their selves in order to serve the organic whole o f society. 
Society should be in a state o f equilibrium in which all properly socialized members 
perform their proper functions. If there are some dysfunctions, technocrats would cure 
them with scientific knowledge. The bureaucratic state equipped with technocrats is the 
neutral agent that does this.
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THE EMERGENCE OF POSTMODERN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 
AS A RESPONSE TO THE AESTHETIC CHALLENGE 
I have argued that sociology was based on the modem assumption o f the scientization 
and moralization of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. Mainstream American 
sociology such as functionalist sociology and positivistic sociology worked on the 
assumption of the scientization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. Non­
mainstream American sociology such as critical sociology and interactionist sociology 
worked on the assumption o f the moralization of ontology, epistemology, and 
ethics/politics. Postmodern social theory challenged this fundamental assumption of 
modem American sociology by way of presenting the aestheticization of ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics/politics.
American sociology began to respond to this challenge from the late 1980s on. But 
the responses to postmodemism differed among variations of American sociology. 
Interactionist sociology in general actively embraced the aesthetic challenge. Some of 
critical sociology also critically responded to the aesthetic challenge. By contrast, both 
positivist sociology and functionalist sociology evaluated postmodemism in a negative 
light. This chapter aims to review how each sociology responded to the aesthetic 
challenge. In what follows, critical postmodem sociology and interactionist sociology 
will be discussed in terms o f  how each responded to the aesthetic challenge to the
212
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fundamental assumptions of sociology about ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. 
Then the resistance of mainstream American sociology to the aesthetic challenge will be 
discussed.
Critical Postmodern Sociology 
Some o f critical sociology responded to the challenge o f the aesthetic with the 
morally practical model o f knowledge, especially contextualism, from which critical 
postmodern sociology emerged. Critical postmodern sociology did not accept the 
poststructuralist notion o f language as a social ontology. The main reason is that the 
poststructuralist notion o f language as being undecidable is somewhat alien to the core 
idea of critical sociology: the contextually-bound realities that shape people’s lives. 
Rather than accepting poststructuralist notion of language as a general ontology, critical 
postmodern sociology tried to investigate the researched by situating it within its 
sociocultural, political, economic contexts. By contrast, critical postmodern sociology is 
more open to the methodological implication of poststructuralism, and tries to situate 
knowledge within social contexts in which real people live. There are roughly three 
positions about this. David R. Dickens, who relied on the Frankfurt School and 
pragmatism, paid attention to the fact that postmodern perspective exhibits striking 
parallels with the project of classical European sociology. Ben Agger relied on the 
Frankfurt School. And Steven Seidman relied on pragmatism.
1. David R. Dickens
Dickens embraced critical postmodemism rather than poststructuralist postmodemism
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because he was suspicious o f the significance o f poststructuralism in the emancipatory
project of Marxism in general and in sociology in particular (see Dickens 1990). Dickens
did not fully embrace poststructuralism because he saw some limits of language-based
alternatives. According to him, poststructuralism distorted Saussure by emphasizing the
arbitrary and radically relational nature o f signs within linguistic systems over the
referential dimension o f signs. Dickens (1990: 155) pointed out that “there is a
fundamental disanalogy between texts and institutions which severely circumscribes the
extension of radical linguistic critique to concrete historical processes.” If  other
postmodern sociologists have tried to “aestheticize” sociology, Dickens has tried to
“sociologize” the postmodern. For him, the ideal of sociology is the classical (European)
sociology. He argued that postmodern perspectives are virtually same as the project o f
classical sociology.
In its many guises postmodemism addresses the same sorts o f issues that 
have fired the sociological imagination since the inception o f the 
discipline in the nineteenth century. These issues include those 
concerning the nature and extent o f large-scale structural transformations 
in Westem societies, their corresponding effects on the nature o f social 
interaction and on the constmction o f social identities, and the need for 
new theoretical and methodological strategies. Seen in this way, 
postmodem perspectives exhibit striking parallels with the project of 
Marx, Weber, Simmel, Durkheim, Mead, and others in the classical 
sociological tradition as they, too, struggled to find new ways to 
understand the dramatic changes in social stmcture and everyday life 
during their own time (Dickens and Fontana 1992:10-11).
Dickens called the first two issues a substantive-theoretical dimension including the 
macro and the micro levels, and the third issue a methodological dimension, and he added 
to these two dimensions a normative dimension which concems ethical and political 
implications of the first two dimensions. Dickens paid attention to the fact that classical 
sociologists struggled with all these three dimensions during their own time. To him.
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postmodem theorists also seemed to struggle with these three dimensions during 
contemporary times. In this sense, Dickens considered postmodern social theory as both 
continuity and discontinuity o f the project of classical sociology. To him, continuity 
appeared mainly in critical postmodern social theory and discontinuity appears in 
poststructuralist postmodern social theory. As I have discussed, critical postmodern 
social theory followed the morally practical model o f knowledge while poststructuralist 
postmodern social theory followed the aesthetic model o f knowledge. Dickens criticized 
poststructuralist postmodern social theory which tended to equate the postmodern with 
the aesthetic.
Although Dickens agreed to some extent with the aesthetic challenge to the 
sociological notion o f the social that the social became flexible, fluid, and further, fragile 
because mass-mediated culture became the new organizing principles o f society, he 
argued that this predominance o f mass-mediated culture did not necessarily mean that 
major modernist institutions such as capitalism, nation-state, and large-scale 
bureaucracies totally lost their power to organize the social. His point is not to deny any 
dramatic transformation of traditional institutions, but to recognize the process of 
reconfiguration o f these institutions as well as the process of cultural change. Dickens 
(1996: 3 1) positively evaluated British or British-oriented postmodern social theorists 
(Lash and Urry 1987; Harvey 1989; Featherstone 1991; Crook, Pakulski and Waters 
1992) who “have documented the dramatic transformations in contemporary economics, 
politics, science, religion, family life, and class, gender, and ethnic relations, in terms of 
their elective affinities with the rise of postmodern culture.” These postmodern social 
theorists are critical postmodernists rather than poststructuralist postmodernists. They
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situated postmodernism in terms of the historical and political-economic contexts in
which it is inscribed. In this sense, Dickens could be said to follow the morally practical
model o f knowledge. He believed that only when the predominance of mass-mediated
culture is situated in terms of the historical and political-economic contexts in which it is
inscribed, superficial grasp o f postmodernism could be avoided because contextualizing
of cultural change would inform us of both changes and continuities of culture.
Reconfiguration is perhaps a better term than fragmentation to describe 
these recent trends as it recognizes both changes and continuities within 
contemporary institutions and social relations as well as continuities and 
changes between and among them, avoiding the simplistic dichotomy of 
unbroken continuity versus radical rupture that characterizes current 
debates concerning the legitimacy of postmodernism as a general 
theoretical category (Dickens 1996: 31).
Dickens agreed to some extent with the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion 
o f the individual that man is decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous 
instability mainly due to the bombardment of mass-mediated communication. Dickens 
tried to explain this change in terms o f classical sociology, especially Mead and Cooley’s 
social psychology. Mead emphasized the context in which self or identity is formed: 
“without social institutions o f some sort, without the organized social attitudes and 
activities by which social institutions are constituted, there could be no fully mature 
individual selves or personalities at all” (Mead 1962:262). Cooley analyzed the 
displacement o f primary group relations by more impersonal secondary group relations in 
modem societies. According to this tradition, what is important for the self and social 
interaction is the nature o f institutions in which the individual is inscribed. 
Poststructuralist postmodernists argued that modernist institutions became textualized by 
electronically-mediated mass communication. Thus, the individual is free from any
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institutional constraints. What is more important is that poststructuralist postmodernists 
argued that “There is no narrative logic inherent in the presentation o f images; they are 
just randomly recombined as mechanical permutations” (Harms and Dickens 1996: 216). 
Further, poststructuralist postmodernists argued that the “rapidly expanding number, 
diversity, and pace o f these communications overwhelms the individual’s ability to 
interpret their meaning rationally” (Harms and Dickens 1996: 216). If  the subject is 
constituted by discourses, then the postmodern subject is randomly constituted by 
discourses of mass media. Dickens criticized this view. According to him, social 
institutions are not totally textualized and postmodern media has its narrative logic which 
is organized by pursuit o f accumulation of capital. The individual is not entirely replaced 
by free-floating signifiers because modem institutions such as capitalism, the nation­
state, and large-scale bureaucracies still work.
By focusing on communications apart from the social context o f their 
production, postmodernists ignore the powerful material forces that shape 
the communication process.. .postmodemists have lost sight o f the 
political economic dimensions of communication.. .The new information 
technologies that are at the heart o f the postmodem condition cost money, 
have developed within the logic of capital, and are produced by 
corporations interested primarily in accumulating capital (Harms and 
Dickens 1996:219-220).
As a response to the aesthetic challenge to sociological methodologies, Dickens 
(1994; 98) emphasized “the continuing need for critical, historical analysis of 
contemporary societies. Even those intrigued by such widely heralded postmodemist 
themes as ‘the end o f the social’ and ‘the disappearance of man’ will hopefully view 
these as topics for concrete empirical investigation rather than as metaphysical 
manifestos to be accepted or rejected at face value.” Dickens proposed postmodem- 
oriented cultural studies which substantively emphasized “the heightened importance.
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even centrality, o f culture in the structuring and functioning of everyday life in 
contemporary ‘advanced’ societies... ,” but which did not deny “the continuing 
importance o f major modernist institutions such as capitalism, the nation-state, and large- 
scale bureaucracies” (Dickens 1996: 31). From the start, cultural studies had 
multidisciplinary roots in the Birmingham School. More importantly, multiperspectival 
approaches are needed because the nature and the role of culture have become 
increasingly complex in contemporary societies. Following Johnson (1987) and mainly 
Kellner (1992), Dickens (1996:32) argued that “this research program is focused on three 
interrelated sets o f issues: the production of cultural texts; textual analysis of cultural 
objects and their meanings; and the study of lived culture and experiences.” The first 
issue emphasizes the political economic dimension o f culture and how this shapes the 
ideological contents o f its products. The second issue involves the implementation of a 
variety o f reading strategies, including semiotics, deconstructionism, and feminism. The 
third methodological dimension o f postmodem-oriented cultural studies examines “how 
individuals and groups connect their lived experiences to the cultural representations of 
those experiences” (Dickens 1996: 33). In sum, cultural studies uses the 
multiperspectival methodologies such as the political economy, variety of textual 
analysis, and ethnography, which were all used by the early British cultural studies. 
Dickens’ postmodem-oriented cultural studies is a kind o f revitalization of the early 
British cultural studies: “Like the classic Birmingham studies of working-class 
subcultures, a multiperspectival cultural studies approach attempts to trace the linkages 
among the various levels, from the stmctural political economic through the textual to the 
interpersonal, that together constitute the complicated terrain o f contemporary media
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studies” (Harms and Dickens 1996: 225). This project is also one of the core ideas of 
classical European sociology.
Dickens presented a critical position about the aesthetic challenge to the normative 
dimension because he did not believe that the decline of the unilinear deterministic sense 
o f temporality necessarily leads to the loss of sense of temporality itself, and further, to 
the morally and politically irresponsible conclusion that “anything goes.” He argued that 
the decline of unilinear deterministic sense of temporality ironically convinced us to be 
more sensitive to differences and local contingencies. Dickens rejected both the 
universalist ethics and easy-going amoral postmodern relativism. Ironically, personal 
moral responsibility is needed. Dickens basically agreed with postmodemists that 
difference, pluralism, and the incommensurability of culture and values should be 
embraced, but he warned o f the danger of cultural populism. Cultural populism tended to 
believe that in mass culture difference, pluralism, and the incommensurability o f culture 
and values are already embraced. Thus, what is remaining is to enjoy mass media. 
Dickens did not believe in this. Following the tradition o f cultural studies, he argued that 
mass media culture is an ideology, even though fragmented or decentered, to stunt 
political opposition. “Political resistance requires active work and organization, not just 
‘killing time’” (Harms and Dickens 1996: 223).
2. Ben Agger
Unlike Dickens and Seidman, Agger is a self-proclaimed Marxist, who did not 
abandon truth, reason, or justice as reconstructive ideals. He rejected some versions o f 
postmodernism which abandon Marxism as well as radical politics. Nevertheless, he
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tried to embrace some politicized postmodernism which would revitalize Marxism as a 
critical social theory in “fast capitalism” (Agger 1989). For Agger, critical theory aims to 
radically change the domination of production over reproduction, which according to him 
is the axial logic o f domination in civilization. Agger highly evaluated Marx as a critical 
theorist who articulated concepts of exploitation and the alienation of labor in market 
capitalism in the nineteenth century. According to him, the first-generation Frankfurt 
critical theory of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse broadened Marx’s concepts of 
exploitation and alienation o f labor into the category o f domination in late capitalism 
characterized by the state intervention in economy and the rise of the culture industry.
But the first-generation theory fell short in its lack o f political activism resulting from a 
mandarin approach to culture industry, which lacked a grounding in everyday life. In this 
sense, the first-generation Frankfurt critical theory ignored the popular. The first- 
generation Frankfurt critical theory also ignored feminism by defending paternal 
authority as the source of childhood ego autonomy. The second-generation critical 
theory o f Habermas reformulated Marx’s capital/labor motif in system/lifeworld terms so 
as to theorize new social movements grounded in the lifeworld. But Habermas did not 
pay sufficient attention to male supremacy and the popular. According to Agger, 
feminism and postmodernism could fill in this gap in critical theory. Feminism 
challenged male supremacy while postmodernism, especially critical postmodern cultural 
studies, challenged the mandarinism of the Frankfurt critical theory (Agger 1992a, 1993). 
Agger saw it as his mission to create a new version o f critical theory, a feminist 
postmodern critical theory. For him, the core of critical theory is a utopian vision that 
allows people to see and hopefully moves them to act beyond what it is. What is
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important here is the recognition that the social world is not absolutely determined. This 
indeterminate natiure o f the social world is directly connected with the belief in the human 
agency to change the social world. This idea is the core o f the morally practical. Agger 
refuted the aesthetic in as far as it endorses nihilism, cynicism, fatalism, etc., which 
eventually supports the status quo. For him, poststructuralism and some postmodern 
cultural studies influenced by poststructuralism represent this apolitical stance. Agger's 
acceptance of poststructuralism is limited because he was suspicious o f the Saussurean 
linguistics as ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. For him, Saussurean linguistics 
metaphysically tends to desert human agency and significant politics based on the 
subject. For him, the question of human agency and politics is not a metaphysical, but an 
empirical issue. Among many arguments put forward by Derrida, Agger (1994, 1996) 
only tended to accept the undecidability of the text as opening possibilities of new 
interpretation. Agger wanted to see the relationship between the social and the individual 
in terms o f dialectics, not in terms o f differance; he believed that the dialectical 
difference between the social and the individual, and theory and practice is the best way 
for a transformational project because it poses a utopian society as an alternative to the 
present. Only when posing a utopian society could critical theory avoid normal 
naturalization of the present as the eternal.
Agger accepted some o f the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion of the 
social when he characterized postmodern capitalism as fast capitalism. According to him 
(1992b: 9), fast capitalism is “the second stage o f  late or monopoly capitalism, in which it 
is virtually impossible to disentangle the productive and reproductive, labor and text, 
science and fiction, men and women, white and non-white, base and superstructure.” The
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main force of this transformation o f capitalism was the development o f new mass 
commimication technologies such as TV, mainly through which the culture industry 
developed and extended its influence on the everyday lives of people. In this sense, the 
social has become textualized. But Agger (1993:24) did not agree with the thesis of the 
“total” textualization o f the social, arguing that “[t]he text is a world, although the world 
is not all text.” He wanted to distinguish the world from the text even though he 
recognized that it has become increasingly difficult to do so in postmodern capitalism 
because o f fast capitalism or hyperreality. But as a Marxist, Agger wanted to locate the 
deep structure belying hyperreality: “Although sign value is important in its own right, 
we must not lose sight o f surplus value, which endures as the fundamental means of 
exploitation, profit, and domination” (Agger 1993: 24). For him, this deep structure is 
the exploitation of labor power, whose nature has changed over time. During Marx’s era, 
the exploitation o f labor power was centered around the realm of production, which was 
maintained by false consciousness. But in late capitalism when the Frankfurt critical 
theorists worked, the logic of capital was extended to other realms. The exploitation of 
labor became (re)produced by domination, i.e., the deep internalization of alienation.
The state became the central agent for social control and large corporation the central 
figure to impose endless consumption to masses. Still, exploitation and domination were 
centered in visible institutions. But in postmodern capitalism, the situation seems to 
change. The social seems to be decentered, flexible, and fragile enough to invite pluralist 
democracy. But the basic logic o f  capital is the same. What has changed is the degree o f 
complexity of exploitation and domination.
In postmodern capitalism domination, as Horkheimer, Adorno, and
Marcuse call it, is regionahzed, differentiated, and deconstructed inasmuch
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as system, in Habermas’ terms, colonizes the everyday lives of people 
everywhere. Upon casual inspection, these differential instances of 
domination appear to stem from separable sources—capitalism, patriarchy, 
racism. But once we understand their common source in the hierarchies of 
production over reproduction,. .  .then we can theorize a complexly 
integrated postmodernism that only appears to proliferate healthy 
difference at every turn. Difference, like plurality, is marshaled 
ideologically in order to demonstrate the system’s openness and fairness 
(Agger 1993: 9).
According to Agger, pluralist democracy could not be achieved unless hierarchies of 
domination are ameliorated or altogether eliminated. Differentiation under capitalism 
leads only to quasi-difference because capitalism itself is a totalizing system which 
penetrates every area of life and thus destroys individuality and particularity: “What is 
unique about postmodern capitalism is the way in which differentiation reproduces 
homogeneity and hegemony, hence blocking world-historical transformation" (Agger 
1993: 9-10). In this sense, “‘[r]eality’ is still real—it is grounded in historical structures 
of domination that can be unpacked, to use a popular deconstructive phase, around the 
axial principles of their structure and function” (Agger 1993: 15). It is too early to claim 
the end of the social (structured inequality). The social is still, even though complexly, 
integrated according to the hierarchies o f production over reproduction.
Agger tried to refute the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the 
individual because he believed that the thesis o f the death of the subject cannot be posed 
metaphysically as some poststructuralist postmodemists do. According to 
poststructuralism, the subject is narrated by language or discourse, not vice versa. Some 
semiotic versions o f information society theory endorse the death of the subject by 
arguing that hyperreality o f culture industry makes people drifting signifiers. Agger 
refuted this poststructuralist claim because he wanted to make the subject narrate
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language or discourse, not vice versa. Agger (1993:41) claimed that “[t]he degree of 
subjectivity’s eclipse is above all an empirical question,” and asked, “How much do 
forces o f discipline and power imperil political imagination and agency?” (1993:41). 
What is important is to “reckon empirically with the discursive and political contexts 
within which individuals find themselves positioned” (Agger 1993: 41). But 
unfortunately. Agger never empirically investigated the thesis o f the death of the subject 
in fast capitalism. Rather, he was busy in theorizing the possibility of agency. For this, 
he relied on Marcuse who claimed that the decline o f the subject is associated with the 
decline o f a bourgeois mode of socialization rooted in patriarchal authority. Marcuse 
argued that the generic atom directly becomes a social atom through the all-embracing 
forces o f total administration. But Marcuse did not desert the possibility of the agency, 
grounding agency on the objective character of human subjectivity, Eros, which is never 
totally mainpulable by dominant ideology (Agger 1992b). Agger followed this notion o f 
ineradicable subjectivity as a basis for agency. In fast capitalism, individuals are 
bombarded by hyperreality, but they are not entirely exhausted because they have an 
institutional basis for agency, Eros. Surplus repression is variable because the amount o f 
libidinal repression historically varies. The possibility of the agency is everywhere 
regardless of the amount o f libidinal repression. In this sense. Agger did not agree with 
the aesthetic argument that man is decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous 
instability.
Agger basically embraced the aesthetic argument that there is no presuppositionless 
representation o f social facts: “There is no ‘outside’ to language, no Archimedean point 
o f epistemological privilege fi’om which we can be granted access to perfect lucidity
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through certain protocol statements, such as those o f mathematics” (Agger 2000: 56). 
Thus, positivist notion of science as presuppositionless representation of social facts loses 
its validity because science is not exempt from the discursive and rhetorical. In this 
sense, the traditional distinction between science and literature is blurred (see Agger 
1991). All stories including science and literature are perspectival, discursive, and 
rhetorical, which aim to present a worldview and to persuade others of it. But Agger did 
not want to equate science with literature because he wanted to retain the public nature of 
scientific story. For him, telling a literary story usually implies a more personal, even 
inimitable recoimting of events. In this sense, he was against Lyotard who deserted grand 
narratives in favor of little narratives. No matter whether a story is big or small, all 
stories are agendas, i.e., totalizations and structurations. It is a political decision whether 
to choose a collective, big, public story or an individual, small, private story. He did not 
ague “that we should abandon grand narratives but that we should refresh timeworn large 
stories with new empirical evidence and better theorizing” (Agger 1993: 84).
Agger wanted to retain a comprehensive theoretical logic, which provides a total 
explanation about the domination o f the productive over the reproductive. Total social 
science is needed because the social is unequally structured according to the axial logic of 
domination which is a ‘micro’ as well as ‘macro’ practice” (Agger 1993: 81). For this. 
Agger tried to articulate feminism, postmodernism, and the Frankfurt critical theory. 
Feminism addresses the body and the domestic labor, informing that the personal is the 
political and the political is the personal. Postmodernism addresses the imagination or 
philosophy o f history, informing the discursive nature of nature-like reality. Critical 
theory addresses popular culture, politically theorizing the culture industry. These three
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theories positively evaluate the devalued (woman and household, the imagination, and
the popular) by male supremacy, a modernist philosophy o f history, and cultural
mandarinism. According to Agger, these theories have different emphases, not different
logics. Thus, he wanted to create a feminist postmodern critical theory: “I am saying that
it is vitally important to formulate Marxism, feminism, and postmodernism as
articulations of an overarching critique of domination or critical theory. The payoff of
this integration is the explanation of a host of interrelated phenomena in terms of a
singular theoretical logic, hence affording new social movements a common self-
understanding and, just possibly, common political strategies” (Agger 1993:65). The
singular logic is the domination of production over reproduction:
The underlying structural principle of modernist civilization, then, is 
expressed in a range o f  hierarchies o f production over reproduction, from 
capital/labor to men/women, white/colored, science/art, material/ideal,
West/East, North/South, labor/text, exchange value/use value, and many 
others. What these hierarchies have in common is the subordination o f 
activities heretofore regarded as nonproductive or reproductive to a 
productivist rule of value—for example, in a capitalist society exchange 
value, or in a sexist society men’s work (Agger 1993:95).
In this sense. Agger endorsed the ideal of totality: “I retain Marx’s idea that there is 
an underlying structural logic to postmodern capitalism that can be expressed 
theoretically to explain all domination” (Agger 1993: 87). One of the main merits o f the 
totality theory is that it “explains all modernist dominations, from class to gender and 
race” (Agger 1993:104). The basic logic of domination is also relational in the sense 
that it well understands that “domination happens relationally, between people and 
among groups” (Agger 1993: 104-105). The most important thing is that the basic logic 
o f domination is transformational “in the sense that it suggests a dynamic process 
whereby reproducers recognize that they are in fact producers and thus mobilize
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
themselves to wrest both discourse and material power from those who have heretofore 
arrogated privilege to themselves. In other words, the production/reproduction hierarchy 
always contains the potential for its deconstruction via coming to consciousness, new 
public discourse, and organized social movements” (Agger 1993: 105).
On the transformational nature of the logic. Agger met a politicized Derrida (see
Agger 1991, 1994). According to Agger, Derrida challenges metaphysics o f presence
based on the binary oppositions of the subjects (presence) and the others (negative mirror
images o f presence), presenting the thesis o f undecidability, “the tendency o f texts to
exclude (‘defer’) problems that they cannot solve in their own terms” (Agger 1994: 501).
Derrida’s deconstruction is not nihilistic nor destructive because it valorizes and gives
voices to the otherness by subverting the dichotomies o f presence/alterity.
Far from being nihilist, Derrida wants to reveal the hidden assumptions o f 
systems in order to open public dialogue about them; far from refrising 
values, Derrida wants more talk of values, albeit talk rendered humble and 
dialogical by the acknowledgement that no text or argument can achieve 
“foundation.” Thus, . .  .deconstruction is a necessarily political way o f  
reading writings (and all discourses) that exploits writing’s undecidability, 
difference, and deferral to produce a new version o f  "the text" and thus a 
new world (Agger 1994: 503).
Agger extended Derrida’s deconstruction to a multidisciplinary or pandisciplinary 
radical cultural studies. Although Agger endorsed the Frankfurt School’s fresh empirical 
analysis o f the structural contradictions and crisis tendencies of capitalism, he did not 
concentrate on larger structural analysis of capitalism. Rather, he concentrated on a 
politicized deconstructive reading and writing which aims to deconstruct the role of 
cultural texts and practices in the imposition o f  false needs through commodified cultural 
consumption. He had a different notion o f text distinguished from the depoliticized 
poststructuralism which proclaims the death o f  the subject in the text, emphasizing the
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dialectical relationship between the author and the text: “It [a social theory of text] views 
the text as a deliberate authorial product; it also views the text as having an internal 
logic—language game—that imposes its own meaning on the text. Thus, texts can be 
viewed as an interplay between authorial intent and the structuring logic o f language 
game in use” (Agger 2000: 16). Agger (1992a: 1) hated “a vacuous methodology for 
reading cultural texts that has no real political grounding.” Especially, he was very 
critical o f “the poststructuralism methodologized into deconstruction in American literary 
departments” (1992a: 2) which “engage in self-referential discussion that legitimize their 
common enterprise rather than solve real empirical and political problem” (1992a: 154). 
According to Agger (1992a: 153), Americanized literary deconstructionism has tended to 
become “a cult—an endlessly self-reproducing series of ungrounded readings not 
anchored in the framework of an overarching social theory and political practice.” 
Americanized literary deconstructionism “neglects the difference between theory and 
literature, utterly substituting the former for the latter and thus losing any practical con­
text within which literary theory could do useful work in deconstructing the 
theory/literature duality as well as literary texts themselves for their imbedded 
metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of class, gender, race and all the rest” 
(1992a: 155). Unlike this deconstructionism, a political deconstructionism that Agger 
envisioned engages in the politics o f ideological contestation: “Deconstruction helps us 
find, decode and then rewrite ideology that increasingly takes the form of Baudrillard’s 
simulations and not the straightforward texts o f religion and bourgeois economic theory 
readily debunked by Marx” (1992a: 155). In fast capitalism where “the boundary 
between text and world is fading fast” (Agger 1989: 16) and writing merely tends to
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“reflect and thus reproduce the given order of things” (Agger 1989: 17), the critique of 
ideology is more difficult because there seems to be nothing outside of text. 
Deconstruction tries to deconstruct text as the given order o f things, relating text to its 
context of production and reception: “we must read into and out of particular simulations 
of popular culture, engaging with them on the quotidian level of their production and 
reception, which we theorize in terms of larger structural principles of social and 
economic reproduction” (Agger 1992a: 182).
Agger wanted to deconstruct cultural products as well as contribute to counter- 
hegemonic political practice. Then how is it possible? From what position? There is no 
Archimedean position to guarantee the validity o f deconstructive critique of hegemonic 
ideology and to construct a counter-hegemonic political practice. Agger (1992a: 182- 
183) proposed a (auto)biography as an alternative starting point toward a radical cultural 
studies:
We are products of our time and place—men, women, the middle class, 
Anglo-Americans, academics. For me as a man fully to comprehend the 
political possibilities o f a feminist deconstruction I must position myself in 
terms o f the fields of difference constituted hierarchically around the issue 
of gender. 1 must reflect on my own conditioning as man and on what I 
actualize in the way o f manly behavior in order to understand how our 
culture positions women subordinately with respect to men. Similarly, for 
me to engage in cultural criticism and media analysis I have to reflect on 
the ways in which I have been constituted by cultural works and practices 
that are typical of my generation, social class, gender and national 
heritage. Surely, the fact that I watched the infamous family sitcoms of 
the 1950s and 1960s affected the ways in which I understood my own 
family dynamics as well as formed my relations with women, which I had 
to redo in the meantime.
Cultural studies is, thus, a kind of self-criticism. A researcher o f cultural studies 
starts from his/her autobiograhy and connects it with more politically oriented theory. 
Reading and writing him/herself is internally connected with reading and writing culture.
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Thus, without changing him/herself, the researcher of cultural studies cannot change 
people. In the process of research, the researcher problematizes the taken-for-granted 
images, including his/her ego: “In the process o f cultural problematization we 
problematize ourselves, understanding and thus changing ourselves as the cultural 
conduits we have become” (Agger 1992a: 183). In this sense, autobiography revitalizes 
author-present writing which is against both positivist writing and nihilistic 
deconstructionist writing. This author-present writing is one of the features of what 
Agger called “public sociology” (Agger 2000).
Agger accepted the aesthetic challenge to the sociological, especially positivist,
notion of temporality. Agger (1993: 23) argued that we should abandon “the idea that we
can remake the world through social engineering,” and also rejected deterministic
Marxism which believes that the future can be politically preordained. The teleological
optimism precludes people necessary to bring about a better world. He argued that we
need the philosophy of history which holds open the possibility o f fundamental social
change. Like Habermas, Agger did not think that the emancipatory project of the
Enlightenment should be abandoned because he wanted to direct the change of society to
a “dominationless society” (1992a: 146) in which true cultural needs such as “unfettered
self-expression as well as substantive political-economic autonomy” (1992a: 150) will be
fulfilled. To Agger, this dominationless society (postmodemity) is a utopia from which
the present society would be criticized:
It is my argument here that we should treat postmodemity as a utopian 
category.. .1 argue that postmodernism, conceived within the 
eschatological or “critical” framework of Marxist critical theory, does not 
betray Marxism but extends Marxism into the late 20'*^  century, 
formulating postmodemity as the latter-day version of Marx’s socialism.
In particular, postmodern critical theory is the first narrative to pose a
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possible utopian future not as a determinate outcome o f nature-like social 
laws but rather as one conceivable discursive accomplishment among 
many (Agger 1996: 37).
Morally, Agger accepted that free flow of bodily desire is needed. But unlike some 
postmodemists who oppose biology (body, play) to sociology (society, work). Agger 
wanted to merge play and work, or nonproductive / creative and productive work in 
people’s own daily lives (Agger 1992b). According to him, some postmodemists 
wrongly emphasize the pleastwe of texts in the realm of consumption, naturalizing the 
division of production and consumption. According to this scheme, free flow of bodily 
desire is possible only in the realm of consumption. According to Agger, this position is 
similar to neoliberalism which endorses multiculturalism in the realm of consumption.
He argued that this position deepens alienation and domination. Following Marcuse, 
Agger proposed “erotization o f labor” as an ideal o f good life. Erotization o f labor means 
that “a type of work can become the creative and productive self-extemalization of 
polymorphous erotic individuals who have been freed from surplus repression imposed 
by capitalism” (Agger 1992b: 93). This ideal cannot be achieved without restructuring 
work structure.
Politically, Agger also accepted that the traditional politics based on the self-same
subject is out o f date, but he did not endorse the politics of difference:
Although cultural pluralism is to be defended against occidental 
ethnocentrism, it is hardly a valid utopian constmct when it amounts to lip 
service on the part o f the dominant group and does not promote real 
difference. Difference theory is certainly correct to defend the claims of 
individuals and groups against the state. But the narrowing of difference 
theory into a politics o f subjectivity tends to ignore the structural and 
institutional nature o f politics today.. Although the ultimate aim of 
politics is to liberate subjectivity, this is not to be achieved via a program 
of self-transformation involving therapies and technologies of adjustment, 
from twelve-step programs o f aerobics (Agger 1993:71).
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Thus, politics which links personal problems with public issues is needed because 
liberation involves both subjective and institutional transformation. Textual politics 
should be coimected with institutional politics. It is not enough to deconstruct texts for a 
radical transformation. In addition to it, the effort to transform institutions o f textuality 
such as university and culture industry is needed so that people’s communicative 
competence and access to public discourse are improved. This demands some coalition 
among the dominated, forming a collective movement. This coalition comes from the 
underlying structural logic o f domination o f production over reproduction.
3. Steven Seidman
Seidman did not seem to take the aesthetic challenge seriously because he thought 
that there are only two kinds of knowledge model in sociology: sociological theory and 
social theory (Seidman 1991b). Sociological theory has two versions: (neo-)frmctionalist 
sociology which embraced the theoretical and positivistic sociology which embraced the 
technically practical. (Neo-)functionalist sociology, what Seidman called “philosophical 
sociology,” has been preoccupied with “a series of highly abstract, socially remote issues 
such as the micro-macro link, the interrelationship between agency and structure, action 
and order, and structure and culture” (Seidman 1994:4). Similarly, positivistic 
sociology, what Seidman called “scientific sociology,” has fallen into remote and socially 
pointless issues by aiming to “explain the social laws o f the universe or to reduce society 
to a set of general principles that, like physics, can be formulated in mathematical 
equations and formulas” (Seidman 1994:5). As an alternative for these sociological 
theories, Seidman proposed “social theory.” Seidman wanted to revitalize sociology as a
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moral public practice to aim to promote public enlightenment and action. This vision of
sociology as a moral public practice is in fact one of the core ideas o f the morally
practical. Seidman wanted to revitalize this tradition which emphasizes the power of
human agency to shape history. This power does not come from the a priori abstract
reason, but from the practical reason embedded in its contemporary social conflicts and
public debates. As Seidman (1994: 2) put it:
Sociology must recover its role as public educator. I urge a recentering of 
sociological theory in public debates and conflicts. Instead of sociological 
discourses being driven by disciplinary conventions and disputes, theorists 
should take their problems, themes, and language o f argumentation from a 
public world of social and political conflict. Sociologists need to recover 
the moral impulse of their role, to see themselves less as scientists and 
more as public educators engaging the issues of the day. I imagine a 
sociology that can sustain its rich tradition of conceptual and empirical 
analysis while recovering its public role and authority. If we abandon the 
false promise of science to achieve objective and universal knowledge, if 
we accept our role as storytellers or social critics, we can revitalize 
sociology and contribute to the strengthening o f a democratic public 
culture.
What is at stake here from our perspective is that Seidman ignored the aesthetic 
model of knowledge, presenting the binary opposition o f sociological theory and social 
theory, in which sociological theory has been positively positioned over social theory. 
According to Seidman, the main result o f this binary opposition is the isolation o f 
sociology from the public. Seidman seemed to believe that this problem could be solved 
by reversing this binary hierarchy. Seidman found the revitalization o f social theory in 
postmodernism. Seidman connected postmodernism with the development of new social 
movements rather than with the large-scale transformation of traditional institutions: 
“postmodern social discourse emerged, at least in part, from the development o f the new 
social movements. The intellectual and social historical meaning o f postmodernism in
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the U.S. needs to be grasped in relation to the evolution of these movements” (Seidman 
1991c: 183-184). As a result, Seidman rarely talked about institutional changes.
Seidman responded to the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the social 
from the perspective of the morally practical. Embracing the lead of the British cultural 
studies, Seidman saw the social as texts: “[sjocial realities are approached as a field of 
signs, meanings, or, if  you will, texts.. .This suggests a view of the social as deeply 
cultural or as organized by signs and meaning patterned in relations of identity and 
difference” (1996a: 9). But Seidman was critical o f some poststructuralist textualism in 
which the term “social” is mainly negative. “The tendency in Foucault to collapse all 
social control into domination and in Baudrillard to flatten the social universe into an 
undifferentiated manipulated, dominated mass is both sociologically naïve and politically 
suspect.. .In Baudrillard and Lyotard, ‘the social’ remains an underdeveloped concept” 
(Seidman 1994: 231). Compared to some anarchistic poststructuralism, the British 
cultural studies escaped the danger o f textualism by introducing the idea that [tjexts are 
produced by social practices in particular institutional contexts which have histories” 
(Seidman 1996a: 9). Thus, texts are not a field o f free play o f differences in which no 
constrains exist. Texts are not a flattened universe (a self-referential system). Rather, 
texts are conceptualized “as positioned both in relation to other texts—the principle of 
intertextuality—and in relation to social practices and conflicts—gender-based, class 
based, and so on—that produce texts and affected by them.” (Seidman 1996a: 9).
Seidman situated this textualization o f the social within information society or consumer 
society. Seidman seemed to believe that contemporary society o f America has undergone 
a large-scale structural transformation and thus is qualitatively different from modem
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America, but he did not give any convincing evidence for a large-scale structural 
transformation. Following the semiotic version o f information society theory or 
consumer society theory, Seidman (1996a: 11) just seemed to believe that “the new 
positioning of the mass media, the saturation of daily life by commerce and 
commodification, the new technologies of information, and the foregrounding o f cultural 
politics” signal “perhaps a second ‘great transformation’ in post-Renaissance western 
societies.” Seidman seemed to take the great transformation for granted without giving a 
comprehensive argument about it. Thus, Seidman argued that this great transformation 
urged French postmodern theory and cultural studies to make a semiotic turn from which 
social realities are considered to be a field of signs, meanings or texts. Therefore, the 
traditional core categories that have enabled sociologists and Marxists to do systematic 
analyses of society have become obsolete: they are “classes, economic dynamics, 
bureaucracy, occupations, status groups, market exchanges, population dynamics, and 
network structures” (Seidman 1996a: 11). These categories are assumed to be “the 
organizing social principles or key variables ” (Seidman 1996a: 9). In these systematic 
analyses of society, culture is seen as “discrete, isolated values, beliefs, attitudes, 
identities, or ideologies” (Seidman 1996a: 10). This old attitude does not fit a second 
great transformation in post-Renaissance western societies.
Seidman responded to the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion of the 
individual from the perspective o f the morally practical. American sociology “assumes 
the individual as a foundation o f social life as figures the self as an internally coherent, 
rationally calculating agent” (Seidman 1996a: 12). But according to him, this 
methodological individualism is not only a betrayal o f classical sociology’s original
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project as “a critique o f the notion of a presocial self and a critique of the idea of ‘society’ 
as a creation o f a rational subject” (Seidman 1996a: 13), but also is incongruent to the 
contemporary Western societies in which mass media saturates individuals. Contrary to 
modem American sociology, Seidman (1996a: 12) imagined “the individual as socially 
produced; as occupying multiple, contradictory psychic and social positions or 
identities.” Seidman tried to understand how the structural transformation of Western 
societies had impact on the conventional notions of self and identity. He considered the 
development of new mass communication technologies as the most spectacular index of 
that structural transformation, and recognized that mass media contains many discourses 
and practices and that the self is complexly constructed through these many discourses 
and practices. Thus, the subject is considered to occupy contradictory psychic and social 
positions and identities. In the contemporary Western societies, the self is not the modem 
subject who “is figured as ego-and-present-centered and programmed (seemingly by 
nature) to be goal-directed, strategically rational, and social, that is, compelled to interact 
or engage in social exchange” (Seidman 1996a: 13). Rather, the self is a social product 
who is constructed through a variety of discourses and practices o f mass media.
Seidman willingly embraced the aesthetic challenge to sociological methodology. 
Seidman criticized sociological theory as a “foundational” discourse, borrowing the term 
“foundationalism” from Rorty. Rorty (1979: 293) characterized foundationalism as the 
demand for “some transcendental standpoint outside our present set of representations 
from which we can inspect the relations between those representations and their objects.” 
According to Seidman (1991b: 133), sociological theory has served this task: “We have 
assigned ourselves the task o f defining and defending the basic premises, concepts, and
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explanatory models o f sociology. We have assumed the role of resolving disciplinary
disputes and conceptual conflicts by presuming to be able to discover a universal
epistemic rational that provides objective, value-neutral standards of conflict resolution.”
According to him, this vision of sociological theory is a kind of human science that the
Enlightenment project and modem Westem civilization have defined. Seidman (1996a:
700) attacked the thesis of value-neutrality: “It is the compulsion to erase epistemological
and social differences—a compulsivity concealed behind the sacred canopy of
Enlightenment and progress but also exposed by the very ‘othemess’ it calls forth—that
is the political unconscious o f the human sciences.” Thus, Seidman (1991b: 136)
proposed to abandon the modemist justifications o f conceptual strategies and to accept
local, pragmatic rationales for conceptual approaches; “Instead o f asking what is nature
of reality or knowledge in the face of conflicting conceptual strategies—and therefore
going metatheoretical—I suggest we evaluate conflicting perspectives by asking what are
their intellectual, social, moral, and political consequences.” In addition to
foundationalism, Seidman also criticized the quest for a totalizing general theory.
General theory assumes that the researcher can transcend local and particularistic points
of view so as to reach the universal tmth. He argued that general theory cannot avoid
being local and ethnocentric. As Seidman (1992: 68-69) put it:
I recommend abandoning the project of developing general theories such 
as historical materialism, stmctural-functionalism, or French or American 
stmcturalism. I also have doubts about the value of more narrowly 
focused general theories of (say) the state, social movements, 
modernization, or crime. It seems to me that general theories cannot 
escape being culture-bound or ethnocentric because o f their sociohistorical 
embeddedness.. .Moreover, general theories are more likely than local, 
contextual social analyses to promote essentializing, reified identities, to 
promote and legitimate social hierarchies, to repress social differences and 
particularities, and to ignore the interests o f marginalized populations or
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simply to be irrelevant to their struggles and aims. Finally, general 
theories mask their will to shape history. They contribute to the de­
politicization of the public sphere by trying to transfigure moral and 
practical struggles into analytical or metatheoretical struggles.
Following Foucault, Seidman claimed that the claim to truth is inextricably an act of
power—a will to form humanity. What is more important is that this will to power is
subject to particular cultural and power struggles. In this sense, science is not a general
theory which is objective and universal because it is intimately connected to particular
interests at a specific juncture of time and space. As an alternative for foundationalism
and general theory, Seidman (I99lb: 138) proposed social theory as the social narrative.
The postmodern social narrative I advocate is event-based and therefore 
careful about its temporal and spatial boundaries. By event-based, I mean 
that the primary reference points of postmodern narratives are major social 
conflicts or developments. As event-based narratives, postmodern social 
analyses also would be densely contextual. Social events always occur in 
a particular time and space, related to both contemporary and past 
developments in a specific social space.. Individual societies evolve their 
own unique configurations and historical trajectories, which are best 
analyzed historically, not fi'om the heights of general theory.
Modemist narratives are characterized by the flat, unidimensional language of
domination and liberation whose main consequence is to repress and marginalize
differences. Thus, Seidman argued that these narratives should be replaced by “the
multivocal notion of multiple, local heterogeneous struggles and a many-sided experience
of empowerment and disempowerment” (Seidman I99lb: 142). Thus, epistemological
pluralism is inevitable. Seidman envisioned the active intervention of social theory in the
pressing public issues that would influence the lives of people.
From a postmodern pragmatic standpoint, it would not be sufficient 
simply to invoke general values (e.g., fi-eedom, democracy, solidarity, 
order, material comfort, pleasure) or moral imperatives (e.g., that 
individuals should be treated with respect or dignity or should be treated 
as ends) either to justify or to criticize current social arrangements or to
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recommend changes. Social criticism must go beyond pointing to the 
deficiencies o f current realities from some general moral standpoint. It 
would be compelled to argue out its standpoint through an analysis that is 
socially informed and pragmatic (Seidman 1991b: 142).
In fact, this vision has been developed by critical theories. Seidman wanted to
revitalize this tradition, stripping it o f essentialism. Seidman (1996a) found one of the
ideals of social research in the tradition of British cultural studies. Cultural studies has
recognized the nexus o f power/knowledge and encouraged the “organic intellectual” who
speaks “from a specific social location addressing events or developments as a particular
conjimcture” and who “is always socially and politically situated” (18). This
embeddedness motivates public engagement and makes possible an effective intellectual
intervention. Seidman also argued that sociology should embrace the formation of new
domains o f social knowledge such as communications, gender studies, comparative
literature, queer theory, postcolonial studies, etc. (see Seidman 1995,1996b). On
methods, Seidman argued that sociology should embrace other methods utilized
especially by the humanities. Foucauldian genealogy and archeology are useful for the
study of “the making of bodies, desires, and identities,” “power / knowledge regimes,”
and “dynamics o f normalization, discipline, and surveillance.” Psychoanalytic theory is
useful for the study of “the social formation o f subjectivity, gender identity, male
domination, and sexuality which focuses on the interplay between psyche and society and
on interpsychic dynamics” (14). This argument for trans- or multi-disciplinarity attacks
the rigidity o f disciplinarity o f modem American sociology. In fact, Seidman (1996b:
711) proposed a postdisciplinary culture o f human studies:
These fields o f knowledge [new domains of social knowledge] point to the 
institutional consolidation of hybrid knowledges that underscores the
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blurring o f the lines among the human sciences, literature, rhetoric, ethics, 
and philosophy and between scholarship and partisanship.
Seidman did not accept the aesthetic argument that the sense o f temporality is lost in 
the postmodern world, arguing that the sense of loss of temporality is an effect of the 
Eurocentric discourse: “Both the great modernist narratives o f progress and the 
counterenlightenment motif of decadence are decidedly Eurocentric” (Seidman 1991b: 
140). What is needed is to investigate the enormous social complexities and 
heterogeneous struggles and strains within a specific society at a specific time. The 
moral implication is that the individual should rely on local values or traditions because 
there is no transcendent or universal moral standards. What is important here is that the 
individual has multiple identities and group affiliations. This position assumes a 
radically pluralistic society in which heterogeneous struggles with multiple possibilities 
for empowerment exist: “My o ^  view is sympathetic with Rorty’s affirmation of 
contemporary Western societies while pushing his liberalism in a decidedly stronger 
pluralistic and democratic direction” (Seidman 1991c: 184). This radical pluralism 
comes from Seidman’s discontent with the traditional liberalism which has concealed the 
compulsion to erase social differences. Against this, Seidman argued that difference 
should not be negated for the formation o f identity. In this sense, Seidman accepted the 
aesthetic notion o f politics.
Interactionist Postmodern Sociology 
Only interactionist postmodern sociology can be called “postmodern” in the strict 
sense that it embraced the aesthetic challenge enthusiastically. As I have argued, 
interactionist sociology emphasized the “indeterminate” nature o f the world, which
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allows humans to make their destinies. Some interactionist sociologists easily found that 
poststmcturalism has a very similar view, and soon began to embrace it. The most 
distinctive feature of interactionist postmodern sociology is to accept the poststructuralist 
model o f language as both social ontology and sociological methodology. In different 
words, interactionist postmodern sociology willingly textualized both the social and the 
individual. Embracing a semiotic version of information society theory or consumer 
society theory, interactionist postmodern sociology claimed that discourses of mass 
communication were producing visual language, replacing the earlier forms of literacy 
based on orality and the print media. Interactionist postmodern sociology did not accept 
critical postmodern social theory, and as a result it talked rarely about a decline in 
political efficacy of the modem nation state and economic transformations in production 
processes and workplace organization. Even if it does, it concentrates on how 
electronically-mediated mass communications influence nation-state and economy. The 
most representative are Laurel Richardson, Norman K. Denzin, and Patricia T. Clough. 
They all used to work within the interactionist sociology, but has rapidly moved towards 
poststructuralist postmodern social theory.
1. Laurel Richardson 
Richardson accepted the aesthetic challenge mainly in terms of the 
epistemological/methodological challenge: “I am attracted to postmodernism as a 
‘sensibility,’ a way of looking at and operating in the world. The core of that sensibility 
is the doubt that any discourse has a privileged place, any method/theory a universal and 
general claim to authoritative knowledge” (Richardson 1993: 77-78). Unlike Aristotle
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and Kant who divided knowledge into three, Richardson divided knowledge into two 
modes: the logico-scientific mode and the narrative mode. From my perspectives, the 
logico-scientific mode parallels the theoretical and the technically practical while the 
narrative mode parallels the morally practical: “The logico-scientific mode looks for 
universal truth conditions, whereas the narrative mode looks for particular connections 
between events. Explanation in the narrative mode is contextually embedded, whereas 
logico-scientific explanation is abstracted from spatial and temporal contexts” 
(Richardson 1990: 118). Reminding o f Derrida’s deconstructive strategy of a bipolar 
opposition, Richardson argued that the logico-scientific mode o f knowledge has been 
privileged over the narrative mode in the Western intellectual history and that what is 
needed is to deconstruct this hierarchy. According to Richardson, the core of 
postmodernism is the new notion o f language: “Language is not simply transparent, 
reflecting a social reality that is objectively out there. Rather, language is a constitutive 
force, creating a particular view of reality” (1991a: 3). This poststructuralist notion of 
language undermines the logico-scientific mode: the poststructuralist notion of language 
reveals that the privileged truth o f the logico-scientific mode is connected with a 
particular view of reality. Richardson presented a feminist-poststructuralist theorizing 
and writing as an alternative. Richardson wanted to transform sociology by revitalizing 
the narrative mode in sociology.
To the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the social, Richardson did not 
present a comprehensive response. Richardson seemed to just take for granted the 
inappropriateness o f the traditional sociological notion of the social. The most important 
reason for this is that Richardson accepted the poststructuralist notion of language in
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constituting social reality. Because o f the indeterminate nature o f language, the social 
world is fluid, often contradictory and ambiguous, in which diversified discourses 
compete. But Richardson did not totally give up the sociological notion of the social. 
Richardson observed that the social reality is unequally arranged in terms o f class, 
gender, race/ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, martial status, etc. As a result, there are 
many collectivities which sociological categories can embrace. For instance, there is a 
set of single women involved with married men (Richardson 1985). This set can be seen 
as a sociological group because it as a collectivity shares some common lived 
experiences, which gives it the possibility to act collectively.
To the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the individual, Richardson 
also did not present a comprehensive response. The reason is the same; Richardson 
accepted that language constitutes the subject. Richardson (1991a: 13) argued that 
“Subjectivity.. .—like the social world—is fluid, often contradictory and ambiguous, 
rather than fixed and unified, and subjectivity, like the social world, is a site where 
discourses compete.” Discourses cannot avoid using narrative: “Narrative displays the 
goals and intentions of human actors; it makes individuals, cultures, societies, and 
historical epochs comprehensible as wholes; it humanizes time; and it allows us to 
contemplate the effects of our actions, and to later the directions o f our lives” ( 1990: 
117). The human subject has lived experience o f discourses through the mind and body: 
“the mind and body split does not work as a meaning-making paradigm” (Richardson 
1999: 79). But Richardson (1992:26) emphasized that “lived experience is lived in a 
body.” As a result, bodily experience is influenced by, for instance, poetry devices such 
as “line length, meter, cadence, speed, alliteration, assonance, connotation, rhyme and
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off-rhyme, variation and repetition” (1992: 26). This character of bodily experience 
makes it difficult for the subject to form a self-identical identity.
Richardson’s main merit lies in her response to the aesthetic challenge to the 
sociological methodology. Richardson rejected the binary opposition of 
science/narrative, fact/fiction, plain language/rhetoric, objectivity/subjectivity, etc., 
tracing how this binary opposition historically occurred since the seventeenth century. 
Richardson claimed that this historical separation was completed in the nineteenth 
century: “By the nineteenth century, literature and science stood as two separate domains. 
Literature was aligned with art and culture. It contained the values of ‘taste, aesthetics, 
ethics, humanity, and morality’ and the rights to metaphoric and ambiguous language. 
Given to science was the belief that its words were objective, precise, unambiguous, 
noncontextual, nonmetaphoric” (Richardson 1991a: 4). But this “historical separation of 
literature and science is not immutable” (Richardson 1991a: 4). Embracing the 
poststructuralist notion o f language, Richardson challenged this binary opposition: “All 
language has grammatical, narrative, and rhetorical structures which ‘create value, 
bestow meaning, and constitute (in the sense of imposing form upon) the subjects and 
objects that emerge in the process of inquiry.’ There is no such thing as a neutral 
language” (Richardson 1991a: 3). According to this, it is untenable that “language is 
intrinsically irrelevant to the scientific enterprise and that science writing is neutral and 
transparent” (Richardson 1991a: 6). Scientific inquiry also uses language, and thus, it 
cannot be objective: “All social scientific writing depends upon narrative structure and 
narrative devices” (Richardson 1990:117). In this sense, “Social science writing 
including sociology is socio-historically constructed” (Richardson 1991a: 10) and “truth
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daims are suspected of making and serving particular interests in local, cultural, and 
political struggles” (Richardson 1993: 78). The result is that “[o]nce the epistemic veil of 
privileged truth is lifted, feminism, Afro-American, gay, and other routinely discounted- 
as-ideology discourses rise to the same epistemological status as dominant discourses” 
(1993: 78).
Then, isn’t there any privileged writing for sociology? Richardson did not go that far.
Richardson wanted to privilege lived experience o f people. Richardson paid attention to
the fact that ordinary people organize their lives in terms of narrative:
Narrative is the primary way through which humans organize their 
experiences into temporally meaningful episodes. People link events 
narratively. “Narrative meaning is created by noting that something is a 
“part” of a whole and that something is a “cause” o f something else. The 
meaning o f each event is produced by its temporal position and its role in 
a comprehensible whole (Richardson 1990: 118).
What is important here is that “Narrative explanation means that one person’s
voice—the writer’s—speaks for others ” (Richardson 1990: 130). The narrative that most
ordinary people are using is characterized by the following:
People make sense o f their lives, for the most part.. in terms o f specific 
events, such as giving birth, and sequences o f events, such as the life-long 
impact o f parenting a damaged child. Most people do not articulate how 
the sociological categories o f race, gender, class, and ethnicity have 
shaped their lives or how the larger historical processes such as the 
demographic transition, service economies, and the Women’s Movement 
have affected them (Richardson 1990: 130).
Sociologists are basically the same, but “[sjociologists tell the collective stories of
constituencies to which they may not even belong” (Richardson 1990:130).
A collective story tells the experience of a sociologically constructed 
category o f people on the context of larger sociocultural and historical 
forces. The sociological protagonist is a collective. I think o f similarly 
situated individuals who may or may not be aware of their life affinities as 
coparticipants in a collective story. My intent is to help construct a
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consciousness of kind in the minds o f the protagonists, a concrete 
recognition of sociological bondedness with others, because such 
consciousness can break down isolation between people, empower them, 
and lead them to collective action on their behalf (Richardson 1997: 14).
For this reason, telling a collective story entails a practical-ethnical issue: “how can 
we use our skills and privileges to advance the case of the non-privileged” (1990: 131). 
Richardson argued that collective story could have a privileged place within a liberating 
(liberated) sociology: “This narrative tells the collective story of the disempowered, not 
by judging, blaming, or advising them, but by placing their lives within the context of 
larger social and historical forces and by directing energy toward those social structures 
that perpetuate injustice” (Richardson 1997: 19). According to Richardson, a feminist- 
postmodern sociology can tell this type o f collective story. Feminism has been driven by 
political practice which aimed to dismantle the subordination o f woman. Feminism has 
tried to situate the women’s lives within the context o f larger social and historical forces, 
arguing that the personal is the political. Contemporary deessentialized and 
deuniversalized feminism willingly embraced postmodernism which argued that 
theorizing must be grounded in explicitly historical and cultural ways (Richardson 
1991b).
Richardson believed that collective story should be closer to lived experiences of
people, move them, make them engage in interpretive labors, and thus, empower them.
Richardson argued that poetry, rather than prose, is more appropriate for this double task
and she tried to represent lived lives poetically (see Richardson 1992).
Poetry depends upon the silences and pauses o f speech and is closer to 
oral representation that is prose. As a result, poetry is, arguably, closer to 
lived experiences and more likely to affect its readers and listeners.
Poetry is both visual and oral, both speakable and readable. Poetic 
representation commands itself to multiple and open readings in ways that
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conventional prose does not; it engages its readers in frankly interpretive
labors (Richardson 1991c: 177).
To the aesthetic argument o f the loss o f sense of temporality, Richardson responded 
negatively because it betrays the commonplace fact that “Everywhere people experience 
and interpret their lives in relationship to time. Time is the quintessential basis for and 
constraint upon the human experience. And, everywhere, humans make sense o f their 
temporal worlds through the narrative” (1990:124). Of course, Richardson rejected the 
grand narrative that uses the linear notion o f temporality. But the attack on the linear 
notion of temporality does not necessarily mean that humankind lost sense of 
temporality. On morality, Richardson did not elaborate much. But we can get a moral 
implication from Richardson’s works. Richardson seemed to reject traditional morality 
because it is based on the binary opposition of the mind and body. The self-restraining 
morality is achieved only at the cost of bodily experience. Richardson wanted to vitalize 
lived experience. On politics, Richardson was critical o f the traditional politics of 
assimilation and acculturation. In fact, the politics of inclusion operates on the binary 
opposition of inclusion and exclusion. Richardson challenged the politics of assimilation 
and acculturation which is buttressed by modem sociological story. For instance, a 
modernist story used the guiding concepts o f assimilation and acculturation when telling 
about Native Americans: “For the acculturation story, the writing problem was the 
description of past culture. Indian life had no future, and the present was interpreted in 
light o f this futurelessness as pathology and disintegration. The political action 
consistent with this metaphor was to send Native American children to Anglo boarding 
schools, to create urban relocation projects, to undermine tribal tradition ” (Richardson 
1990:132). Richardson criticized this story. Richardson argued that what is needed is to
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tell the other story to the disempowered: “For the contemporary resistance narrative, 
however, the writing problem concerns the future: the resistance o f indigenous people to 
exploitation in their struggle to preserve ethnic identity. The writing describes the 
resistance in the present to preserve the past for the future. Political action consistent 
with this narrative is intervention to prevent cultural genocide” (Richardson 1990: 132).
2. Norman K. Denzin 
Denzin tried to synthesize feminism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, and 
postmodernism through the axial principle of C. Wright Mill’s pragmatism. For Denzin, 
Mills is important because “Mills argued that as new realities and new images appear on 
the horizon, the old Enlightenment ideologies of liberalism and socialism are in the 
process o f collapsing. Fearing that a Cheerful Robot would become a predominant social 
type. Mills argued that we need to study ‘the types of men, women and children that this 
postmodern age is producing.’ We will require, he said, different theories, methods and 
different ways of looking at this new historical moment” (Denzin 1993a: 179). Denzin 
believed that feminism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism are 
following Mills’ lead: “Taking their lead from Mills, feminist scholars (Meaghan Morris, 
Dorothy Smith, Patricia Clough), scholars of color (bell hooks, Cornell West, Stuart Hall, 
Patricia Collins), poststructural theorists (Barthes, Foucault, Derrida) and avowed 
theorists of the postmodern (Jameson, Lyotard, Baudrillard), postmodern theorists now 
attempt to write and theorize this historical moment Mills identified.” For Denzin, these 
new theorists are important because they analyzed the nature o f new realities and new 
images in postmodern era. Denzin (1991b: ix) argued that “classical sociological ways o f
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representing and writing about society require radical transformation” because they are 
inappropriate for representing and writing about new realities and new images. For this 
transformation, Denzin enthusiastically embraced the aesthetic challenge to American 
sociology. Denzin (1992: 24) was critical about mainstream American sociologists who 
have been preoccupied with the abstract sociological problem of macro-micro links: 
“What’s at issue is hegemony and control of a theoretical paradigm that would speak for 
all o f sociology. Beneath this search for power are individual careers, prestige, 
publications, and the power to determine what passes as knowledge within a discipline.” 
Against this depoliticized abstract project, Denzin (1996a: xxiv), following pragmatic 
tradition, wanted to start from the worlds of lived experiences and to use “pragmatically 
gained knowledge as a tool for social criticism.” But Denzin distinguished himself from 
traditional pragmatists who worked decades before, calling his pragmatism a media and 
communication centered pragmatism. Following the semiotic version o f information 
society theory or consumer society theory, this pragmatism accepted “the proposition that 
the image of reality has replaced reality” (Denzin 1996a: xx). Denzin concentrated on 
the nature of the image o f reality and its impact on the social and the individual. 
Following a politicized version ofDerridean deconstruction, Denzin tried to deconstruct 
the “images” of the repressive arrangements o f class, gender, race and ethnicity, that 
electronically-mediated mass communications represent as the real.
Denzin embraced the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f  the social. 
According to Denzin (1991b: 23), the sociological notion of the social as a totality is a 
sociological fiction: “ordinary sociology’s society, society-at-large, is a sociological 
fiction; society in the abstract is neither visible nor countable. It exists in the texts that
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sociologists and others write about it.” Denzin defied all reified notion of the social and 
proposed a new notion of the social which is virtually same as the poststructuralist notion 
of language. The postmodern world is a world where symbols and meaning freely 
circulate within a system and have no apparent concrete anchoring in reality. The 
postmodern world consists o f systems o f representation, not systems o f real things. In the 
postmodern world, everything becomes what Denzin (1991a: 17) defined as cultural: 
“Culture refers to the taken-fbr-granted and problematic webs of significance and 
meaning that human beings produce and act on when they do things together.” Denzin 
did not believe that these meanings are neutral because he believed that they are “shaped 
and moulded by larger culture-and-meaning-making institutions o f society-at-large” 
(1991a: 17). In the postmodern world, the main institution to shape and mould meanings 
is electronically-mediated mass communications. The language o f electronically- 
mediated mass communications is similar to the Derridean notion of language as a 
process o f deferral and delay. The language of electronically-mediated mass 
communications does not represent the real but produce texts which are always parts of 
other texts. The texts contain contradictory features because there is no author to 
organize them coherently. Likewise, the culture of postmodern society that the language 
of electronically-mediated mass communications produces cannot avoid containing some 
contradictory features.
It seems difficult to find any recurrent or persistent patterns of social behaviors 
because culture as a text appears to be seamless: “A text is never a finite entity, with 
fixed boundaries, for a text always spills over into other texts” (Denzin 1991a: 25). 
Denzin implicitly wanted to make society like a text. But Denzin observed that there are
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many determinant signifîers to freeze a text. Socially, they are master signifiers such as 
gender, social class, race and ethnicity. The discourses of electronically-mediated mass 
communications produces a variety of texts that arrange gender, social class, race and 
ethnicity in a way to (re)produce an unequal system of the social.
Denzin also embraced the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the 
individual. Like other texts, the human being is constituted by a variety of discourses 
that electronically-mediated mass communications deliver. The discourses of 
electronically-mediated mass communications are mainly visual, which displace the 
earlier forms of literacy based on orality and the print media. The visual discourses of 
electronically-mediated mass communications introduce a new set of media logics and 
media formats;
These new formats alter the person’s relationships to tlie “real” and the 
technologies o f the real. They maintain a narrative and epistemological 
commitment to the simulational logic o f the third stage of the sign. They 
serve to tum the individual into a new cultural object; an object who 
produces cultural knowledge and cultural texts via the new informational 
formats (Denzin 1991b: 8).
Following Baudrillard, Denzin (1991b: vii) argued that “members o f the 
contemporary world are voyeurs adrift in a sea of symbols. They know and see 
themselves through cinema and television.” Thus, the individual in the postmodern 
world seems to be free o f any kinds of constraints. But Denzin did not forget to mention 
that new media formats are simultaneously new vehicles for the (re)production o f official 
ideology. The individual is (re)produced as the postmodern self whose ingredients “are 
given in three key cultural identities, those derived from the performances that define 
gender, social class, race and ethnicity. The patriarchal, and all too often racist 
contemporary cultures o f the world ideologically code the self and its meanings in terms
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of the meanings brought to these three cultural identities” (Denzin 1991b: viii). Visual 
discourses o f electronically-mediated mass communications are ideological in so far as 
they try to reify the subjects, giving some specific fixed essences to the subjects. The 
individual seems to freely enjoy the representation of mass media, but s/he is in fact 
caught in ideological discourses. Nevertheless, Denzin did not believe that the individual 
became a cultural dope because alongside media representation the individual lives in the 
worlds o f lived experiences. “The postmodern self,” thus, “has become a sign of itself, a 
double dramaturgical reflection anchored in media representations on the one side, and 
everyday life on the other” (Denzin 1991b: viii). Thus, the relation between media 
representations and lived experiences is an empirical, not ontological problem. In this 
sense, Denzin wanted to preserve the dialectical relationship between lived experiences 
and experiences mediated by mass communications such as TV and cinema.
Denzin also embraced the aesthetic challenge to sociological methodology. First of 
all, he refuted the modernist epistemology that assumed the privileged position o f 
absolute spectator: “any hint of objectivity predicated on the privileged position o f the 
absolute spectator must be relinquished” (Denzin 1991b: xi). Following Derrida, Denzin 
called this epistemology a metaphysics of presence that assumes that speech and writing 
are direct mirrors to thought, speakers and writers are fully present to themselves, and 
texts are pure. This realist epistemology is false because “things do not exist independent 
of the representations in social texts” (Denzin 1993b: 149). The logocentric search for a 
fixed presence is doomed to fail due to the nature of language as a process o f deferral and 
delay. Denzin distinguished two models o f interpretation in human disciplines: “The first 
seeks to decipher, unravel, and discover the truth, the origins, the centers, the essences.
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the inner structures, and the obdurate meanings that operate within and shape particular 
forms of experience, interactional sites, social texts, and social institutions” (Denzin 
1991b: 153). According to him, the classical and neo-classical version o f sociology as a 
science of society followed this model. The other model followed Derridean 
deconstruction: “It seeks.. to examine how current textual practices (including theory 
and research) reify structures, subjects, and social experiences. It proposes to deconstruct 
these practices so as to reveal how they keep in place a politically repressive picture of 
the social that is out o f touch with the world as it is lived, and experienced” (Denzin 
1991a: 153). Denzin actively embraced the second position because he wanted to make 
sociology civic sociology, “a form of radical democratic social practice” (Denzin 1996b: 
747).
Denzin extended deconstructive methods to cultural studies: “Viewing human 
experience as a social text, cultural studies attempts to deconstruct and unravel the 
ideological meanings that are coded into taken-fbr-granted meanings that circulate in 
everyday life” (1991a: 17). Denzin (1992: 81) defined cultural studies as follows: “Such 
an approach examines three interrelated problems: the production, distribution, 
consumption, and exchange o f  cultural objects and their meanings; the textual analysis of 
these objects, their meanings, and the practices that surround them; and the study of lived 
cultures and lived experiences which are shaped by the cultural meanings that circulate in 
everyday life.” The first problem was addressed in the Frankfurt School’s culture 
industry thesis; it involved “issues o f ideology and the political economy (semiosis) of 
signs, including how these signs are worded or photographed, where they circulate, who 
buys them, and so fbrth. The systems o f discourse that shape the meanings brought to
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any cultural object must also be examined” (Denzin 1992: 81). The second problem was 
dealt with in the early British cultural studies; it examines “how a text constitutes (hails) 
an individual as a subject in a particular ideological moment and site.” A variety of 
reading strategies such as feminist, semiotic, hermeneutic, deconstructive, psychoanalytic 
reading strategies can be used. The third problem was dealt with mainly in the British 
subculture studies and the American interactionist ethnographic studies; it examines 
“how interacting individuals connect their lives to these ideological texts and make sense 
of their experiences in terms o f  the texts’ meanings” (Denzin 1992: 82). What is 
important here is that Denzin has focused on the last two problems. In many articles, 
Denzin did excellent textual analyses using Derridean deconstructive reading and writing. 
Denzin has also focused on ethnographic works dealing with how interacting individuals 
connect their lived experiences to the cultural representations o f those experiences. By 
contrast, Denzin has relatively ignored the first problem. Even when Denzin addressed it, 
he did not study the political economy o f the sign. Rather, he focused on the systems o f 
discourse. For instance, in Hollywood Shot by Shot (1991), Denzin analyzed eight 
systems o f  discourses which shaped the presentation of the alcoholic, relatively ignoring 
the political economy. For Denzin, structures of meaning seem to be more important 
than structures of political economy. Later, Denzin (1996: xv) added two more problems 
to the definition of cultural studies: “those transnational cultural and representational 
practices which produce and reproduce new fonns o f control, desire and terror in 
everyday life”; and “new forms o f textual representations that illuminate and critique 
those practice.” In this new definition, Denzin emphasized the globalization o f the 
culture industry. Denzin recognized that through the global network, new global cultural
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forms and practices have begun to have impact on the local cultural forms and practices. 
But Denzin did not locate this globalization of the culture industry within the new 
development o f capitalism. In this sense, Denzin omitted to consider the political 
economy as a method, which I believe is a serious default in his cultural studies.
Denzin also embraced the aesthetic challenge to the normative dimension.
Embracing the aesthetic attack on the linear sense o f temporality, Denzin argued that 
“[e]ach historical moment can be taken on its own terms, and situated within its particular 
cultural, sexual, racial, social, moral, economic, and political order o f things” (Denzin 
1991b: 49). On morality, Denzin (1991b: 5) argued that “[c]ultural eclecticism has 
become a way of life.” People have increasingly become conspicuous consumers who try 
to verify their existence through diversified consumption. This way of life is 
contradictory to the liberal ideal of morality characterized by self-denying ethics. He 
defied this kind of conservative, commercialized version o f morality, and advocated “a 
radical, non-violent pluralism that represses no one and liberates all” (Denzin 1991b:
154). On politics, Denzin (1992: 161) criticized the Chicago School model o f democratic 
politics which privileges the heroic individuals who “create their own value through 
action and by assuming full responsibility for the consequences of their own conduct.” 
Social inequality and conflicts are seen as a result o f lack o f communication among 
people, and thus, they are considered to be eradicated if  there is full communication 
among people. There is a sharp division between the public and the private: the public 
sphere includes economy and politics while the private includes family, friendship, and 
leisure activities. The public is a field in which the firee and open communication of 
informed citizens construct the public good. The institutions o f civil society such as
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media, school, social sciences, etc. will present the knowledge necessary for the public to
make correct decisions in any problematic situation. The state is supposed to speak on
behalf of its citizens. But according to Denzin, this traditional politics has served as a
dominant ideology to perpetuate the status quo: “an economic division of labor organized
for private profit rather than human need; a gender-based division of labor ‘that separates
privatized childrearing firom recognized and remunerated work’; gender and race-
segmented paid labor markets that generate a marginalized underclass’; and a world
political economy and system of nation-states that ‘engage in crisis management in the
form of segmented social welfare concessions and subsidized war production” (Denzin
1992: 145). This politics is now outmoded; new politics is needed because of the
postmodern condition depicted above. Denzin (1996a: xxiii) described this new politics,
the post-pragmatic politics, as thus:
This post-pragmatism will dispense with the liberal desire to sustain a 
fiction between the public and the private. It will seek a radical 
democratization of gender, race and ethnic relations. It will deconstruct 
the ideological means that surround these relationships, including the 
“bourgeois concepts of individualism, interpersonal relations, education, 
productivist values and natures.” It will analyze the discursive and 
interactional forms these relationships assume within organizational, class 
and interpersonal structures. This post-pragmatism will critically attach 
itself to the postmodern family, the media and popular culture, cyberspace, 
science, protest movements, national identities, and race and gender as the 
critical sites for interpretive-political work. It will push hard at the 
boundaries and intersections of public science and the media, seeking 
science and the media as the dominant discourses of power and control in 
contemporary life.
3. Patricia T. Clough 
Like other interactionist postmodern sociologists, Clough accepted mainly
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poststructuralist postmodern social theory rather than critical postmodern social theory. 
The main reason is that Clough wanted to understand the modernist division between 
nature and technology, the body and the machine, the real and the virtual, the living and 
the inert “in terms o f differantial relationships rather than oppositional or even dialectical 
ones” (Clough 2000a: 11). Here no element is ontologically privileged. She seemed to 
believe that critical postmodern social theory followed the dialectical model o f base and 
superstructure. Compared to other interactionist postmodern sociologists, she has some 
peculiar characteristics. Firstly, Clough considered poststructuralism as an 
epistemological shift as well as an ontological shift: “against the usual treatment of 
poststmcturalism as provoking an epistemological shift, I want to suggest that 
poststmcturalism’s reach to the future o f thought is in its ontological implications” 
(Clough 2000a: S). This means that she clearly situated poststmcturalism within the age 
of teletechnology. In this sense, she followed the semiotic version o f the information 
society theory. Secondly, Clough connected poststmcturalism with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis when she explained the constitution of the subject identity and social 
reality. She claimed that the Oedipal complex functions as the dominant narrative logic 
informing the constmction of the subject’s identity and social reality. According to her, 
the Oedipal logic constitutes the masculine subject as a unified, rational, autonomous 
figure by replacing irrationality onto the figure of the other. This masculine subject 
constmcts the realist narrative through which the realist notion o f  social reality is 
produced. She wanted to deconstmct this Oedipal logic. In this sense, feminism is 
inherent in her project (see 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994). Lastly, Clough connected 
the change from modem to postmodern era with the change of theorizing writing from
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narrativities to teletechnologies: “while I would argue that our classical theorists gave 
lasting form to the discipline of sociology, as well as influenced every discipline o f the 
human sciences, and that they did so by theorizing the rise of industrialization and the 
mechanization o f the mode o f capitalist production, I also would argue that poststructural 
theorists have instigated a profound transformation of these same disciplines, by 
theorizing writing in terms o f information/communication media technologies, especially 
telecommunications. In this sense, poststructural thought has always threatened to 
displace classical sociological theory” (Clough 1996: 722-723).
Clough embraced the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion of the social.
Following Derrida, she rejected the traditional ontology o f presence. According to her,
the sociological notion o f the social is based on the traditional ontology of presence,
which is held by the Oedipal logic. The Oedipal logic endorses the traditional ontology
o f presence by producing realist narrative whose author is a unified, rational, autonomous
subject: “the desire of the realist narrative is an oedipal desire with which the past is
rewritten and the present is desired to the end(s) o f the subject’s self-knowledge, his
unified self-development” (Clough 1992a: 22). Against the traditional ontology of
presence, she presented preontology, or what Derrida called “hauntology.”
1 want to suggest that the ontological implications of poststmcturalism 
cross through the ontology o f presence, put origins and authenticity under 
erasure, making ontology impossible or only impossibly so. The shift in 
ontological perspective that poststmcturalism implies makes ontologizing 
impossible but imperative, necessary for thinking Being anew, that is, for 
bringing Being back to the opening o f ontology, to the preontological, and 
thereby inviting a rethinking of technicity as well. Poststmcturalism, I 
want to suggest, offers an ontological perspective in which nature and 
technology, the body and the machine, the real and the virtual, the living 
and the inert are given in diffêrantial relationships, each inextricable from 
the other” (Clough 2000a: 6).
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What is at stake is that Clough situated the ontology of presence within the modem
era and the preontology within the age of teletechnology or telecommunication.
By teletechnology I mean to refer to the realization o f technoscience, 
technoculture, and technonature—that is, to the full interface of computer 
technology and television, promising globalized networks of information 
and communication whereby layers of electronic images, texts, and sounds 
flow in real time, so that the speeds o f the territorialization, 
deterritorialization, and reterritorialization o f social spaces, as well as the 
adjustment to the vulnerabilities of exposure to media event-ness, are 
beyond any user’s mere decision to tum “it” on or off (Clough 2000a: 3).
Telecommunications challenges the sociological notion o f the social based on the
traditional ontology of presence. Telecommunications undermines the sociological
category of social stmcture: “telecommunications plays a large part in .. .the
deconstmction of the ‘principally co-ordinated space.. .inside which all traditional
sociological categories have been once securely allocated”’ (Clough 1996: 723). As a
result, telecommunications introduces a new notion o f the social based on preontology.
The sociological notion of the social is based on the sharp division between the public
and the private spheres, the family and the state, the economy and the state. Autonomy
of each institution is the core idea of the sociological notion o f the social. But with the
development of teletechnology, this notion of the social has lost its referent. The
boundaries become blurred. But this does not mean that the social disappeared.
What is expected instead is various reterritorializations in the 
reconfiguration of social spaces conditioned by the transnationalization of 
capital and the globalization of teletechnology, such that the transnational 
or the global are better understood as nodes in various networks alongside 
the local, the singular, the immanent. As the relevant distinction for 
political economy is no longer that between circulating capital and fixed 
capital but rather between capital effected by state apparatuses and capital 
effected by multinationals and globalization, the functions o f nation-states 
and the aims for their interrelationship in terms of a transnationalism are 
being revised (Clough 2000b: 384).
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This new notion of the social is very similar to one that the aesthetic assumes.
Clough (2000a: 4) argued that “matter-energy flows” are displacing the structural. Using 
Deleuze and Guattari’s terms “territorialization,” “deterritorialization, and 
“reterritorialization,” she valorized the aesthetic argument that the structural is in flux.
She saw the traditional notion o f the social in a negative light because she believed that 
the Oedipal logic “holds together the structural configuration of family and national 
ideologies, the state and civil society, and the private and the public spheres” (Clough 
2000a: 12). Clough (1996: 727) argued that telecommunications deconstructed the 
traditional notion of the social: “the difference between production and consumption has 
been displaced; so too the distinction between the private and public spheres is all but 
erased.”
Clough believed that the sociological notion of the subject, which derived out of 
modernist social-structural configuration of family and national ideologies, the state and 
the civil society, and the public and private spheres, lost its significance. The core idea is 
that the subject becomes what the aesthetic assumes, a free-flowing matter. Following 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, she argued that the modem subject as a unified, rational, 
autonomous being was constituted as the resolution of the Oedipus complex in which the 
position of the subject, masculinity or femininity, is fixed. In the Oedipal logic, the 
position of the masculine subject is fixed as being “a unified, rational, autonomous figure 
by displacing irrationality onto the figure of the other: the woman, the colonized subject, 
the raced subject, and the homosexual” (Clough 1996: 724). But the development of 
telecommunications undermines the Oedipal logic, and further, its discursive product, the 
modem masculine subject. According to Clough, the multiple, diffuse subjectivity o f
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telecommunications escapes the Oedipal logic: ‘The logic o f telecommunications is not 
narratively organized around a subject.. .The logic is not about before-during-after.
Given its seemingly endless flow of information and images, telecommunications is 
organized w ith .. .the logic of underexposed-exposed-overexposed”; “Its 
[telecommunications’] unconscious cannot be found in projecting a unified subject 
through displacement onto others. The unconscious o f telecommunications is more in the 
felt constancy of its flow of information and images. The unconscious of 
telecommunications is in the way its stills and extends time that is already consumed or 
socialized” (Clough 1996: 726, 728). The logic of underexposed-exposed-overexposed 
does not concern representation. Rather, what matters is “the capacity and speed of the 
circuits o f information in which the subject is no longer the centering (or decentering) 
figure and therefore no longer the site of an unconscious not-knowing” (Clough 1996: 
726). What is at stake here is that telecommunications functions as an agent o f 
socialization: “The socialization processes of the institutions once enclosed in the private 
sphere o f civil society have been generalized. Telecommunications can no longer be 
conceived as a technological extension of the human being that is engaged in the 
perfecting o f the subject, socializing and educating the individual. Rather, 
telecommunication increasingly submits socialization and education to the requirements 
of technology” (Clough 1996: 727). Telecommunications changed the nature of the 
subject: “the subject is only one point (or even multiple points) in the network of always 
already transmitted information” (Clough 1996: 727). In the Oedipal logic, the 
unconscious of the subject is located under the subject because the Oedipal logic 
displaces the lack o f the subject onto the other. But in the logic of underexposed-
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exposed-overexposed, “the unconscious is always already everywhere in the flow of 
images and information. Only the intensities of the flow can change, can be changed” 
(Clough 1996: 730).
Clough embraced the aesthetic challenge to sociological methodology, arguing that 
the traditional methodology o f sociology is imbued with narrativity intrinsically 
associated with the Oedipal logic. She criticized empirical science which masquerades 
itself as a factual representation of empirical reality by using the realist narrativity, a 
production of projected or displaced unconscious desire. She held that “all factual 
representations of empirical reality, even statistical representations, are narratively 
constructed” (Clough 1992a: 2). All narratives, including the scientific one, conceal 
within them the writing subject’s unconscious desire which desires to disavow the writing 
subject’s loss of the mother and to fix its sexual identity through the crude anatomical 
opposition. Therefore, reality outside the narrative does not exist, nor does factual or 
neutral reality exist outside the narrative; all realities written by narratives are sexual. 
Clough (1992a: 4) argued that the researcher’s authority as an author is fantasmatically 
constructed by “defensive fantasies in which a coherence of identity is imagined in order 
to disavow and supplement the failure o f identity.” According to her, narrativity 
intrinsically associated with the Oedipal logic has dominated the human sciences 
including sociology: “[n]arrative has functioned.. .to constitute the authorial subject as a 
unified, rational, autonomous figure by displacing irrationality onto the figure of the 
other: the woman, the colonized subject, the raced subject, and the homosexual” (1996: 
724).
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Clough sought to find anti-Oedipal or pre-Oedipal narrativity in telecommunications 
because she believed that telecommunications erupts the Oedipal narrativity. She seemed 
to suggest to follow the pre- or anti-Oedipal logic o f telecommunications. Writing 
experiments such as the ones of Carolyn Ellis, Laurel Richardson, and Allen Shelton are 
strategies to re-find the social in the telecommunications age. Their writings take 
sociology into the “network imagination of telecommunications.” In a sense, they mimic 
the logic of telecommunications which is characterized by the following: “The personal 
story does not begin in order to end with the unified, autonomous, rational subject all of 
one piece. The personal story is always a breached autobiographical form”; “Cuts in the 
writing allow for play with the timing of the appearance and disappearance of images and 
information, the switching on and off of representations, subjects and voices, histories, 
events and situations. The particular, the local, or the contingent are evoked without the 
illusion that their appearance makes the global disappear once and for all” (Clough 1996: 
729). She was very cautious when she evaluated experimental writing. Sociology has 
usually followed the unconscious of the human sciences, but postmodern critique of 
sociology and the development of telecommunications technologies challenged 
sociology’s usual way o f defining/writing the social. The link of power and knowledge 
becomes obvious, and sociologists’ self-reflexivity based on the unified, autonomous, 
rational subject or on scientific community is no longer available. What should 
sociologists do? Just keep on with conventional writing? Or follow the logic of 
telecommunications? In this dilemma, experimental writing can be seen as a transitional 
alternative to re-find the social. Clough (1996: 730) argued as follows: “I propose that 
we focus on these writings because they are symptomatic o f our interregnum between the
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past of the human sciences and the future o f what Seidman calls the postdisciplinary 
discourses o f culture. Having already abandoned the science/nonscience binary, while 
transgressing the border separating the empirical conventions of the social sciences from 
the literary and the rhetorical, these writings demand a new form of criticism.” Like 
other postmodern sociologists, Clough proposed a transdisciplinary studies which 
combines social science and literary criticism. Literary criticism is significant when it 
makes apparent the entanglement of desire, power, and academic discourse. She argued 
that African-American feminists. Third World feminists, feminist post-colonial critics, 
and queer theorists inform us that academic discourse is interwoven with an author’s 
unconscious desire to disavow an author’s loss and to control/shape the world according 
to an author’s ideal unified imago at the cost o f other differences of race, class, sexuality, 
ethnicity, nationality, and gender. These studies theorize across the border of social 
science and literary criticism in order to reclaim previously assimilated cultural histories 
as well as revise notions of fantasy and unconscious desire.
Clough proposed a deconstructive reading (and writing) as a main method, which is 
based on new “understanding of all texts as deployments or distributions o f persons, 
places, events, and perspectives in relations o f power/knowledge” (Clough 1992a: 132). 
She tried to deconstruct canonical texts which utilized realist narrativity that combines 
authorized knowledge with a fantasy o f a unified masculine subject identity. The 
masculine author is sexually biased, but it masquerades itself as a unified subject who 
factually represents the empirical reality. The aim of Clough’s strategy is to deconstruct 
this fantasmatic subject and to analyze how the text deploys or distributes persons, 
places, events, and perspectives in relations o f power/knowledge.
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Clough also embraced the aesthetic challenge to the normative dimension. The core 
idea is to escape the Oedipal logic. Clough attacked the linear notion of temporality, 
which is endorsed by the Oedipal logic, and also criticized the self-denying or self­
restraining morality, which is driven by the unconscious desire to disavow the subject’s 
loss and to fantasmatically construct its unified imago at the cost o f others. She also 
rejected traditional politics based on essentialist identity, attacking the modernist 
assumption that real experiences of real people exist outside of discourse. From this 
perspective, she criticized even modem feminist politics for utilizing the identity politics 
that argues that all members o f the same oppressed group share a common identity.
Thus, she aimed to deconstruct identity politics, investigating how many identities are 
discursively produced in relation to hegemonic discourses. For instance, the meanings of 
women are discursively produced under specific conditions, and thus, they can be 
changed. In this sense, she concentrated on textual politics. She held that hegemonic 
discourses enframe the psychic structure of the subject, regulate the sense o f reality for 
the subject, and establish texts (deployments or distributions o f persons, places, events, 
and perspectives in relations o f power/knowledge) through (historically) conflating 
themselves with realist narrativity. In this sense, discourse is a site for the production of 
knowledge/power. Thus, deconstructive reading of hegemonic discourses also means an 
effort to rearrange a certain political, economical arrangement.
Critics o f Postmodern Sociology 
Generally speaking, mainstream American sociology represented by positivistic 
sociology and functionalist sociology has ignored the aesthetic challenge to the
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fundamental assumptions o f modem American sociology. Mainstream American 
sociology has been busy in making sociology a genuine science of humanity and society. 
But some mainstream American sociologists began to be interested in the aesthetic 
challenge. But their interest in the aesthetic challenge was different from one of 
postmodem American sociologists who embraced the aesthetic challenge in order to 
broaden the horizon o f sociology. Unlike them, some mainstream American sociologists 
tried to defend modem American sociology as a genuine science of humanity and society 
against the aesthetic challenge. These mainstream American sociologists believed that 
the new condition called the postmodem could be investigated through traditional 
methodologies. Thus, according to them, there is no need to invent new strategies to 
study the postmodem. In what follows, I will briefly discuss how these mainstream 
American sociologists responded to the aesthetic challenge. Jeffrey Alexander will be 
considered as an exemplar o f functionalist sociology. Jonathan Tumer will be thought as 
an exemplar of positivistic sociology.
1. Jeffrey Alexander
Functionalist sociology represented by Parsons’ functionalism had been dead until 
neofunctionalism emerged in the midst of 1980s. Jeffrey Alexander played an important 
role in revitalizing functionalist sociology. Through Theoretical Logic in Sociology' 
(1982) and Neofunctionalism (1985), Alexander presented “multidimensionality” as the 
criterion of good sociological theory, elaborating on Parsons’ functionalism. Like 
Parsons who wanted to make the analytic reference, Alexander used the idea of 
equilibrium as a reference point. Alexander believed that both the social and the
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individual are multidimensional and thus sociological inquiry also should be 
multidimensional. Thus, what is at stake is to construct a “general theory” to grasp this 
multidimensional nature o f the social and the individual.
Alexander’s general theory embraced the transcendental version of the theoretical
which emphasizes the capacity o f the mind to ascend from the illusory world o f the
particulars to the real world of the universals. As Alexander (1992: 325) put it in a
modest tone: “To advocate the necessity for general theory is to uphold the possibility of
universal thought. Universalism rests upon the capacity of actors to decenter themselves,
to understand that the world does not revolve around themselves, that they are not its
creators, that they can study ‘it’ in a relatively personal way.” He wanted to make
sociological theory a general theory:
Sociological theory can be legitimate and socially important enterprise 
only if  it can make a claim to reason.. To make a claim to reason.. .is to 
suggest that sociological theory can achieve a perspective on society 
which is more extensive and more general than the theorist’s particular 
lifeworld and the particular perspective of his or her social group. If this 
is not possible, there is no such tiling as theory, whether social or 
sociological (Alexander 1991: 147).
Then, how can a sociologist transcend his/her own particular perspective so as to
form more extensive and general theory? Alexander recognized that theory can not
achieve “the view from nowhere.” Nevertheless, Alexander (1991: 147) argued that
theory achieves “a view from ‘somewhere else,’ a place that is neither the theorist’s own
personal world nor the world entirely outside.” Alexander (1991:147-148) described
“somewhere else” as follows:
In the life o f the university, this place is sustained by the intellectual 
disciplines, which exert stringent demands for the impersonal expression 
o f personal commitments that Weber called value-rationality. These 
disciplines have been created historically by what can be called broadly
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the tradition o f reason, which has developed very gradually and unevenly 
and in many different civilizations over thousands o f years. In 
microsociological terms, this tradition is sustained by the decentering of 
moral and cognitive understanding that underlies socialization, as Piaget 
and Parsons have shown. In macrsociological terms, the tradition of 
reason is institutionalized when civil society guarantees universal rights to 
particular groups according to the rule of an impersonal law.
Alexander considered the capacity to achieve “somewhere else” as an index of 
maturity in both the individual (micro level) and civilization (macro level). The earlier 
the individual, the more s/he is centered. Likewise, “The earlier the human society, the 
more its members experience centeredness” (Alexander 1992: 325). By contrast, the 
more mature the individual, the more decentered s/he is. Likewise, the later the human 
society, the more its members experience decenteredness. In this sense, decentering 
one’s own self and own civilization is an index o f maturity because it enables us to go 
beyond our own particular positions and to comprehend the world and self in a 
universalistic and impersonal way. Alexander considered positivism and empiricism as 
an extreme version of decentering and Romanticism and idealism as an extreme version 
of recentering. Positivism and empiricism eliminated reason, arguing that scientists 
experience themselves as mirroring nature. He called this “absent reason.” Alexander 
posited poststructuralism as a contemporary extension of neo-romantic countermovement 
against this absent reason, originating from Romanticism and idealism in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The common feature o f this countermovement is its refusal of 
universalism or the value o f general theory and its contextualism whose epistemological 
implication is conventionalism and skepticism. Alexander opposed both positivism and 
empiricism on the one hand, and contextualism on the other hand.
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With this view on general theory, Alexander responded to the aesthetic challenge to 
American sociology. Alexander did not accept a positivist position that scientific 
knowledge is exempt from any ideological implication. This argument is understanable 
because Alexander did not use the term ideology as the Marxian notion o f false 
consciousness. Rather, it is a Geertzian notion o f ideology which refers to a symbolic 
system that functions to interpret the world in a manner that provides meaning and 
motivation. Alexander distinguished four distinctive theoretical-cum-ideological periods 
in postwar thought. First is modernization theory and romantic liberalism, which covers 
the period from end o f World War II to later 1960s. Modernization theory is a general 
theory in as far as it presented a general claim that “there are functional not merely 
idealistic exigencies that push social systems toward democracy, markets, and the 
universalization of culture, and that shifts toward ‘modernity’ in any subsystem create 
considerable pressures on the others to respond in a complementary way” (Alexander 
1995: 11). Modernization theory is an ideology insofar as it endorsed romantic liberalism 
which emphasizes real individuals and incremental change over a collective historical 
subject and revolutionary change. Second is antimodemization theory and heroic 
radicalism, which covers the period from later 1960s to end of 1970s. Antimodemization 
theory is a general theory in as far as it presented a general claim that serious “reality 
problems” betray modernization theory. Antimodemization theory is an ideology in as 
far as it endorsed heroic radicalism which emphasized a collective historical subject and 
revolutionary change over real individuals and incremental change. Third is postmodern 
theory and comic detachment, which covers the period from early 1980s to mid-1990s. 
Postmodern theory is a  general theory in as far as it produced new middle range models
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of culture, science and epistemology, social action, gender and family relations, and 
economic life. Postmodern theory is an ideology in as far as it endorsed comic 
detachment: “Because good and evil cannot be parsed, the actors—protagonists and 
antagonists—are on the same moral level, and the audience, rather than being 
normatively or emotionally involved, can sit back and be amused” (Alexander 1995: 27). 
Alexander (1995:29) argued that “the departure from postmodernism has already 
begun.” An upcoming theoretical-cum-ideological period is neo-modemization or 
reconvergence theory and the combination o f the narrative forms o f its predecessors. 
Neo-modemization or reconvergence theory is an heir of early modernization theory. 
Neo-modemism is an ideology as far as it reinflated the emancipatory narrative o f the 
market. Alexander was basically positive to this transformation, but under the condition 
that we should avoid the totalizing conceit: “Institutional stmctures like democracy, law, 
and market are functional requisites if  certain social competencies are to be achieved and 
certain resources to be acquired; they are not, however, either historical inevitabilities or 
linear outcomes, nor are they social panaceas for the problems of non economic 
subsystems or groups” (Alexander 1995:46).
As we know from what we have discussed so far, Alexander did not accept the 
aesthetic challenge to American sociology. On the aesthetic challenge to the sociological 
notion of the social, he argued that “[m]odemization theory (e.g. Parsons 1964) stipulated 
that great civilizations of the world would converge towards the institutional and cultural 
configurations of Westem society. Certainly we are wimessing something very much 
like this process today, and the enthusiasm it has generated is hardly imposed by Westem 
domination” (Alexander 1995:42). He rarely talked about the aesthetic challenge to the
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sociological notion of the individual. He did not seem to be interested in how mass 
communications influence the construction of the self and social interaction. On the 
aesthetic challenge to the sociological methods, Alexander did not accept the crisis of 
representation because he believed that Westem civilization has developed universal 
criteria. In this sense, he defended scientific sociology: “one must distinguish between 
different kinds of narratives—between stories that are literary and political, on the one 
hand, and scientific on the other. Science differs from other narratives because it 
commits the success of its story to the criterion o f truth. For every scientific narrative we 
are compelled to ask, “Do we know whether it is true?” (Alexander 1991: 149). 
Alexander also did not agree with postmodernists who claim that we lost the sense of 
temporality. Alexander pointed out that “[e]very historical period needs a narrative that 
defines its past in terms of the present, and suggests a future that is fundamentally 
different, and typically ‘even better,’ than contemporary time” (Alexander 1995:10). 
Alexander did not believe in the inevitable linear development of history, but still 
believed that the human race has moved toward market and democracy. On morality, 
Alexander accused postmodemism of being fatalistic, private, particularistic, fragmented, 
and local. Alexander believed that Westem civilization had achieved universal morality 
that transcends fatalistic, private, particularistic, fragmented, and local morality. On 
politics, Alexander endorsed liberalism equipped with institutional stmctures such as 
democracy, law, and market.
2. Jonathan Tumer
Since the 1980s, positivistic sociology has flourished independent of the influence o f
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postmodernism. Especially, in the course o f 1980s rational choice theory emerged as a 
dominant version of positivistic sociology. The core idea of positivistic sociology is to 
create a natural science of society. Most positivistic sociologists did not take the 
aesthetic challenge to American sociology seriously. They usually ignored it. But some 
o f them began to think postmodemism seriously. Jonathan Tumer is one of the 
representatives. Tumer (1985, 1990, 1992) actively defended positivism. His main aim 
was to tum sociology into precise science like the natural sciences. For this, pre- or non- 
scientific elements should be diminished in sociology. According to Tumer, there are 
four basic approaches to building sociological theory; metatheorizing schemes, analytical 
schemes, propositional schemes, and modeling schemes. Metatheorizing schemes are 
concemed with “the basic presuppositions that should guide theoretical activity.. .What 
is the nature of human activity, human interaction, human organization? What is the most 
appropriate set of procedures for developing theory and what kind of theory is possible? 
V/hat are the central issues or critical problems on which sociological theory should 
concentrate? And so on” (Tumer 1992:167). Metatheorizing schemes also address a 
history of ideas associated with classical sociologists. According to Tumer (1992: 168), 
metatheorizing “is not theory and it is not easily used in actual theorizing.” Analytical 
schemes involve “the constmction of abstract systems o f categories that presumably 
denote key properties of the universe and cmcial relations among these properties” 
(Tumer 1992: 168). Analytical schemes include two basic approaches: naturalistic 
analytical schemes and sensitizing analytical schemes. Naturalistic analytic schemes 
assume that “the ordering of concepts in the scheme represents an ‘analytic accentuation’ 
o f the ordering o f the universe; as a consequence of this isomorphism, explanation is
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usually seen as involving the discovery o f the lace o f an empirical event in the scheme” 
(Tumer 1992: 168). Sensitizing analytic schemes argue that “the system of concepts can 
only be sensitizing, and at best, can only provide general guidelines for interpreting 
empirical events” (Tumer 1992:168-169). Propositional schemes “revolve around 
statements that connect variables to one another. That is, propositions state the form of 
the relation between two or more variable properties o f the social universe” (Tumer 
1992: 169). Propositional schemes include three types: axiomatic, formal, and empirical. 
Axiomatic theorizing “involves deductions, in terms o f a precise calculus, from abstract 
axioms that contain precisely defined concepts to an empirical event. Explanation 
consists of determining if  an empirical event is ‘covered’ by one or more axioms”
(Tumer 1992: 169). Formal theorizing is “watered-down axiomatic theorizing” in which 
abstract laws are articulated and deductions to empirical events are made. In forma 
theorizing, “[ejxplantion consists of visualizing an empirical event as an instance or 
manifestation of the more abstract law” (Tumer 1992:169-170). Empirical theorizing 
uses empirical generalization as a kind of axiom. Finally, modeling schemes use a visual 
picture for mapping properties o f the social universe and their relations. Modeling 
schemes include abstract-analytic models and empirical-causal models: “Abstract- 
analytical models develop context-free concepts” and “represent their relations in a visual 
picture”; “Empirical-causal models are usually statements o f correlation among measured 
variables, ordered in a linear and temporal sequence” (Tumer 1992: 171).
Tumer (1992: 174) criticized naturalistic analytical schemes and metatheorizing for 
tending “to be too philosophical and detached from the actual workings of the world. 
They become overly reified and either concemed with their architecture or obsessed with
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their scholastic capacity to ‘resolve’ philosophical issues.” Tumer (1992: 172) argued
that the best approach to theory-building in sociology is “a combination o f sensitizing
analytical schemes, abstract formal propositions, and analytical models.” To Tumer, this
best approach is positivism as defined below:
Start with sensitizing schemes, propositions, and models, and only then 
move on to the formal collection o f data or to metatheorizing and scheme- 
building. In this way, it will be possible to generate scientific knowledge 
about the social universe, with the result that sociology can take its place 
among the natural sciences (Tumer 1992: 175).
Tumer was very optimistic about the development of positivist sociology as true
science. In fact, this article of 1992 was a part of Postmodernism and Social Theory: The
Debate over General Theory edited by Steven Seidman and David G. Wagner. In this
article, Tumer did not mention even a word about postmodemism. By 1992, Tumer still
maintained his confidence in positivist sociology, which had been atmounced in 1990.
There is very creative and synthetic work currently being done at both the 
micro and macro level, as well as in efforts to link these. Most o f this 
work builds on the early masters, employs formalism, and states 
propositions that are testable. Moreover, I sense that positivistic sociology 
is on the verge of developing laws and models that are equivalent o f those 
in the natural sciences and that will bring us closer to Comte’s original 
dream.. The relativistic, solipsistic, particularistic, anti-positivistic, and 
meta-istic (to invent a word) character of theory is no longer a challenge to 
debate. Increasingly, it is something to be ignored (Tumer 1990: 388- 
389).
But this optimistic hope has not come tme. As we know, postmodemism, which 
might be characterized by being relativistic, solipsistic, particularistic, anti-positivistic, 
and meta-istic, has been massively influential within the social sciences and humanities. 
Tumer could not ignore postmodemism any more, but he could not fully accept it. 
Instead, Tumer tried to rewrite postmodemism in terms o f positivist Sociology-
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In “A Formalization of Postmodern Theory” (Allan and Tumer 2000), Tumer tried to 
do this task. Tumer (365) clearly claimed that “our goal is to provide an example of what 
can be done from a positivistic point o f view.” Following Jameson, Tumer (365) defined 
social postmodemism as “a critical form o f  theorizing that is concemed with the unique 
problems that are associated with culture and subjectivity in late capitalist societies." He 
rightly pointed out that all postmodemists address two issues of culture and subjects. 
According to his view on positivism, he started with sensitizing schemes about two issues 
o f culture and subjects, which most postmodem theorists have provided: increasing 
importance of culture, destabilization and dereification of culture, increasing significance 
of the self, and decreasing viability o f the individual subject. And then, he tried to 
translate these postmodemists’ claims into “propositions that highlight the key forces that 
are hypothesized to be part of a ‘postmodem condition’” (364). He did this job well. 
Postmodernists’ claims are changed into propositions whose empirical plausibility seems 
to be assessable. He did not assess the empirical plausibility of each proposition because 
it is beyond the scope of a single article. Rather, he hoped that his work would stimulate 
others to refine the propositions and to bring data to bear on the claims of postmodem 
theory.
Nevertheless, Tumer (381) tried to present a preliminary assessment by outlining the 
postmodem condition in a visual picture as follows.
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Advanced Capitalism The Consequences
High volume/velocity/scope Increased significance o f cultural
markets fueled by advertising over material structures
Increased commodification o f Detachment o f culture from groups.
objects, people, and most local time and place
importantly, cultural symbols
Destabilization o f cultural symbols
Rapid movement and and their capacity to provide
déconcentration o f capital ------ ► meanings
Compression o f time and space via Increased salience o f the individual
transportation and communication over groups and collectivities
technologies
Increased reflexivity o f self
Dominance o f technologies o f
reproduction (i.e., imaging Decreased viability, stability, and
technologies) over technologies o f coherence o f self
production
According to Turner, postmodern theory assumed that the forces on the left cause the 
outcomes listed on the right. He pointed cut that postmodemism is strongest “when the 
forces on the left are highlighted, because these do indeed seem to be empirically true" 
(380). But he suspected “whether the outcomes listed on the right of the figure are 
empirically true" (381) even though postmodemists believed that the outcomes are 
inevitable. Thus, he suggested that fi'om a positivist’s point of view these outcomes 
should “be considered hypotheses that have varying degrees of plausibility but that have 
not been systematically examined empirically” (381). Tumer (381) asked, “Are these 
empirically plausible? And, if so, to what degree?” He answered that we need more 
data.
Tumer rarely talked about postmodem challenge to sociological methodologies 
because he believed that the positivist methodology he outlined is still the best way to
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study postmodern condition. He also did not pay attention to the normative implication 
of postmodemism, which is in a sense inevitable because positivist inquiry, by nature, 
does not care about ethics and politics. To positivist inquiry, ethics and politics are pre- 
or un-scientific assumptions which should be diminished in science.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS: FURTHER IMPLICATION OF 
POSTMODERN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 
Some scholars consider postmodemism to be a fad of the 1980s (Alexander 1995; 
Callinicos 1990; Faberman 1991; Frow 1995; Huber 1995; Rosenau 1992). But I believe 
that postmodemism is more than a fad and I agree with some sociologists’ argiunent that 
a postmodem perspective exhibits striking parallels with the project of classical European 
sociology (Dickens and Fontana 1992: 10-11; Smart 1993: 28; Wagner 1994: vix). 
Embracing their arguments. I point out some parallels between postmodem social theory 
and classical European sociology in terms of three dimensions: ontology, epistemology, 
and ethics/politics.
First is the ontological dimension. On the macro level, in the classical era, market 
economy or capitalism began to emerge with the rise of the nation-state and in 
postmodern era, global market system has emerged with the development of multi-or 
trans-national organizations. On the micro level in the classical era modem individuals, 
who were freed from traditional institutions such as extended family. Catholic Church, 
the feudal economy, and monarchy, were emerging. These new individuals were mainly 
the property less/rootless masses. In the postmodem era, the postmodern subjects, who 
are freed from any kind o f fixed sources of identity such as class, age, gender, race.
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ethnicity, and sexual orientation, have emerged mainly due to the dedifferenting impact 
of electronically-mediated media on the social and the individual.
Second is the epistemological dimension. In the classical era, there was a strong 
sense of epistemological break with the traditional epistemology. With regard to the 
position to truth claims, the scientific epistemology was struggling with the religious 
epistemology. In the postmodern era, there is also a strong sense o f epistemological 
break with the modernist epistemology. With regard to the position to truth claims, the 
non-positivist, non-foimdational epistemology is struggling with the positivistic 
epistemology. In the classical era, new scientific methods to study society were 
struggling with the traditional ones. In the postmodern era, multidisciplinary approaches 
to society are struggling with the disciplinary approach.
Third is the normative dimension. In the classical era, ethics and politics based on 
alleged universal laws were struggling with traditional ethics and politics based on the 
Catholic God. One of the main interests o f the classical era was how to homogenize the 
newly emerging propertyless/rootless masses into useful laborers. With regard to this, 
liberalism and communism struggled with each other. Liberalism wanted to base its 
ethics and politics on the rational individual while communism strove to ground its ethics 
and politics on the collectively shared values. The question was whether rationality was 
individual or collective. In the postmodern era, ethics and politics based on differences 
are struggling with modernist ethics and politics based on sameness. One of the main 
concerns of postmodern ethics and politics was how to live together without 
repressing/silencing/marginalizing the differences.
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In this sense, the postmodern perspective or situation invited sociology. But 
American sociology was quite unwilling to accept this invitation. American sociologists 
hardly paid attention to postmodern debates until the mid-1980s. Up till the early 1980s 
the debate on postmodemism remained almost exclusively confined to more humanist- 
oriented sciences. Instead of sociologists, English literary critics and artists were able to 
be sensitive to the structural transformation of Westem societies. In a sense, English 
literature became more sociological than sociology. One of the main reasons for this 
irony might be the deadlock o f imagination in which American sociology was kept 
because it has been so obsessed with the issue of how to make sociology a science. The 
primary model o f science that modem American sociology adopted was the technically 
practical. It has become clear that the technically practical derived from the nineteenth- 
century thermodynamics. Lyotard (1984: 55) explained this in terms of Laplace’s fiction 
of the demon: “he [the demon] knows all o f the variables determining the state of the 
universe at a moment t, and can thus predict its state at a moment t’ > t. This fiction is 
sustained by the principle that physical systems, including the system of systems called 
the universe, follow regular pattems, with the result that their evolution traces a regular 
path and gives rise to ‘normal’ continuous functions (and to futurology...).” As Lyotard 
pointed out, the advent of quantum theory and microphysics has made this model 
obsolete. But mainstream American sociology has stuck to this model. This fixation to 
the old model is partly explained by the demands o f the state and large corporations 
which funded sociologists. The main concern of the funding agencies was how to 
administrate or discipline people in the name of scientific efficiency. American 
sociology began to bloom institutionally right after it embraced the technically practical
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as the main model of sociology, especially after World War II (see Tumer and Tumer 
1990). But the cost was very high. American sociology has been shut off from the “real 
world.” Instead of reading/writing the “real” change of America, American sociology 
has striven to achieve the analytic synthesis of narrowly-oriented empirical data. 
Following the ideal of natural science proposed by the technically practical, American 
sociology has tried to create a natural science of society. In addition, American sociology 
has striven to establish the grand abstract system of theory deduced from some 
fundamental axioms. Embracing the transcendentalist version of the theoretical, 
functionalist sociology has been preoccupied with a series of highly abstract issues such 
as the micro-macro link, the interrelationship between agency and structure, action and 
order, and stmctme and culture (see Seidman 1994). These two mainstream trends of 
American sociology has repressed and marginalized other voices such as the morally 
practical and the aesthetic, resulting in the poverty of imagination in American sociology.
While American sociology has been obsessed with this scientific project, French 
intellectuals were busy transgressing the traditional boundaries o f the theoretical, the 
practical, and the aesthetic. Why did new thoughts such as structuralism, 
poststmcturalism, and postmodemism originate and develop in Europe and not in 
America? I draw a hint from Seidman (1994: 195): “In France, we look less to the 
narrow academic disciplines o f the social sciences to locate the major breakthroughs in 
the human studies than to broader movements o f thought that have an interdisciplinary, 
public character.” I believe that the core of French thought came from the aesthetic 
model o f language. In the New French social theory, poststructuralist linguistics has 
replaced the nineteenth-centiuy thermodynamics model, liquidating the validity o f the
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notion of a stable system and opening up an indeterminate micro-world. As 
poststructmalist postmodern social theorists have shown, poststructuralist linguistics is 
successful at analyzing micropolitics focusing on mass culture, sexuality, subjectivity, 
desire, power, narrativity, textuality, etc.
American sociology has rarely paid attention to these issues because they are difficult 
to quantify. In this sense, the aesthetic challenge might be thought to be a new 
opportunity for American sociology. As I have shown in chapter 5, postmodern 
American sociology has embraced this aesthetic challenge fairly well, by acknowledging 
that linguistic forms are constitutive of culture, sexuality, subjectivity, desire, power, etc. 
Postmodern American sociology accepted that linguistic forms create the conditions that 
locate the social inside the social texts, not within the institutions. The main reason is 
that traditional institutions lost their former power to constitute the social. Instead, free- 
floating images produced by electronically-mediated mass communications are in a 
ceaseless double process o f creation and destruction of the social in the texts. As a result, 
textual politics gained power: if we want to change how things are, we must change how 
things are written.
I believe that this position has some merit, but I would like to add one thing that 
postmodern American sociology seems to relatively ignore. Following poststructuralist 
postmodern social theory, interactionist postmodern American sociology over­
emphasizes the textual aspect of the social. Poststructuralist postmodern social theory is 
usually highly abstract; it tends to overemphasize the polysémie nature of texts, erasing 
the economic and social contexts in which texts are produced, distributed, consumed, and 
reproduced. As a result, poststructuralist postmodern social theory is highly textual or
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cultural rather than material or institutional. Interactionist postmodern sociology tends to 
repeat this fallacy. O f course, only a few people would deny that the social has become 
cultural or textual in a postmodern era. Even positivistic sociologist such as Jonathan 
Tumer recognized it as I have shown in the previous chapter. But this would not 
necessarily mean that institutional analysis is out-of-date because only a quite few people 
could also ignore the Marxist argiunent that the main force of changing the social into the 
cultural is the movement o f capital. As Jameson (1984b: xx) put it: “The dynamic of 
perpetual change is, as Marx showed in the Manifesto, not some alien rhythm within 
capital—a rhythm specific to those noninstrumental activities that are art and science— 
but rather is the very ‘permanent revolution’ o f capitalist production itself.” Capital has 
accumulated until it has become an image, which seems to move according to the logic of 
poststructuralist linguistics. But this would not mean that we don’t have to study 
institutional change which made capital into an image.
Critical postmodern sociology tries to fill this gap, but it tends to emphasize only one 
aspect of Marxist political economy. First o f all, Marxist political economy has a special 
way of addressing a large-scale institutional change by tracing the change of 
accumulation of capital (for instance, see Brenner 1998; Mandel 1975). Marxist political 
economy emphasizes the crisis and change inherent in capitalism, seeing capital as value 
looking for accretion, for surplus-value. The basic drive of capitalism is to accumulate 
capital: “what characterizes capitalism is precisely the compulsion to accumulate, that is 
‘enlarged reproduction’” (Mandel 1990: 61). Marx saw the inevitability of periodic 
crises of overproduction mainly due to the fact that “the owners o f the means of 
production are organized separate firms which compete with each other for shares o f the
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market” (Mandel 1990: 82). Thus, Marxist political economy investigates how the mode 
of accumulation o f capital changes over time.
Marxist political economy also emphasizes the importance of the historical and 
political economic contexts in which the cultural or the textual is produced, distributed, 
consumed, and reproduced because it believes that the historical and political economic 
contexts determine the way that the cultural or the textual is produced, distributed, 
consumed, and reproduced.
Critical postmodern sociology has relatively ignored the first aspect of political 
economy while emphasizing the second aspect. I doubt it is possible to situate the 
cultural within certain historical and political economic contexts without investigating the 
new mode o f acciunulation of capital. But critical postmodern sociology, which I 
presented in the previous chapter, has not provided a systematic analysis o f a new mode 
of accumulation o f capital. I believe that critical postmodern sociology should integrate 
the two aspects o f political economy.
Many have argued that multi- or trans-disciplinary or multiperspectival approaches 
are needed in postmodern era. I believe that the core of these approaches is the synthesis 
of poststructuralist linguistics and Marxist political economy. I claim that this synthesis 
does not come from an abstract methodological interest in integrating the micro and the 
macro. Rather, it comes from the sensibility that the postmodern world is not only a 
world of play o f differences, but also a Sadean world in which the strong exploits the 
weak ever efficiently. Poststructuralist linguistics is excellent at analyzing the 
aestheticized world o f everyday life, but is relatively weak at investigating the 
institutionally-structured social injustice. Political economy situates the structured social
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injustice within the economic and social contexts in which it is produced, distributed, 
consumed, and reproduced. In this sense, Marxist political economy is especially needed 
for analyzing the movement of capital which brings out a world full of tyranny and 
injustice. I hope that postmodern American sociology extends its horizon so as to be 
sensitive to the real issue of social injustice by utilizing both poststructuralist linguistics 
and political economy.
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